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 In this study, the researcher tested two theoretical models of justice in the context 
of child protection proceedings. Participants read a case file describing a hypothetical 
child neglect case. The file included the court petition, the caseworker’s court report, a 
summary of the protective custody hearing, and the judge’s final order. Within the case 
file, the researcher manipulated four variables: procedural treatment, interpersonal 
treatment, severity of child neglect, and assigned role (judge or parent). Results of 
confirmatory factor analyses suggested that a four-factor model of justice judgments best 
fit the data. Consistent with the organizational justice approach (Colquitt, 2001) the four 
latent justice factors were: procedural, distributive, interpersonal, and informational. 
Distributive justice had the strongest relationship to measured justice outcomes, 
significantly predicting decision satisfaction, leader evaluation, and predicted legal 
compliance. The results did not support the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 
2003) in that perceptions of social identity did not mediate the relationships between 
procedural justice judgments and predicted legal compliance. Both severity of neglect 
and assigned decision-making role weakly moderated the relationships between justice 
judgments and outcomes. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for 
justice theory and child protection practice. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Since the late 1970s, psychologists have studied the effects of decision-making 
procedures on decision recipients. Starting with the seminal work of Thibaut & Walker 
(1975), we have known that perceptions of procedures can have just as much an impact 
on reactions to decisions as the decisions themselves. In fact, subsequent research has 
consistently demonstrated that procedural justice has a stronger impact on attitudes and 
behaviors than distributive justice in many contexts (e.g., Bettencourt, Brown, & 
MacKenzie, 2005; Tyler, 1984, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler, Casper, & Fisher, 
1989; Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw, 1985).  
Research on procedural justice can be divided into two overlapping categories, 
one aimed at uncovering the antecedents of justice and the other aimed at uncovering the 
consequences (Ambrose, 2002). Research on the antecedents of justice has been largely 
theoretical (e.g., Ambrose & Schminke, 2003; Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies, 2001; Blader & 
Tyler, 2003; Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Colquitt & Shaw, 2005; Henle, 
2005; Johnson, Selenta, & Lord, 2006); the purpose has been to understand how people 
come about deciding whether something is fair and what aspects of the procedure people 
rely on in making those determinations. In statistical terms, this body of research has 
largely been directed toward identifying a measurement model of justice judgments. In 
contrast, research on the consequences of justice has blended application and theory (e.g., 
Cropanzano, Howes, Grandy, & Toth, 1997; Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002; 
Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000; Roch & Shanock, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 
2003). Researchers have explored attitudinal and behavioral consequences of fairness 
perceptions in a variety of contexts, from consumer to employment to legal. In statistical 
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terms, this body of research has been primarily directed toward identifying a structural 
model of the outcomes of justice. 
Until recently, these two bodies of literature have progressed largely independent 
of each other. However, in recent years, researchers have started moving towards creating 
theoretical frameworks that include both the antecedents and consequences of justice 
perceptions. Two approaches stand out. On the one hand, organizational psychologists 
have posited that that there are three (or four, depending on the researcher) distinct types 
of justice—procedural, distributive, and interactional (which can be divided into 
interpersonal and informational)—each reflecting different kinds of concerns or 
information, and thus, linked to different behavioral and attitudinal consequences (Bies, 
2001, 2005; Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Colquitt & 
Shaw, 2005).  
On the other hand, legal psychologists distinguish between only two kinds of 
justice—procedural and distributive (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Heuer, Penrod, Hafer, & 
Cohn, 2002; Heuer, Penrod, & Kattan, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 
2003).1 In addition, the latest theoretical model that has come from this approach, called 
the group engagement model, does not predict the same kinds of differential outcomes. 
Instead, this model posits that both procedural and distributive justice indirectly predict 
justice outcomes via their influence on people’s sense of identity. Greater perceptions of 
justice give people a more positive sense of social identity, which makes them more 
                                                           
1 At this point, I should acknowledge that the distinction between “organizational 
psychologist” and “legal psychologist” is not a firm one. For example, Tyler, one of the 
most prominent psycholegal justice researchers, has frequently collaborated with 
organizational justice researchers and tested his theories in the organizational context, 
(e.g., Bies & Tyler, 1993; Blader & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2009).  
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likely to have positive attitudes about a decision and engage in group-relevant behavior. 
Unlike the organizational justice approach, the group engagement model goes further to 
identify underlying mechanisms or attitudes that link justice judgments to outcomes (see 
Blader & Tyler, 2005). 
This dissertation tested these two theoretical models in an experimental design. I 
manipulated four variables: procedural treatment, interactional treatment, severity of 
child neglect, and participant role. The first two manipulations were designed to test the 
core hypotheses derived from the two theoretical approaches. The second two were 
designed to test moderator effects. The introduction to the dissertation begins with a 
literature review and ends with a detailed description of the research questions and 
hypotheses tested herein. The methods, data analysis, and discussion sections follow, in 
that order. 
The Organizational Model of Justice  
 Colquitt (2001) illustrated what I call the “organizational model of justice” 
(OMJ), but it should be noted that it was built on a synthesis of years of organizational 
justice research by a large number of researchers. In fact, Colquitt (2001) takes 
ownership of the measurement portion of the model, and the associated organizational 
justice measure that is now widely used (e.g., Chiaburu, 2007; Siers, 2007; Wu, Neubert, 
& Yi, 2007). However, he treats the fact that the four proposed justice constructs have 
differential outcomes as merely a validation of the validity of those constructs, rather than 
a component of a formal theory, as such. Nonetheless, taken together, this work and 
Colquitt’s subsequent writings (2001; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Colquitt, Greenberg, 
& Scott, 2005; Colquitt, Greenberg, & Zapata-Phelan, 2005; Colquitt & Shaw, 2005; 
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Scott, Colquitt, & Zapata-Phelan, 2007) provide a cohesive framework for understanding 
the antecedents and consequences of justice. 
Measurement Component 
 The core proposition of the organizational model of justice is that people evaluate 
four distinct types of justice (measurement component), and each of these judgments is 
associated with distinct outcomes (structural component; Figure 1.1 on p. 33). The four 
types of justice are distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational. Procedural 
justice refers to evaluations of the formal decision-making procedure, like whether the 
process was conducted in an unbiased manner. Distributive justice refers to the fairness 
of the decision-making outcome, or the decision itself. Both interpersonal and 
informational justice refer to evaluations of the decision-maker. Interpersonal justice 
judgments reflect evaluations of the decision-maker’s sensitivity, like whether the 
decision-maker was respectful. Informational justice judgments reflect evaluations of the 
decision-maker’s justifications for the decision, like whether the decision-maker 
explained the decision and the explanation was reasonable. 
Many of these ideas are not new to the field of justice research. In particular, the 
distinction between procedural and distributive justice has been present in the literature 
since Thibaut and Walker (1975) (e.g., Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Leventhal, 1980; Tyler 
& Folger, 1980). The literature has defined distributive justice in the same terms since 
then (see, e.g., Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, 2001; Folger & Konovsky, 
1989; Moorman, 1991). However, the major difference is in how organizational 
psychologists define the other three justice constructs. It was not until the late 1980s that 
organizational justice researchers began to consider that their definition of “procedural 
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justice” might be confounding distinct types of judgments. In 1986, Bies and Moag 
proposed that “procedural justice,” as defined up until that point, actually consists of two 
distinct constructs—procedural and interactional justice—with procedural justice 
referring to evaluations of the decision-making process and interactional justice referring 
to evaluations of the decision-maker. Today, this distinction has been widely adopted by 
organizational justice researchers (e.g., Bernerth, Armenakis, Field, & Walker, 2007; De 
Cremer, van Dijke, & Bos, 2007; Flaherty & Moss, 2007; Forret & Love, 2008; 
Klendauer & Deller, 2009), and is the predominant measurement model within the 
organizational justice field. 
Colquitt’s (2001; Colquitt & Shaw, 2005) contribution to the field is this further 
distinction between interpersonal and informational justice. In essence, Colquitt (2001) 
argues that the construct of interactional justice remains too broad, and that people’s 
evaluations of their interpersonal and informational treatment are independent and lead to 
differential outcomes. Generally, his work (e.g., Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt & Shaw, 2005), 
as well as the work of others provides mixed support for this distinction (e.g., Kernan & 
Hanges, 2002; Siers, 2007; Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, & Walker, 2008; Wenzel, 2006; Wu, 
Neubert, &  Yi, 2007). The empirical support for the OMJ will be discussed in more 
detail later. 
Structural Component 
The structural component of the OMJ is simply the prediction that each of the 
four distinct types of justice predict distinct types of outcomes. Specifically, distributive 
justice is more influential on self-relevant evaluations, like decision satisfaction and 
approval. In contrast, procedural justice should be more influential on system- or 
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institution-related outcomes, like organizational commitment and compliance with the 
decision. Because interpersonal justice is an evaluation of the decision-maker’s 
sensitivity, it ought to be more influential on outcomes like evaluation of the decision-
maker as a leader. Finally, informational justice should be more influential on outcomes 
related to one’s group identity, like collective esteem. This last hypothesis is derived 
from the argument that informational justice conveys a sense of respect from the group, 
which Colquitt derived from the research of Tyler and colleagues (Tyler & Lind, 1992; 
Tyler, DeGoey, & Smith, 1996).  
It is worth noting that while the model posits that each of the four types of justice 
predicts specific outcomes, it is silent on whether one type of justice might also influence 
the outcomes primarily associated with the other types of justice. In other words, while 
interpersonal justice might most strongly predict leader evaluation, that is not to say that 
informational justice does not also have some influence on leader evaluation. In fact, 
given how interrelated justice judgments and outcomes generally are, it would be 
exceptional if it were not the case that multiple judgments predicted the same outcome. 
Thus, my interpretation of the model is that it predicts the relative strength of judgment-
outcome relationships, rather than absolute or singular relationships.  
There is support for this interpretation in the literature. First, the justice contructs 
themselves appear to be highly correlated. Colquitt (2001) found significant correlations 
between all four justice constructs, ranging from .17 for the correlation between 
distributive and interpersonal justice and .64 for the relationship interpersonal and 
informational justice. In their meta-analysis, Cohen-Charash & Spector (2001) found 
correlations between distributive, procedural, and interactional justice ranging from .46 to 
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.55. Second, the research investigating differential outcomes has not consistently 
produced clean results supporting the absolute relationship hypothesis. For example, 
Colquitt (2001) found that, in addition to interpersonal justice, procedural justice also 
predicted leader evaluation. Similarly, Roch and Shanock (2006) found that both 
informational and procedural justice predicted organizational support, with procedural 
justice being a relatively stronger predictor. 
Support for the Model 
 As mentioned earlier, there is robust support for the distinction between 
procedural and interactional justice. In fact, two meta-analyses were recently published, 
both providing evidence of the conceptual distinction. Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) 
included 190 samples and over 64,000 individual participants in their meta-analysis. 
They found the perceptions of all three justice constructs to be significantly correlated. 
Interactional and procedural justice were equivalently correlated in laboratory 
experiments, r = .57, and in field studies, r = .58. The authors concluded from these 
correlations that procedural and interactional justice were related, but distinct, constructs.  
The authors found additional evidence for the distinction between the justice 
constructs in their differential relationships with outcomes. Specifically, procedural 
justice was more strongly related to institution-relevant outcomes, like organizational 
support. Distributive justice was more strongly related to evaluations of the outcome, like 
pay satisfaction. These findings provided some support for the structural model of the 
OMJ. However, the authors did not have enough data to test the specific hypotheses 
regarding the relative strength of the relationships between procedural and interactional 
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justice and their associated outcomes. Therefore, overall, the meta-analysis provided only 
mild support for this particular component of the organizational model. 
 In the second meta-analysis, which Colquitt and colleagues (Colquitt, Conlon, 
Wesson, Porter, and Ng, 2001) published the same year that Colquitt published his 
refinement of the OMJ, the authors tested some of the relationships in that theory. Unlike 
Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001), Colquitt et al. (2001) analyzed the distinction 
between the four justice constructs proposed in the organizational model—procedural, 
distributive, interpersonal, and information. Colquitt et al. (2001) first studied the 
correlations among the justice constructs. The authors found support for the notion that 
there are four distinct types of justice. Specifically, although all four justice judgments 
were significantly correlated, the correlations were not so high as to conclude that they 
are tapping the same construct. The correlations ranged from r = .38 for the relationship 
between distributive and informational justice and r = .66 for interpersonal and 
informational justice. Note that this latter correlation is quite high. The authors concluded 
that it still supports their proposal that informational and interpersonal justice are distinct 
constructs. However, one could easily argue that this correlation is high enough to favor 
combining them into the broader construct of interactional justice, which is the more 
traditional organizational approach. 
 Colquitt and colleagues (2001) also evaluated whether justice judgments 
differentially predicted decision outcomes and found mixed support. Consistent with the 
OMJ, distributive justice more strongly related to outcome satisfaction than the other 
justice constructs. Also consistent with the model, procedural justice more strongly 
related to organizational commitment and performance at work than the other types of 
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justice. However, support for the model broke down with the predictions for interpersonal 
and informational justice. The organizational model predicts that interpersonal justice 
will more strongly relate to leader evaluation. The results of Colquitt et al.’s (2001) meta-
analysis did not support this hypothesis. Instead, informational justice was the strongest 
predictor of leader evaluation when researchers measured the construct on a system, or 
organizational, level. When researchers measured leader evaluation on an individual 
level, with reference to a specific leader, then interpersonal and informational justice 
were more equivalently predictive. These findings, again, suggested that the distinction 
between interpersonal and interactional justice is not as strong as Colquitt (2001) has 
proposed. 
 Consistent with the two meta-analyses, the vast body of literature almost 
universally supports the distinction between procedural and interactional justice (e.g., 
Bernerth, Armenakis, Field, & Walker, 2007; Chory, 2007; De Cremer, van Dijke, & 
Bos, 2007; Flaherty & Moss, 2007; Forret & Love, 2008; Klendauer & Deller, 2009; 
Luo, 2007), both in terms of scale or measurement validity and predictive validity.  
As for the distinction between informational and interpersonal justice, the research 
support is sparser and more equivocal. In Colquitt’s (2001) original publication of the 
model, he presented the results of three studies, all of which supported the distinction. In 
his first study, Colquitt (2001) tested and validated his measurement model using 
confirmatory factor analysis with two different samples, a field sample of employees and 
a university sample. In the second and third studies, he tested the structural model and 
found general support for the model’s differential outcome predictions. The second study 
confirmed all four relationships between the justice constructs and their individual 
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outcomes, although it should be noted that, in addition to interpersonal justice, procedural 
justice also predicted leader evaluation. The third study also supported all four predicted 
relationships. 
In addition, other researchers have investigated this more nuanced four-factor 
approach and found some support (e.g., Kernan & Hanges, 2002; Siers, 2007; Skarlicki, 
van Jaarsveld, & Walker, 2008; Wenzel, 2006; Wu, Neubert, & Yi, 2007). Moreover, 
many contemporary organizational justice researchers have adopted Colquitt’s (2001) 
measure, which is evidence that the measurement model, at least, has been implicitly 
accepted as valid (e.g., Siers, 2007; Wu, Neubert, & Yi, 2007). Nonetheless, despite its 
implicit acceptance, consistent or robust empirical support for the OMJ is lacking, 
especially when it comes to the distinction between interpersonal and informational 
justice. This dissertation was among the first experimental tests of the model. 
The Group Engagement Model 
 The group engagement model is described in full detail in Tyler and Blader 
(2003) and reproduced in Figure 1.2 (p. 35). As with the organizational model of justice 
(OMJ), the group engagement model (GEM) includes both a measurement and a 
structural component. However, compared to the organizational justice model, the GEM 
seeks to explain the underlying process whereby positive procedural treatment creates 
positive attitudes and behavioral engagement with regard to the decision-making group 
and the decision itself. Another key difference is that the OMJ distinguishes between 
different kinds of justice outcomes, while the GEM, on the other hand, makes a much 
simpler argument with regard to outcomes. Put simply, the GEM posits that procedural 
justice will improve group engagement. The GEM is a model of motivation and, as such, 
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its strength is in its description of the process. The OMJ is much more a descriptive 
model of the strength and relationships between types of justice and types of outcomes. 
Measurement Component 
 Whereas Colquitt (2001) proposes that justice judgments consist of four distinct 
categories, Tyler and Blader (2003) argue that there are really only two categories: 
procedural and distributive justice. The group engagement model defines distributive 
justice in the same terms that Colquitt (2001) uses, focusing on the fairness of the 
outcome itself. In contrast, procedural justice is defined more broadly in the GEM than in 
the OMJ. In fact, Tyler and Blader’s (2003) measurement model of procedural justice 
encompasses the substance of all three of the OMJ’s remaining justice constructs: 
procedural, interpersonal, and informational.  
While similar substance is in both models, the structure and definition are quite 
different. Specifically, Tyler and Blader (2003) propose that procedural justice judgments 
are founded on four components, which are detailed in a separate publication (Blader & 
Tyler, 2003). According to the model, two functions are central to people’s judgments 
about procedural justice: the quality of the decision-making and the quality of the 
treatment. Blader and Tyler (2003) argue that decision-making quality provides 
information about the outcomes of the decision making process and whether those 
outcomes will be fair. In evaluating decision-making quality, people rely on issues like 
neutrality and opportunity to participate in the process.  
Arguably, decision-making quality is akin to “procedural justice” in 
organizational justice research, and treatment quality is akin to “interactional justice.” 
However, the components are defined in broader terms in the four-component model than 
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in the OMJ, because they take into account two different “procedural sources.” 
Procedural source is the second function in Blader and Tyler’s (2003) model. The source 
can be either formal or informal. Formal sources are rules and policies of the institution 
and reflect the prevailing group norms. Informal sources of procedural information are 
the particular authorities enacting the procedure, like a judge or supervisor.  
Blader and Tyler (2003, 2005) acknowledge that their model recognizes the 
distinction between procedure and treatment so prevalent in organizational research, but 
they argue that their model presents a more comprehensive view of interactional justice. 
Specifically, organizational justice research tends to define procedural justice in formal 
terms (i.e., formal decision-making) and interactional justice in informal terms (i.e., 
informal treatment). The four-component model extends this measurement by allowing 
for judgments of formal treatment and informal decision-making, which are excluded in 
the narrow conceptualizations of justice in the OMJ. 
Structural Component 
The structural component of the GEM is more complex than that of the 
organizational model of justice. As with Colquitt (2001), Tyler and Blader (2003) draw a 
link between justice judgments, on the one hand, and attitudinal and behavioral reactions 
on the other. However, that is where the similarities end. Tyler and Blader (2003) argue 
that justice judgments, regardless of the type of justice, indirectly affect attitudes and 
behaviors through the mediating mechanism of identity judgments, which include pride 
in being a member of the organization or institution, respect from the organization or 
institution, and identification with the organization or institution. The authors call this 
argument the social identity mediation hypothesis (Tyler & Blader, 2003; Blader & Tyler, 
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2009). The core idea is this: People are motivated to evaluate justice because it gives 
them information about their group identity. To the extent that they perceive increased 
fairness, they develop a more positive sense of group identity, which then motivates them 
to engage in positive group-related behaviors. 
The social identity mediation hypothesis is the gist of the structural component of 
the GEM. However, the GEM also describes some more nuanced relationships between 
the constructs of interest. Perhaps most importantly, even though both procedural and 
distributive justice have the power to indirectly affect behavior, Tyler and Blader (2003) 
argue that procedural justice is generally a more powerful motivator than distributive 
justice. This argument follows from the assumption that procedural treatment conveys 
more information about people’s group identity than distributive treatment. Furthermore,  
the model subjugates distributive justice judgments to the role of antecedents of resource 
judgments, which reflect people’s understanding of the amount and quality of resources 
the group has available to it and the amount and quality of resources the group is willing 
to share with that person in particular. Procedural justice and resource judgments directly 
influence identity judgments, while distributive justice influences identity only indirectly 
through resource judgments, which are, in themselves, hypothesized to be a weaker 
influence than is procedural justice. 
Despite the relatively weaker position of distributive justice and resource 
judgments, Tyler and Blader (2003) make one caveat: the power of procedural treatment 
is not as strong when it comes to predicting mandatory group behaviors. The authors 
argue that mandatory behaviors, by definition, are directly connected to institutional 
sanctions and rewards, which are distributive, resource mechanisms. Therefore, where 
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mandatory behaviors, like compliance with legal orders, are concerned, resource 
judgments should have both the indirect effect described above and a direct effect on 
those behaviors. 
 With regard to distributive justice, one additional structural detail is worth noting. 
In the OMJ, distributive justice directly influences outcome favorability (i.e., decision 
satisfaction), and predicts it more strongly than the other three justice judgments. In 
contrast, in the GEM, outcome favorability operates at the same level and in conjunction 
with distributive justice. Both distributive justice and outcome favorability are two 
dimensions of people’s global resource judgments. 
A final structural detail deserves attention. Tyler and Blader (2003) make an 
additional caveat concerning mandatory behaviors. Specifically, they argue that pride, or 
group prestige, motivates people to act with loyalty towards the group. This translates 
into pride directly increasing motivation to comply with mandatory behaviors. That is, 
pride acts both directly and indirectly through social identity to motivate people to 
comply with mandatory group engagement. 
Support for the Model 
 Unlike the organizational model of justice, the GEM has been the subject of very 
little systematic research. In introducing the four-component model, Blader and Tyler 
(2003) presented data from a series of studies supporting the measurement structure. 
However, while a few researchers acknowledge that the model exists (Horvath & 
Andrews, 2007; Lipponen, Koivisto, & Olkkonen, 2005), no published study tests the 
four-component model of procedural justice, or even adopts it as a measure. In fact, even 
the authors themselves have implicitly rejected the four-component model in favor of 
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simpler measures of procedural justice in their recent work (e.g., Blader, 2007b; Blader & 
Tyler, 2009; Okimoto & Tyler, 2007; Tyler & De Cremer, 2005). 
 It is unclear why the four-component model has not been as widely tested, yet 
alone accepted, as the OMJ. One explanation is that the organizational model is more 
parsimonious. The adage that the simplest explanation is often the right one applies to 
theory development, and the organizational model of justice is arguably simpler and more 
intuitive. Another explanation is that the measurement component of the organizational 
model of justice simply has too much momentum as an instrument for researchers to 
reject it, even if the alternative is more valid. 
 Compared to the measurement component, the structural component of the group 
engagement model certainly has a stronger empirical foundation. First, it is rooted in 
about 15 years of research and theory development. The model has its roots in the group 
value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and the relational model (Tyler & Lind, 1992) of 
procedural justice, both of which were well-supported. The group value model and the 
relational model were also based on the hypothesis that procedural justice is important 
because of what it communicates to people about their group status and identity. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, many researchers adopted one of these models in their 
research (e.g., De Cremer, 2003; Murphy-Berman, Cross, & Fondacaro, 1999; van 
Prooijen, van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002), and found support for the notion that identity and 
status judgments have an important role in the link between procedural justice and 
decision outcomes. 
 For example, Sousa and Vala (2002) surveyed 1100 employees in a Portuguese 
insurance company about their perceptions of justice and support for organizational 
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change. The researchers explored whether identity judgments (i.e., respect and pride) 
mediated the relationships between procedural justice judgments and support for 
organizational change. They found partial support for the mediation hypothesis in that, 
once pride and respect were factored in, the relationship between procedural justice and 
organizational support was partially, but not completely, attenuated. 
 Tyler, Degoey, and Smith (1996) evaluated the group value model in a series of 
four studies in four separate contexts: college students’ conflicts with their parents, 
university employees’ conflicts with supervisors, college students’ conflicts with a 
faculty or staff member, and people’s attitudes about the United State Supreme Court. 
The authors found, consistent with the identity mediation hypothesis, that perceptions of 
pride and respect mediated the relationship between procedural justice judgments and 
various justice outcomes—compliance with group rules, group commitment, and 
voluntary group behavior. The authors did not find complete mediation in every set of 
analyses, but they found either partial or full mediation in the majority of analyses. 
Second, outside of adopting any of the three models proposed by Tyler and 
colleagues, subsequent researchers have still empirically tested the relationships between 
procedural justice, identity, and outcomes (Amiot, Terry, & Callan, 2007; Blader, 2007a; 
Blader, 2007b; Fuller, Hester, Barnett, Frey, Relyea, Beu, 2006; Gleibs, Mummendey, & 
Noack, 2008; Hakonen & Lipponen, 2008; Mayer, Greenbaum, Kuenzi, & Shteynberg, 
2009). Although not all studies directly test the mediation hypothesis, generally, the data 
support the model. For example, Blader (2007a) conducted two experimental studies in 
which he tested the relationships between identification, procedural justice judgments, 
and outcomes. In the first study, procedural justice and identification were manipulated, 
17 
 
while identification and outcome were manipulated in the second study. Taken together, 
the results of the studies supported the relationships between identification, procedural 
justice, and outcomes predicted by the group engagement model. More specifically, 
Blader (2007a) found strong positive relationships between all three constructs: both 
positive identification and positive outcome favorability predicted increased perceptions 
of procedural justice. The author did not test the social identity mediation component of 
the GEM. 
Amiot, Terry, and Callan (2007) did test the identity mediation hypothesis in the 
context of employee adjustment to organizational merger. In a longitudinal study, the 
authors measured employee adjustment and support three months and two years after the 
merger. The authors found that identification with the new merged organization fully 
mediated the relationship between procedural justice judgments and changes in both job 
satisfaction and perceived stress associated with the merger over time. In other words, 
procedural justice judgments were associated with increased job satisfaction and 
decreased employee stress between Time 1 and Time 2 and these associations were fully 
mediated by identification.  
To conclude, there is considerable research support for some of the core 
relationships proposed in the structural component of the GEM. However, there is 
virtually no research even examining the full model, let alone providing empirical 
support. This dissertation was among the first to test the group engagement model in full. 
Child Protection Proceedings as a Context 
 A procedural justice framework might be particularly helpful in studying child 
protection cases for two primary reasons. First, the psychological concept of procedural 
justice maps neatly onto the legal concept of due process, which is the constitutional 
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requirement that legal proceedings be conducted in a manner that promotes fair decision-
making. Second, procedural justice theory has the potential to offer some insight into 
parental compliance with court orders and case plans. Specifically, a procedural justice 
framework can help to explain one influence on parental compliance and, in turn, identify 
ways that judges and caseworkers can act to promote compliance. 
Procedural Justice and Due Process 
Because child protection proceedings are civil rather than criminal, parents are not 
afforded the same procedural protections that criminal defendants have. They do, 
however, have certain basic rights under the federal constitution. These rights derive from 
the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which 
require that no state “shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law” (14th Amendment). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that parents have 
an inherent liberty interest in the care and custody of their children (Meyer v. ebraska, 
1923; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 1925). In Troxel v. Granville (2000), the Supreme 
Court stated that “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children 
is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” (p. 65). The existence of this 
constitutional protection means that the government has limited rights to intervene into 
matters related to child-rearing. With regard to child custody, parents cannot have their 
rights to the care and custody of their children terminated without being proven unfit or 
proven to have abandoned their children (Stanley v. Illinois, 1972). 
In the abstract, then, the U.S. Constitution provides strong protections for parental 
rights. In practice, this constitutional protection has formed the foundation for the 
extension of a host of procedural safeguards to parents in child protection cases. 
Specifically, parents generally have a constitutional right to notice of any petition filed 
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and a right to a hearing on the merits of the petition, including the right to cross-examine 
witnesses and present evidence (Jones, 2006). Parents also have the right to testify on 
their own behalf. 
Federal legislation has also provided some rights to parents related to due process. 
For example, Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, which was modified with the passage 
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA, 1997), gives parents the right to 
contribute to the development of their case plan (Badeau, Gesiriech, Haralambie, 
Donnelly, & Duquette, 2005). The same section of the Social Security Act gives parents 
the right to an expedited hearing when the state places their children into temporary 
custody via an ex parte order, meaning that there was no hearing on the merits prior to 
removal (Baduea et al., 2005). 
Beyond these basic rights derived from the federal constitution, most states have 
expanded parents’ due process rights through either state constitutions or state law. For 
example, the federal constitution does not provide parents in child protection hearings an 
absolute right to counsel (Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 1981). Nevertheless, most 
states do provide parents the right to an attorney in child protection proceedings 
(Donnelly & Haralambie, 2005). In fact, most states offer protections far beyond the 
minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause (Jones, 2006). Appellate court 
interpretations of state constitutions, as well as state legislative code, have extended these 
rights.  
For example, in Nebraska, parents have a right to counsel starting at the 
adjudication hearing (Constantakos, 2006), although many districts provide attorneys 
even at the initial appearance. Also in Nebraska, judges must inform parents of their 
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rights at their initial appearance (In re Interest of R.W., 1990; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-
279.01, 2008). In addition to the right to an attorney, Nebraskan parents have the right to 
prompt notice of temporary custody and a prompt detention hearing. They also have the 
right to an explanation of the nature of the proceeding and the potential dispositions and 
consequences of those dispositions. Furthermore, the state guarantees  the right to 
confront witnesses, the right to testify and compel their own witnesses, the right to a 
speedy adjudication, and the right to appeal and obtain a record of the proceedings for the 
purposes of the appeal (Neb Rev Stat § 43-279.01, 2008). While some of these rights are 
also provided under federal law, they are all codified in the state juvenile code. In 
addition, inherent in the requirement that state officers must explain these rights to 
parents is the corollary that parents must understand these rights (In re Interest of R.W., 
1990). Generally, judges ask parents if they understand what they have been told and 
seek to clarify any misunderstandings as they arise (Constantakos, 2006). 
Due process is a cornerstone of involvement in the legal system because it is 
necessary for a fair and impartial hearing. In this way, due process protections are 
“procedural safeguards,” because they protect parties from potential impropriety or 
inequity in the legal system. When one thinks of due process in these terms, it is clear 
why a procedural justice framework is so important. As discussed earlier, “procedural 
justice” refers to judgments about the fairness of a particular legal decision-making 
procedure, a child protection hearing in this case. When due process is present, we can 
assume that participants will perceive greater procedural justice (Koh, 2004).  
In the legal context, there has been little research exploring the relationship 
between due process protections alone and perceptions of procedural fairness. This lack 
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of research partially results from the fact that the measurement of procedural justice used 
in the legal context is often broad, combining both formal procedural protections and 
interpersonal treatment. Most procedural justice researchers in the legal context rely 
heavily on the seminal work of Tyler (Tyler; 1994; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996; Tyler 
& Lind, 1992), who has always defined procedural justice broadly and, at least until 
recently (Blader & Tyler, 2003), emphasized the relative import of relational treatment 
over formal procedural safeguards as influences on overall procedural justice judgments. 
Despite the lack of research on this specific issue, the body of procedural justice 
theory and research has clear implications for understanding the significance of due 
process protections. Procedural justice research has established that opportunity for active 
participation in the legal process (i.e., “voice”) can be a strong predictor of judgments of 
the fairness of the procedure (e.g., Bies & Shapiro, 1988; De Cremer & Stouten, 2005; 
Price, Lavelle, Henley, Cocchiara, & Buchanan, 2006; van Prooijen, Karremans, & van 
Beest, 2006). “Voice” in child protection law results from various due process 
protections, including the right to have an attorney advocate and the right to testify on 
one’s behalf. In this dissertation, I directly manipulated voice to investigate whether 
opportunity to provide one’s story, alone, influenced procedural justice judgments in the 
child protection context.2 
The organizational model of justice (OMJ) might be particularly useful in the 
legal context. In contrast to the broad definition used in the legal psychology context, the 
                                                           
2 It is worth noting that federal law provides an additional mechanism for voice in 
establishing the right for parents to participate in their case plan development (ASFA, 
2007). I did not investigate this particular provision in this dissertation, but one can argue 
that it should have a similar influence on parents’ procedural justice judgments to 
opportunity to testify. 
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organizational model of justice clearly distinguishes between formal procedures and 
interpersonal treatment. As described earlier, organizational justice researchers reserve 
the term “procedural justice” for evaluation of the process itself. Procedural justice 
derives from institutional rules and policies, whereas interpersonal justice derives from 
the individuals who enact those rules (Ambrose & Schminke, 2003; Colquitt, 2001; Roch 
& Shanock, 2006). Procedural justice, then, is akin to an evaluation of “due process,” as 
defined by the law. 
Further, the OMJ predicts that procedural and interpersonal justice will have 
differential effects. Specifically, procedural justice likely influences institutionally 
relevant attitudes and behaviors, like organizational support and organization citizenship 
behaviors. Interactional justice likely influences authority-relevant outcomes, like 
supervisor satisfaction. Because the organizational model of justice makes room for the 
important legal distinction between due process protections and informal, interpersonal 
treatment, it has the potential to be useful for understanding the role of procedural justice 
in the legal context. 
Procedural Justice and Parental Compliance 
At its most basic, procedural justice theory predicts that when people feel that 
they are being treated fairly during a legal decision-making process, then they will be 
motivated to comply with whatever legal decisions or orders are made. In fact, Tyler and 
Blader (2003) described their group engagement model as one that identifies underlying 
motivations to engage in both discretionary and mandatory group behaviors. 
Understanding, indeed facilitating, motivation to comply with legal demands is nowhere 
more crucial than in the context of the child protection system. For parents involved in 
the child welfare system, their compliance with caseworkers, treatment providers, and the 
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courts appears to be a consistent predictor of decision-making in their case. Research 
suggests that perceptions of parental compliance influence decisions to remove the child 
from the home (Dalgleish & Drew, 1989; DeRoma, Kessler, McDaniel, & Soto, 2006; 
Jones, 1993), decisions to reunite the family (Jellinek, Murphy, Poitrast, Quinn, Bishop, 
& Goshko, 1992; Larrieu, Heller, Smyke, & Zeanah, 2008), and decisions to recommend 
termination of parental rights (Brank, Williams, Weisz, & Ray, 2001).  
 Jones (1993) conducted a review of the literature on caseworker decision-making 
through the 1980s and early 1990s, and observed that several studies identified parental 
cooperation as one indicator caseworkers relied on in deciding whether to remove the 
child from the home. Among the studies cited in Jones’s review was one conducted by 
Dalgleish and Drew (1989), in which they coded 152 case-planning team files and used 
that information to predict the court’s ultimate decision to issue a removal order. The 
researchers coded family cooperation as low, medium, or high, and found that lack of 
cooperation predicted whether the judge issued a removal order. In addition, the 
researchers had neutral caseworkers code the case files and make decisions about the risk 
to the children by remaining in the home. Lack of family cooperation predicted the 
caseworker-coders’ perceptions of risk to the child. 
 Unfortunately, there is very little subsequent research examining the relationship 
between family cooperation and the removal decision. However, one recent study is on 
point. DeRoma, Kessler, McDaniel, and Soto (2006) asked 51 caseworkers in a single 
state to rate the importance of a list of indicators of child wellbeing and risk factors for 
child harm for making removal decisions. Parental motivation to comply, phrased by the 
researchers, as the “ability to accept help/cooperate with helping agencies (DSS),” was 
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included in the list. This item was given the second highest level of endorsement as an 
important risk factor in the removal decision, with 27.5% of caseworkers listing it in the 
top three most important factors to consider in making the removal decision. Moreover, 
motivation or ability to comply was ranked as the sixth most important consideration 
overall. 
 A small amount of research also demonstrates that perceptions of parental 
compliance predict the judicial decision to reunite the family. Jellinek and colleagues 
(1992) followed the course of 206 children who entered the Massachusetts child welfare 
system in 1985 and 1986. They measured parental compliance with court orders, and 
observed that 93% of the cases in which parents did not comply ultimately resulted in 
continued loss of custody (or failure to reunify the family) at the disposition stage. In a 
more recent study, Larrieu, Heller, Smyke, and Zeanah (2008) explored compliance with 
an intervention program to which the court referred mothers after the child protection 
agency removed their children from the home. As with the Jellinek et al. (1992) study, 
90% of mothers who dropped out of the intervention program lost custody of their 
children. 
Together, research, theory, and commonsense all suggest that a case will not 
progress smoothly through the child welfare system without the parents actively engaging 
in the treatment recommendations of their caseworker and the court. Given that fact, 
identifying mechanisms for promoting parental compliance would be of value to all the 
players in the child protection system—caseworkers, judges, and parents. Procedural 
justice theory predicts that the quality of the procedural and interpersonal treatment, as 
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perceived by the parents, will influence the parents’ willingness and motivation to 
comply with their own case plans. 
To date, we know relatively little about predictors of parental compliance, but 
some research does support applying a procedural justice framework to the topic. 
Specifically, a number of studies have identified factors related to informational 
treatment as important to parental compliance. For example, Kapp and Propp (2002) 
conducted focus groups with parents who had been in the child protection system. A 
majority of these parents complained that caseworkers provided them too little 
information and that parents had difficulty making contact with them. Similarly, Drake 
(1994) interviewed parents and caseworkers, and found that both groups identified 
communication with parents as important.  
 There is also evidence that interpersonal treatment is relevant to parents’ 
reactions. Studies by Drake (1994), Kapp and Propp (2002), and Thoburn, Lewis, & 
Shemmings (1995) all identified respectful treatment as important to parents. Parents in 
the Kapp and Propp (2002) study indicated that they frequently felt disrespected by 
caseworkers. Parents and caseworkers in the Drake (1994) study emphasized that worker 
attitude was important. Specifically, parents said that a good caseworker should not 
prejudge parents and should express an open attitude. Interestingly, caseworkers more 
clearly articulated the themes of interactional justice than did parents. Caseworkers 
suggested that skilled caseworkers should be able to show respect to the clients, be polite, 
ask permission when looking around in their homes, be honest, and be aware that the 
system can be dehumanizing. It is unclear whether this means that caseworkers are 
merely more articulate about what makes a good caseworker-client relationship, possibly 
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due to training, or whether these matters are actually less important to clients than 
caseworkers believe they are. 
 Interestingly, there is weaker evidence that due process is relevant to parents. 
Some studies have identified “voice,” or the opportunity to participate in the process, as 
important to parents, and voice is typically associated with procedural rather than 
interactional justice. Parents in the Drake (1994) study believed that they had a clear right 
to participate in case plan development, although caseworkers in that study did not 
identify client participation as an important goal. Similarly, many parents in the Kapp and 
Propp (2002) study complained that they felt left out of the decision-making process.  
Thoburn, Lewis, and Shemmings (1995) also found that parents are left out of the 
case planning process. They found that only 19% of over 300 families were “active 
participants,” although it is unclear whether the lack of active involvement was due to 
caseworker or client barriers. There is some evidence that some caseworkers do not 
actively involve parents in the process. Dumbrill (2006) interviewed parents and 
identified two kinds of caseworkers: those who use power over parents and those who use 
power with parents. Caseworkers who used power with parents were more collaborative, 
while those who used power over parents tended to be more aggressive and threatening.  
It seems, then, that procedural and interactional justices are relevant to parents’ 
attitudes about the child protection system and caseworkers. However, it is unclear 
whether justice judgments predict behavioral outcomes, like parental compliance. 
Furthermore, all of this research neglects the influence that the court process itself has on 
parents’ behavioral outcomes. Judges and lawyers also interact with parents, and judges 
are the ones who order parents to engage in certain behaviors. Furthermore, these studies 
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neglect to account for perceptions of distributive fairness. One can assume that many 
parents believe that removal of their children from the home is unfair, but we do not 
know that for sure. Without taking these factors into account, we have a poor 
understanding of how parental compliance is manifested in the child protection system. 
To summarize, research on parental compliance lacks a systematic exploration of 
the underlying mechanisms that promote or hinder it. Research on parental motivation to 
comply in child protection cases, and subsequently, our understanding of it, could benefit 
greatly from a theoretical foundation. One potential influence on parental compliance 
might lie in parents’ perceptions of justice. It may be that motivation to comply follows 
directly from perceptions of fairness and justice, which follows from parents’ own 
perceptions of their treatment during the legal process. An additional purpose of this 
dissertation was to explore whether procedural justice theory can account for observers’ 
evaluations of child protection hearings and outcomes. More specifically, the major 
question is which model, if either, is best suited for explaining the way in which people 
evaluate decision-making procedures and outcomes, including compliance with legal 
decisions. 
Study Purpose and Hypotheses 
Overview of Research Design 
 This dissertation systematically tested the complex theoretical relationships 
between justice judgments and decision outcomes in the context of a child protection 
case. The general purpose of this study was to compare two theoretical models of justice: 
the organizational model of justice (OMJ) and the group engagement model (GEM). 
Participants read a case file, which included the petition for removal, the caseworker’s 
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court report, a summary of what happened during the protective custody hearing, and a 
copy of the judge’s protective custody hearing order.  The case involved allegations of 
child neglect, as a result of which, the mother had recently lost temporary custody of her 
child. At the end of the hearing, the judge refused to return the child back to her mother’s 
physical custody until the case proceeded at least through adjudication.  
The study utilized an experimental between-subjects design with four 
manipulated independent variables: procedural treatment, interactional treatment, severity 
of neglect, and decision-making role (i.e., decision-maker versus decision-recipient). The 
first two manipulated variables—procedural and interactional treatment—represented the 
core constructs known to affect justice judgments. For this study, interactional treatment 
was a single manipulated construct, with interpersonal and informational components 
manipulated simultaneously. However, I still separately measured interpersonal and 
informational justice judgments. In this way, the study provided an initial test of whether 
these two constructs are independent.3 In fact, as is described in the results section, the 
two measures did hold up as independent constructs. Many of the analysis reported in the 
results section used the interpersonal and informational justice measures instead of the 
combined interactional justice measure. 
The third manipulation—severity of neglect—was intended to serve as a proxy 
for manipulating distributive justice. If the mother’s neglectful conduct toward her 
daughter was perceived as less severe, then participants would think that the judge’s 
decision to keep the child in the physical custody of Health and Human Services was less 
                                                           
3 Only an experimental manipulation of the constructs would definitively answer that 
question, but the results of this study can lend support to Colquitt’s (2001) refinement of 
interactional justice. 
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fair. Some researchers argue that distributive justice judgments are a strong moderator of 
the relationships between procedural and interactional justice and their outcomes 
(Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Cropanzano, Slaughter, & Bachiochi, 2005; Skarlicki, 
Folger, & Tesluk, 1999).  
The fourth manipulation—decision-making role—was also included to test a 
moderation effect. Specifically, Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) found that decision-
makers, as compared to decision-recipients, are more outcome-focused when evaluating 
procedural justice, interactional justice, and decision satisfaction. They also found that 
decision-makers are more likely to base their judgments on their beliefs about the societal 
costs and benefits of the procedures at issue, than by the traditional criteria of procedural 
justice.  
The remainder of this chapter lists the specific research questions that I asked in 
framing this study. A brief description of the basis for the question, as well as the 
hypotheses derived from it, is also included. The research questions and hypotheses 
provide the framework for the results and discussion. 
Research Question (RQ) 1: Which measurement model best accounts for participants’ 
justice judgments? 
 In the course of more than 30 years of procedural justice research, a number of 
models have described the antecedents of justice. In this study, I compared three of these 
measurement models. The first model, labeled the “traditional model,” posits that people 
evaluate two types of justice: procedural and distributive. This model is present 
throughout the psycholegal justice literature (e.g., Heuer, Penrod, Hafer, & Cohn, 2002; 
Heuer, Penrod, & Kattan, 2007; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2003). The second and 
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third models follow from the organizational justice literature. The first of those is a three-
factor model, which argues that the traditional construct of “procedural justice” consists 
of two distinct constructs: procedural justice and interactional justice (Bies, 2001; Bies & 
Moag, 1986). The third model, part of the organizational model of justice (OMJ) 
proposed by Colquitt (2001), argues for an additional distinction. Specifically, the author 
separates interactional justice into interpersonal and informational justice.   
 Table 1.1 illustrates these three measurement models in terms of the items used to 
define each of the constructs and which justice construct each item loaded onto in each of 
the models. The major difference between the traditional model and the organizational 
models is that the traditional model posits that procedural justice is a single super-
ordinate construct, which contains procedural, interactional, and interpersonal 
components to differing degrees depending on the researcher. The organizational models, 
on the other hand, constrain the label “procedural justice” just to evaluations of the 
procedure itself and places interpersonal and informational concerns on equal, orthogonal 
footing with formal procedure.  
 Research Hypothesis (RH) 1: In a confirmatory factor analysis, the four-factor 
organizational justice measurement model will perform significantly better than 
both the traditional and three-factor organizational justice models.  
Table 1.1: Item Loadings for Three Theoretical Measurement Models of Justice 
Item 
Traditional Model 
2-Factor Model 
OMJ 1 
3-Factor Model 
OMJ 2 
4-Factor Model 
Was the mother able to 
express her views and 
feelings during the 
hearing procedure? 
Procedural Justice Procedural Justice Procedural 
Justice 
Did the mother have 
influence over the 
decision being made 
during the hearing 
procedure? 
Procedural Justice Procedural Justice Procedural 
Justice 
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Was the hearing 
procedure free of bias? 
Procedural Justice Procedural Justice Procedural 
Justice 
Was the hearing 
procedure based on 
accurate information? 
Procedural Justice Procedural Justice Procedural 
Justice 
Did the hearing procedure 
uphold ethical and moral 
standards? 
Procedural Justice Procedural Justice Procedural 
Justice 
Did the judge treat the 
mother in a polite 
manner? 
Procedural Justice Interactional Justice Interpersonal 
Justice 
Did the judge treat the 
mother with dignity? 
Procedural Justice Interactional Justice Interpersonal 
Justice 
Did the judge treat the 
mother with respect? 
Procedural Justice Interactional Justice Interpersonal 
Justice 
Did the judge refrain from 
improper remarks or 
comments? 
Procedural Justice Interactional Justice Interpersonal 
Justice 
Was the judge candid in 
his communications with 
the mother? 
Procedural Justice Interactional Justice Informational 
Justice 
Did the judge explain his 
decision thoroughly? 
Procedural Justice Interactional Justice Informational 
Justice 
Did the judge explain the 
procedures thoroughly? 
Procedural Justice Interactional Justice Informational 
Justice 
Were the judge’s 
explanations about the 
hearing procedures and 
decision reasonable? 
Procedural Justice Interactional Justice Informational 
Justice 
Did the judge’s decision 
reflect what the mother 
deserved? 
Distributive 
Justice 
Distributive Justice Distributive 
Justice 
Was the judge’s decision 
appropriate given the 
situation? 
Distributive 
Justice 
Distributive Justice Distributive 
Justice 
Was the decision justified 
given the mother’s 
performance? 
Distributive 
Justice 
Distributive Justice Distributive 
Justice 
 
RQ 2: Do justice judgments differentially predict justice outcomes? 
 This research question followed from the organizational model of justice (OMJ), 
which suggested that different justice judgments predict different decision outcomes. 
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Figure 1.1, adapted from Colquitt (2001), illustrates the hypotheses derived from this 
literature. Note that some of these hypotheses directly contradict hypotheses that the 
group engagement model (GEM) implies, which are laid out as part of RQ 3. Most of the 
contradictions are the result of structural differences. For example, the OMJ conceives of 
decision satisfaction as an outcome, while the GEM lumps decision satisfaction together 
with judgments about distributive justice. In the GEM, both distributive justice and 
decision satisfaction are considered indirectly predictive of other behavioral outcomes, 
rather than being outcomes themselves (compare Figures 1.1 and 1.2). 
RH 2: Compared to the other justice judgments, perceptions of procedural justice 
will better predict better legal compliance expectations. In other words, those 
who perceive the process itself as more procedurally fair will indicate increased 
expectations that the mother in the scenario will comply with the court and reunite 
with her daughter.  
RH 3: Compared to the other justice judgments, perceptions of interactional 
justice will better predict leader evaluations and collective esteem.  
RH 3a: Those who perceive fairer interpersonal justice to be fairer will 
evaluate the judge more positively.    
RH 3b: Those who perceive fairer informational justice will indicate 
greater endorsement for the mother’s sense of collective esteem, or respect 
derived from social identity as a parent. 
RH 4: Compared to the other justice judgments, perceptions of distributive justice 
will better predict decision satisfaction. Those who perceive the decision as more 
distributively fair will indicate increased satisfaction with the decision, and this 
relationship will be stronger than the relationship between procedural and 
interactional justice and decision satisfaction. 
RQ3: How well does the group engagement model account for justice outcomes? 
 According to Tyler and Blader (2003, Figure 1.2), the group engagement model 
(GEM) is an attempt to explain the underlying mechanism that causes positive procedural 
treatment to increase motivation to engage in cooperative behavior. In short, the model 
argues that procedural justice influences behavioral engagement via identity judgments. 
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Figure 1.1. The organizational model of justice (OMJ). Predicted relationships between justice judgments 
and their associated outcomes according to the OMJ. The dashed ovals represent constructs that were not 
directly manipulated in this study. Even so, they were measured and tested in select analyses. Adapted 
from Colquitt (2001). 
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Positive procedural treatment provides information about a person’s status in the group, 
respect for the group, and identification with the group, which in turn influences their 
willingness to engage in the group, including their willingness to comply with mandatory 
behaviors, like legal orders. This is called the “social identity mediation hypothesis.” 
Note that for this set of hypotheses, the term “procedural justice” referred to procedural 
and interactional justice, combined, as is typical in the psycholegal justice literature. 
RH 5: The group engagement model will adequately represent the data. More 
specifically, procedural justice judgments will predict identity judgments, which 
will predict participants’ predictions that the mother in the scenario will comply 
with the law. In addition, perceptions of distributive justice and outcome 
favorability, which is operationalized as decision satisfaction in this study, will 
jointly predict identity judgments. Both procedural justice and resource judgments 
will exert indirect effects on perceived likelihood of compliance. 
In addition to the relationships illustrated in Figure 2, the group engagement 
model specifies direct relationships where mandatory behavior is concerned: 
RH 6: Perceptions of the mother’s pride as a parent will directly predict 
perceptions of her likelihood of legal compliance. This hypothesis follows from 
the authors’ distinction between pride and respect. Pride should reflect one’s 
perceptions of the status of the larger group, so that when one is proud of their 
group, they are more inclined to comply with group demands, including obeying 
legal orders. 
RH 7: Resource judgments—distributive justice and decision satisfaction—will 
directly predict perceptions of the mother’s likelihood of compliance. According 
to Tyler and Blader (2003), mandatory behaviors are distinguishable from 
discretionary ones in that group-controlled resources, like incentives and 
sanctions motivate their enactments, and thus, resource judgments naturally have 
a more direct influence on these behaviors. 
RQ 4: Does neglect severity moderate the relationships between procedural and 
interactional justice judgments and their outcomes? 
 The organizational justice literature provides a foundation for expecting that the 
severity of the mother’s neglect might influence participants’ justice judgments. In 
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Figure 1.2. The group engagement model (GEM). Reproduced from Tyler and Blader 
(2003). 
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particular, Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) and Cropanzano, Slaughter, and Bachiochi 
(2005) found that evaluations of the decision, in terms of justice and approval, moderate 
the relationships between procedural and interactional justice and decision outcomes. In 
particular, when the perceiver considers the decision unfair and disapproves of it, then 
procedural justice judgments will be more strongly predictive of other decision-related 
outcomes.  In other words, when distributive justice and decision satisfaction are low, 
then the relationship between procedural justice judgments and other decision outcomes, 
like legal compliance, will be stronger than when distributive justice and decision 
satisfaction are high. 
RH 8: Participants will indicate lower distributive justice and decision 
satisfaction in the moderate neglect condition, as opposed to the severe neglect 
condition. In this study, manipulation of the severity of neglect is intended to 
serve as an indirect proxy for manipulation of distributive justice. This condition 
is a prerequisite for establishing the moderator effect predicted in RH 9. 
RH 9: Participants in the moderate neglect condition will exhibit weaker 
relationships between procedural and interactional justice and their outcomes, as 
compared to participants in the severe neglect condition. Because neglect severity 
influences evaluations of distributive justice and decision satisfaction, and these 
constructs are known to act as moderators, neglect severity will also act as a 
moderator.  
RH 10: Distributive justice judgments and decision satisfaction will moderate the 
relationships between procedural and interactional justice and their associated 
outcomes. Specifically, procedural and interactional justice judgments will have 
stronger relationships to their associated outcomes when decision satisfaction and 
decision satisfaction are low.  
RQ 5: Does participant role—decision-maker (i.e., judge) versus decision-recipient (i.e, 
parent) moderate the relationships between justice judgments and outcomes? 
 The final research question is inspired by recent work conducted by Heuer, 
Penrod, and Kattan (2007). In a series of studies, the authors demonstrated that the 
traditional relationships between justice judgments and outcomes do not always manifest. 
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Specifically, they showed that when decision-makers, rather than decision-recipients, 
evaluate scenarios, their evaluations are more closely related to outcome concerns than 
procedural ones. They defined “outcome concerns” as concerns about the potential costs 
and benefits of the underlying acts or procedures, as well as perceptions of distributive 
justice and decision satisfaction. In this study, I operationalized the societal costs and 
benefits of the child protection system as concerns about infringement on parents’ rights, 
beliefs about the magnitude of threat of child neglect, beliefs about the efficacy of the 
child protection system, and perceptions of the fairness of child removal generally. 
 RH 11: As compared to decision-recipients, decision-makers’ decision 
satisfaction will be more strongly related to their judgments about the costs and 
benefits of child protection than to their procedural justice judgments. In other 
words, whereas decision-recipients’ approval of the hearing decision in the 
scenario will be strongly related to their procedural justice judgments, the same 
will not be true for decision-makers. For those induced to take on the perspective 
of a juvenile court judge, their understanding of the costs and benefits of the child 
protection system will better predict their evaluations than will the fairness of the 
procedural and interpersonal treatment in this particular hearing.  
 RH 12: Even when evaluating procedural justice, costs and benefits will more 
strongly influence decision-makers than will traditional procedural justice 
criteria. This hypothesis is derived directly from Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan 
(2007), who found that decision-makers’ evaluations of procedural justice are 
more strongly related to their perceptions of the societal costs and benefits of the 
underlying legal procedure than to the traditional predictors of procedural justice 
judgments. Translated, this hypothesis means that perceptions of the costs and 
benefits of child protection will more strongly predict decision-makers’ 
procedural justice judgments than will the traditional procedural justice items, 
which measure evaluation of the procedural, interpersonal, and informational 
justice.  
Note that, as is also true for the group engagement model, the definition of 
“procedural justice” used by Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) is less nuanced than that 
used in the organizational justice literature. Specifically, the authors defined procedural 
justice as a combination of procedural, interpersonal, and informational treatment. 
However, the authors also noted that future research should begin exploring the role and 
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strength of the moderator effect with different justice criteria. Therefore, in testing these 
hypotheses, I evaluated whether role had effects on either of the relationships between 
procedural and interactional justice and their outcomes.  
 Note that the existence of a role effect necessarily affects the relationships 
hypothesized for each of the previous proposed research questions. Given that this is a 
new area of research, and that most past research has evaluated decision-recipients’ 
judgments, all of the hypotheses derived from the past literature maybe necessarily 
qualified by the role moderator effect identified by Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007). For 
that reason, I also selectively explored some hypotheses separately for only those 
participants in the decision-recipient condition.  
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Chapter 2. Method 
Participants 
 Pilot data. Before collecting the experimental data, I pilot tested the stimulus 
materials to check that the manipulations were effective. I recruited pilot participants 
from the Department of Psychology subject pool at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
Pilot participants were at least 19 years old, the age of consent in Nebraska, and earned  
one course credit for their participation. A total of 88 students participated in the pilot 
study, but 11 did not fully complete the survey ( = 77). Each of the 16 conditions 
contained between four and six participants, and each of the main effect comparisons 
contained between 36 and 41 participants per group. The results of the analyses, which 
showed that the manipulations were successful, appear in detail in the “Results” section 
of this dissertation. 
Experimental data. I recruited 320 participants from StudyResponse, a web-based 
organization operated at Syracuse University that maintains a database of volunteers for 
online research. Participants recruited from this subject pool were each paid $5. 
Participation was limited to individuals who were at least 19 years old. In the end, 335 
people entered the online survey. Of those, 12 did not actually complete any of the 
measures, reducing the sample size to 323 participants, with between 17 and 22 
participants per condition. Within this sample, there remained intermittent missing data. 
To explore the extent of missing data, I calculated the frequency distribution for each 
item, excluding demographics. There was only a small proportion of missing data for 
every item—no more than 8 responses out of 323 (2.5%) per item. All analyses reported 
below include completed data from the 323 participants.  
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The final sample (N=323) averaged 47.58 years old (SD = 13.19). The sample 
was evenly split among genders (48.0% , n = 155, self-identified as female), but was 
predominantly white (90.4%, n = 292, self-identified as white). Only 24 participants 
identified with a racial/ethnic group other than white, rendering racial comparisons within 
the sample impossible. Most of the participants (n = 208, 64.4%) reported that they had 
children. Of those who had children, the number ranged from 1 to 13 children (M = 2.36, 
SD = 1.34). The average age of participants’ youngest child was 19.81 years old (SD = 
12.85), ranging from less than a year old to 57 years old. The majority of respondents 
with minor children (93.4%, n = 137) indicated that they currently had physical custody. 
Only seven respondents indicated they did not have custody; thus, I did not explore 
custody itself in subsequent analyses. Finally, when asked to indicate how liberal or 
conservative they considered themselves, the average response was 3.97 (SD = 1.69) 
which was just slight above the middle of the seven-point scale, where higher numbers 
meant more conservative. Aside from race and custody, each of the demographic 
characteristics (i.e., gender, whether a parent, number of children, and political 
orientation) were explored in subsequent analyses. 
Design 
 The experiment was a 2 (procedural treatment: unfair and fair) X 2 (interactional 
treatment: unfair and fair) X 2 (level of neglect: moderate and severe) X 2 (decision-
making role: judge or parent) between-groups factorial design. The computer program 
randomly assigned participants to each of the 16 conditions after they consented to 
participation.  
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Procedure 
Both pilot and experimental participants completed the study on a computer of 
their choice going first to a URL address that sent them directly to the informed consent 
page. Pilot participants entered their name, so that they could be properly assigned course 
credit. Experimental participants entered their StudyResponse ID number, which allowed 
StudyResponse to send them payment. After consenting, participants went to a 
“Welcome” page, the sole purpose of which was to randomly assign participants to one 
of the sixteen conditions. Both the informed consent and welcome pages were hosted on 
the psychology department server. When participants clicked the “next” button on the 
welcome page, the program randomly sent them to one of the sixteen conditions, each of 
which had a separate URL link on the SurveyMonkey website. The data was stored on 
the SurveyMonkey server until the researcher downloaded it. For both samples, names or 
IDs were stored in a separate database and were not in any way traceable to a particular 
condition or set of responses.  
Once assigned to a condition, participants first completed the role induction 
procedure, where they were encouraged to think about what it would be like to be either a 
decision-maker (judge) or decision-recipient (parent) in a child abuse case (Appendix A). 
The role induction procedure was similar to the one that Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan 
(2007) used. The website instructed participants that the study was about a juvenile court 
case, specifically a child abuse case. Participants in the judge condition read a statement 
about what a juvenile court judge does and then imagined that they were a juvenile court 
judge who frequently heard child neglect cases. They then described whether they 
thought it would be easy or difficult to be a juvenile court judge, what kinds of 
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information they would need to make good decisions in these cases, and how it would 
feel to be this kind of judge. Participants in the parent condition imagined being a single 
parent of a 10-year-old child who had just been removed from the home. They described 
what it would be like to be a parent in this situation, how they would feel about attending 
the hearing, and what they would expect to happen at the hearing.  
Following the role induction procedure, participants read a “case file,” described 
in detail below. After reading the case file, participants completed the measures: 
manipulation checks; a measure of Justice Perceptions, adapted from Colquitt (2001); a 
measure of Justice Outcomes, also adapted from Colquitt (2001); a measure of identity 
judgments, adapted from Tyler and Blader (2001); a measure of Societal Costs and 
Benefits, adapted from Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007); and demographic questions. 
Materials 
The “case file” described the case of Hailey Smith, born January 4, 1999, which 
was loosely based on two recent cases held before the Sarpy County Juvenile Court in 
Nebraska. The first screen told participants that “the next several pages will walk you 
through the case file for the case of Hailey Smith. The case file contains four documents. 
For each document, you will first read a description of the document’s purpose, then you 
will read the actual document.” Proceeding through the study, participants then read the 
Official Juvenile Petition, Official Caseworker Court Report, Protective Custody Hearing 
Summary, and the Official Protective Custody Hearing Findings and Order. Each 
document was on a separate webpage. The top of the webpage described the purpose of 
the document, and the bottom showed the actual document.  
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Official Juvenile Petition. The description of the petition stated, “The county 
attorney files the official petition. The purpose of the petition is to describe the nature of 
the situation that led to removing Hailey from her mother’s home and bringing the case 
before the court.” The text of the petition was in the same format and general language as 
a petition in the juvenile courts of Nebraska and was largely a modification of local court 
records. The petition included one manipulation—severity of neglect—and was a page 
long. Both versions are included in Appendix B. The severity of neglect manipulation is 
described in detail in the “manipulations” section below.  
Official Caseworker Court Report. The description of the court report stated its 
“purpose is for the caseworker to make recommendations to the judge about what to 
order for the family.” The court report was similar in format to those actual reports 
submitted by caseworkers. However, it was shorter and more concise so that the final 
recommendations were more salient to participants. The report was approximately one 
page, and contained no manipulations, meaning that all participants saw the same report 
(Appendix C). 
In the report, the caseworker made four recommendations to the court. First, the 
caseworker recommended that the child remain in the legal and physical custody of 
Health and Human Services. Second, she recommended that the mother participate in a 
parenting assessment and parenting class. Third, the caseworker recommended that the 
judge order the mother to “maintain a sanitary and safe home environment for Hailey.” 
Finally, she recommended that the judge order the mother to “ensure that Hailey is 
properly supervised at all times.” 
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Protective Custody Hearing Summary. The description of the summary stated, 
“The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare 
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the 
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and 
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the 
court process.” This language is similar to that written in the Resource Guidelines 
published by the National Council for Juvenile and Family Court Judges (1995). 
The text of the hearing summary was a combination of dialogue and description 
of what occurred at the actual hearing. Using descriptive text and dialogue allowed for 
the most effective manipulation of the procedural and interactional treatment variables 
(described later). In addition, the severity of neglect manipulation appeared again within 
the hearing summary. The result was eight different versions of the hearing summary 
(Appendix D). At the end, the hearing summary described the judge’s final decision, 
which was to keep the child outside of her mother’s home pending adjudication. The 
exact language of the decision varied as part of the interactional justice manipulation. 
Each summary was about one and a half pages long. 
Official Protective Custody Hearing Findings and Order. The Case File described 
this document as “the judge’s official order at the end of the protective custody hearing. It 
formalizes the decision the judge made during the hearing, including whether the child 
should remain out of her mother’s home or return home pending the next hearing.” The 
text and format of the order appeared as realistic as possible. Much of the language came 
from form-language used in local court practice. The order did not contain any of the 
manipulations, but it did reiterate the judge’s final decision to keep Hailey from returning 
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to her mother’s home pending adjudication by stating, “… continued placement in the 
residence is contrary to the child’s welfare because the house was found in a dirty 
condition and the child was found alone without adult supervision.” As will be illustrated 
below, this language was vague enough that it described both neglect conditions. The 
order was less than one page long (Appendix E).  
Manipulations 
 Procedural treatment. The eight versions of the Protective Custody Hearing 
Summary provided the procedural treatment manipulation (Appendix D). While 
procedural treatment manipulations vary extensively across studies, most definitions 
include “voice,” or the opportunity to speak one’s side, as a key component (Bies & 
Shapiro, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 2006; Colquitt, 2001). In addition, 
experimental manipulations of procedural treatment usually involve a manipulation of 
voice (e.g., Holbrook, 1999; Williams, 1999). For this reason, I manipulated procedural 
justice in this study by varying the mother’s opportunity to personally present 
information to the court during the hearing.  
In both conditions, the mother’s attorney asked the court for permission for the 
mother to make a statement. This is the relevant excerpt from the Summary: 
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on 
behalf of her client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request 
on behalf of my client. Your honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-
year-old girl who is doing the best she can with limited resources. If it 
pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to explain the 
situation from her own perspective.” 
 
In the unfair condition, the judge refused that request:  
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law prevents me 
from allowing Ms. Smith to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the 
case. The purpose of the protective custody hearing is merely to decide on 
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the child’s placement, and parents are not allowed to provide information 
at this hearing. Ms. Smith cannot speak to the court in the manner you 
requested. I cannot hear her testimony now.” 
 
In the fair condition, the judge granted that request: 
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law requires that I 
allow Ms. Smith to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The 
purpose of the protective custody hearing is to decide on the child’s 
placement, and parents are allowed to provide information at this hearing. 
Ms. Smith has a right to provide her own perspective, so that I may 
consider it in deciding Hailey’s placement. I can hear her testimony now.” 
 
The mother then described her side of the story to the judge. 
 
The emphasis on jurisdictional practice served the purpose of emphasizing that this was a 
formal, legal requirement, rather than a personal decision made by the judge. Similarly, 
having the dialogue occur between the judge and the attorney, rather than between the 
judge and the mother, served to isolate the effects of procedural treatment and avoid 
confounds with interactional justice, which would result if the communication were 
interpersonal. 
 Interactional Treatment. Like the procedural treatment manipulation, the 
interactional treatment manipulation was contained within the eight versions of the 
Protective Custody Hearing Summary (Appendix D). However, components of the 
interactional treatment manipulation appeared throughout the description, rather than 
being limited to one paragraph. This is because the interactions between the judge and the 
parent in a real case are likely to occur at multiple points in the hearing.  
Researchers have identified interpersonal and informational treatment as 
important dimensions of interactional justice (Bies, 2005; Colquit, 2001). The fair and 
unfair conditions reflected both of these dimensions. Specifically, personal attention 
varied according to the judge’s behavior toward the mother during the hearing. In the 
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unfair condition, the text describes the judge as “irritated,” “disapproving,” “rude,” 
“hostile,” and “irate.” When reviewing the allegations, the judge made numerous 
negative comments. For example, at one point, the judge referred to the allegations in the 
petition as “disgusting,” and later, the judge told the mother that he was “absolutely 
appalled.” In contrast, in the fair condition, the text described the judge as “smiling,” 
“interested,” and “gentle.” 
Variations in the provision of information and justifications added to the 
interactional factor manipulation. In the unfair condition, the judge did not make an extra 
effort to explain the nature of the hearing or the decision to keep Hailey in the physical 
custody of the Department of Health and Human Services. In the fair condition, however, 
the judge did make an extra effort. At the beginning of the hearing, the judge spoke 
directly to the mother and said: 
Ms. Smith, this is called the protective custody hearing. I want to explain 
to you why you are here. As you know, Hailey was living with you up 
until a few days ago, when the caseworker took her out of your custody. 
The purpose of today’s hearing is for me to hear about why Hailey was 
removed and for me to decide if Hailey should remain out of your home 
for now or if she is safe to be returned to your care while the case 
continues. Do you understand? 
“Good,” said the judge smiling. 
 
At the end of the hearing, the judge explained his decision directly to the mother: 
Ms. Smith, this means that I have ordered that Hailey live outside of your 
home for the time being. I have made this decision based on what I believe 
to be in Hailey’s best interests. Based on what I have read in this petition, 
I believe that you have not taken appropriate care of Hailey, and that she is 
not safe in your home. Ms. Smith, do you have any questions about what 
has happened here today? 
 
Note that this manipulation varied demeanor and justification jointly because others have 
found these factors to be central components of perceptions of interactional justice (Bies 
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& Moag, 1986; Bies, 2005; Colquitt, 2001). Nonetheless, I measured both informational 
justice and interpersonal justice judgments. 
 Severity of neglect. The severity of neglect manipulation was contained in both 
the Petition (Appendix B) and the Hearing Summary (Appendix C). The Petition laid out 
the allegations. In both versions, there were three separate allegations and both cases 
involved dirty living conditions and lack of supervision. However, the living conditions 
were worse in the more severe condition. More specifically, in the severe condition: (1) a 
toilet was found broken, filled with feces and urine, and feces was found on the floor; (2) 
the house was filled with clothes, food containers, debris, and a strong smell of urine; and 
(3) piles of rat feces were scattered throughout the home. In the moderate condition: (1) 
the minor was found sitting home watching television with no adult around; (2) the child 
explained that her mother worked until five and that she was always home alone from 
4pm until her mother returned from work; (3) the kitchen sink, table, and counters were 
full of dirty dishes and pans and there was no clean food preparation area in the kitchen.  
In summary, the house was dirty and the child was found home alone in both 
conditions. The fact that child was regularly unattended for a couple hours each weekday 
is central to the petition in the moderate condition, but lack of supervision was not central 
to the severe condition. Instead, the dirty home was central to the petition in the severe 
condition, while the dirtiness was not central to the petition in the moderate condition. 
This manipulation was repeated in the Hearing Summaries (Appendix D) when the judge 
went through each of the three allegations one by one. Repeating the allegations also 
provided a framework for part of the interactional treatment manipulation, where the 
judge reacted harshly in the unfair condition. 
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Measures 
Appendix F contains the text of all measures. Note that pilot participants only 
answered the manipulation checks and global justice judgment measures. 
 Manipulation checks. To check the success of the role induction manipulation, I 
asked one multiple choice question: “Before you read the case, I asked you to evaluate it 
from one of the following perspectives. Please select the perspective you were assigned: 
County Attorney, Parent’s Attorney, Judge, or Parent.” To check the success of the 
severity of neglect manipulation, I asked participants four questions. The first three were 
answered on 7-point scales: 1) This was a serious case of neglect (scale: 1 (not at all 
serious) to 7 (very serious)); 2) Hailey was living in a harmful environment with her 
mother (scale: 1 (not at all harmful) to 7 (very harmful)); 3) Hailey was living in a dirty 
home (scale: 1 (not at all dirty) to 7 (very dirty)). The fourth was a true/false question 
written to verify that participants understood that Hailey was unsupervised in both 
conditions.  
 Two items served as checks for each of the procedural and interactional treatment 
manipulations.  The items checking the procedural treatment manipulation were the 
following two true/false questions: 1) The mother was given an opportunity to present her 
story at the hearing; 2) The judge had no choice about whether to let the mother present 
her story at the hearing. Note that the answer to the second question was true in all 
conditions, but understanding the lack of judicial discretion was central to true procedural 
treatment manipulation. Participants answered the two manipulation checks for the 
interactional treatment manipulations on 7-point scales: 1) The judge expressed 
disapproval of the mother (scale: 1 (no disapproval at all) to 7 (a lot of disapproval)); 2) 
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The judge explained his decision to the mother (scale: 1 (no explanation at all) to 7 (a lot 
of explanation)). 
 While the decision or outcome of the hearing remained constant in this study, it 
was important that participants understood what that outcome was. Therefore, 
participants answered one true/false question to measure outcome understanding: The 
judge returned Hailey to her mother’s home at the end of the hearing. 
 Justice perceptions. The items that measured perceptions of procedural, 
interactional, and distributive justice were from Colquitt’s (2001) Organizational Justice 
Measure (Colquitt, 2001). The items were as true as possible to their origin, but adapted 
where necessary to better fit the context. Consistent with Colquitt’s (2001) measure, all 
items were written in question format beginning with “To what extent….” However, I 
chose to lengthen the scale from 5 to 7 points, from 1 (to a small extent) to 7 (to a large 
extent). Five items measured procedural justice criteria (e.g., To what extent was the 
mother able to express her views and feelings during the hearing procedure?). Eight items 
measured interactional justice criteria, four of which measured interpersonal justice 
criteria (e.g., To what extent did the judge treat the mother in a polite manner?) and four 
measured informational justice criteria (e.g., To what extent did the judge explain his 
decision thoroughly?). Three additional items measured distributive justice criteria (e.g., 
To what extent did the judge’s decision reflect what the mother deserved?).  
 In addition to measuring the criteria of justice judgments, I also added three 
global justice items. The items measured participants overall sense of procedural, 
interactional, and distributive justice along the same 7-point scale. All justice perception 
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items appear in Appendix F, with items intended to measure global justice judgments so 
noted. 
Justice outcomes. Justice outcomes were also adapted from Colquitt (2001). I 
measured four outcomes: decision satisfaction, leader evaluation, rule compliance, and 
collective esteem. Consistent with Colquitt (2001), the scale for all items were 7-point 
scales from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree completely). Four items measured 
decision satisfaction (e.g., The judge’s decision was acceptable.). Four items measured 
leader evaluation (e.g., The judge was a good judge.). Four items measured legal 
compliance (e.g., The mother will try to follow the rules of her case plan.). Finally, three 
items measured collective esteem, defined in terms of a general sense of respect 
(Colquitt, 2001; e.g., If most people knew the mother well, they would respect her 
values.). 
Identity judgments. In order to test the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 
2003), I measured identity judgments—pride, respect, and identification. The same items 
that measured collective esteem (see above) also measured respect. This is because 
Colquitt (2001) operationalized collective esteem by drawing on Tyler’s earlier work 
(Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996), which also formed the foundation for Tyler and 
Blader’s (2003) later group engagement model. Three items measured pride (e.g., The 
mother is proud to think of herself as a parent.) and four items measured identification 
(e.g., Being a parent says a lot about who the mother is as a person.). Since identity 
judgments overlapped with the collective esteem judgments, they were measured on the 
same scale, namely, a 7-point  scale from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree 
completely). 
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 Societal costs and benefits. Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) argued that 
perceptions of societal costs and benefits of procedural violations drive the “decision role 
moderator effect,” that is, the differential evaluations of decision-makers and decision-
recipients. Because societal costs and benefits depend entirely on the procedural context, 
it was impossible to adopt the researchers’ measures for this study. I wrote items to 
mirror the core idea of a cost-benefit analysis, directed toward evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of child protection and child removal, both in general and with reference to this 
case. These items were also measured on a 7-point scale, from 1 (disagree completely) to 
7 (agree completely).  
Four items measured respect for parents’ rights (e.g., In general, removal of 
children from their homes is an infringement on parents’ rights.). Six items measured 
magnitude of the threat of child neglect (e.g., Child neglect is a big problem in our 
society). Five items measured attitudes about the efficacy of child protective services 
interventions (e.g., When child protective services intervenes, the risk of child neglect is 
effectively reduced.). Finally, four items measured general attitudes about the fairness of 
child removal (e.g., In this case, the way that the child was removed from her home was 
fair.). This latter set of items is the most tenuously related to the original ideas proposed 
by Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007). However, participants’ evaluations of the fairness 
of the removal itself could potentially moderate the reactions to the hearing. In order to 
tease out those relationships, it was important to include these items. 
 Demographics. Participants were asked a brief set of demographic questions: age, 
gender, race/ethnicity, and liberal/conservative orientation. In addition, participants were 
asked to indicate whether they had children, how many, the ages of each child, and 
53 
 
whether they currently had physical custody of all minor children. If they did not have 
physical custody of all minor children, participants were asked how long they had not had 
custody, who had custody, and why they did not have custody.  
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Chapter 3. Results 
Pilot Testing: Manipulation Checks 
 Manipulations were verified with a combination of “percent correct” calculations, 
chi-square tests, and analyses of variance (ANOVAs), depending on the item being 
analyzed. For each item, the effect was measured by collapsing the sixteen conditions 
into two groups representing the two levels of the manipulation being verified. In other 
words, I tested only main effects, no interactions. Significant differences between groups 
were tested with chi-square analyses for the True/False items and ANOVA analyses for 
the scaled items. All manipulations were effective at a p < .05 level. 
Two True/False items tested the manipulation of procedural treatment. Most 
respondents (n = 75, 97.4%) correctly answered the item measuring respondents’ 
perceptions of the mother’s opportunity to present her side of the story (i.e., voice), χ2 (1) 
= 69.20, p < .001. Most participants (n = 66, 85.7%) also answered the second item 
correctly; there was no significance test because this was not a manipulation, meaning 
that the correct answer was the same for both groups. Finally, to test the ultimate success 
of the manipulation in altering procedural justice judgments, I compared participants’ 
global procedural justice judgments between those in the fair and unfair treatment 
conditions. As expected, participants in the unfair treatment condition (M = 4.15, SD = 
2.02) perceived the hearing procedure as less fair than participants in the fair treatment 
condition (M = 5.16, SD = 1.61), F (1, 75) = 5.86, p = .02, ηp
2 = .07. 
 Two items, each measured on seven-point scales assessed the interactional justice 
manipulation. Participants in the unfair interactional treatment condition perceived 
greater judicial disapproval of the mother (M = 6.79, SD = .62) than participants in the 
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fair interactional treatment condition (M = 3.69, SD = 1.78), F (1, 75) = 102.86, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .58. Similarly, those in the unfair condition (M = 3.58, SD = 1.52) thought the judge 
gave the mother less explanation for his decision than those in the fair condition (M = 
5.64, SD = 1.31), F (1, 75) = 40.86 = p < .001, ηp
2 = .35. Again, I also compared global 
interactional justice judgments. Participants in the unfair condition (M = 2.92, SD = 1.87) 
thought the judge treated the mother less fairly than those in the fair condition (M = 5.59, 
SD = 1.65), F (1, 75) = 44.28, p < .001, ηp
2 = .37. 
 Four items measured on seven-point scales assessed the severity of neglect 
manipulation. Participants in the severe condition (M = 5.68, SD = 1.31) perceived the 
case as more serious than participants in the moderate condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.41), F 
(1, 75) = 54.70, p < .001, ηp
2 = .42. Likewise, compared to those in the moderate 
condition (M = 3.25, SD = 1.32), those in the severe condition (M = 5.81, SD = 1.27) 
perceived Hailey’s living environment as more harmful, F (1, 75) = 75.52, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.50. Those in the severe condition (M = 6.70, SD = .62) also perceived the home as 
significantly dirtier than those in the moderate condition (M = 4.43, SD = 1.65), F (1, 75) 
= 62.58, p < .001, ηp
2 = .46. Finally, because the severity of neglect manipulation was a 
proxy for distributive justice, I analyzed mean differences on global distributive justice. 
As expected, participants in the severe neglect condition (M = 5.51, SD = 1.30) perceived 
the hearing outcome (i.e., refusal to reunite Hailey with her mother) as more fair than 
participants in the moderate neglect condition (M = 3.33, SD = 1.87), F (1, 75) = 34.87, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .32. To confirm that participants correctly understood the outcome, they 
were asked to indicate whether Hailey was allowed to return home. All participants (n = 
77, 100%) responded correctly. 
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 The final manipulated variable was assigned role—judge or parent. The role 
induction was confirmed with one multiple choice question asking participants to choose 
which of four options (county attorney, parent attorney, judge, or parent) was the role 
they were assigned at the beginning of the study. The majority of participants (n = 72, 
93.5%) correctly answered the question, χ2 (3) = 65.50, p < .001, V = .92.  
Manipulation Checks (Experimental Sample) 
 I ran the exact same analyses as with the pilot sample. The results followed the 
same pattern, although a greater proportion of the experimental sample failed at least one 
manipulation check as compared to the pilot sample, leading to generally smaller 
manipulation effect sizes. Nonetheless, the majority of participants correctly answered 
each dichotomous variable, group differences on continuous variables were all 
significant, and most effect sizes were moderate to large. 
 Regarding the procedural treatment manipulation, 86.1% (n = 278) of participants 
correctly answered whether the mother had no opportunity to present her side of the 
story, χ2 (1) = 172.19, p < .001, V = .73, and 77.4% (n = 250) correctly answered that the 
judge had no discretion in the matter. The manipulation had its intended ultimate effect: 
participants in the fair treatment condition (M = 4.76, SD = 1.91) perceived the process as 
fairer than those in the unfair treatment condition (M = 3.94, SD = 2.37), F (1, 317) = 
11.60, p = .001, ηp
2 = .04. However, this was a small effect size, likely significant only 
because of the large sample size. Regarding the interactional treatment manipulation, 
participants in the fair treatment condition perceived less judicial disapproval toward the 
mother (M = 3.89, SD = 1.88), F (1, 317) = 210.32, p < .001, ηp
2 = .40, greater 
explanation to the mother (M = 5.14, SD = 1.53), F (1, 317), 57.40, p < .001, ηp
2 = .15, 
and greater overall interactional justice, (M = 5.41, SD = 1.70), F (1, 313) = 125.52, p < 
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.001, ηp
2 = .29, as compared to participants in the unfair treatment condition (disapproval 
M = 6.42, SD = 1.14; explanation M = 3.64, SD = 1.98; interactional justice M = 3.07, SD 
= 2.02).  
Similarly, participants in the severe neglect condition perceived the case as more 
serious (M = 6.00, SD = 1.11), F (1, 321) = 208.31, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39, more harmful to 
Hailey (M = 6.02, SD = 1.09), F (1, 321) = 256.76, p < .001, ηp
2 = .44, involving a dirtier 
home (M = 6.56, SD =.91), F (1, 321) = 181.95, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36, and the outcome as 
more fair (M = 5.34, SD = 1.89), F (1, 317) = 113.81, p < .001, ηp
2 = .26, as compared to 
participants in the moderate neglect condition (seriousness, M = 3.64, SD = 1.76; harm, 
M = 3.44, SD = 1.73; dirtiness, M = 4.57, SD = 1.63; distributive justice M  = 3.04, SD = 
1.96). Finally, most respondents (n = 279, 86.4%) correctly answered the role induction 
manipulation check, χ2 (3) = 242.43, p < .001, V = .87. Similarly, most respondents (n = 
303, 93.8%) correctly identified the outcome. 
 In total, only 193 participants correctly answered the four dichotomous 
manipulation check items that had right and wrong answers. Reducing the sample size to 
these respondents would result in each condition containing between 9 and 17 
respondents, greatly reducing statistical power and potentially impairing the ability to 
detect small effects, especially with regard to the more complex analyses conducted 
herein. Therefore, I did not do this. Instead, I ran many of the analyses with both the full 
sample and with the subsample of those who correctly answered all manipulation checks 
(hereafter, the “correct subsample”).  
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Data Screening and Scale Construction 
 I engaged in data screening and scale construction simultaneously. For each set of 
items intended to work as a scale, I examined their skewness, kurtosis, and distribution 
histograms to gauge normality (Table 3.1). As a rough guideline, I was concerned about 
items with skewness over +/-.8 and kurtosis over +/- 2. However, I considered the 
distribution of each item in the context of the other items in that scale, as well as the 
distribution of the scale itself. In the end, none of the items were seriously abnormal and 
no more than one of the items in each scale had skewness or kurtosis outside the 
guidelines. For those items that did have skewness or kurtosis levels outside the 
guidelines, they were only marginally beyond the threshold. For these reasons, I chose to 
keep all items in their raw format. In addition to normality statistics, Table 3.1 also 
reports the means and standard deviations for all items. 
Once satisfied that the items had adequate distributions, I moved on to creating 
the scales. First, I confirmed that the items were correlated with each other, as they 
should be if they all measure the same construct. Second, I tested the scale’s reliability 
using Cronbach’s alpha. I examined the Corrected Item-Total Correlation and the alpha if 
each item was deleted to decide whether any items should be dropped from the scale. The 
reliability statistics supported keeping every item in each scale. Finally, I created the 
scales by averaging responses for each item and examined the distribution of scale scores 
for normality using the same procedure as for the individual items.  
All scales had adequate reliability and roughly normal distributions (Table 3.1). I 
created three global justice judgment scales (procedural, interactional, and distributive). I 
also created subscales for the two subcomponents of interactional justice that were used 
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in certain analyses: interpersonal and informational justice. Note that even though 
interpersonal and informational justice were manipulated separately, their means and 
standard deviations provided some evidence that participants had varied evaluations of 
the two constructs. This variability allowed me to use these subscales in place of global 
interactional justice scale in many of the subsequent analyses. Higher scores on all of 
these scales represented higher perceptions of fairness. As expected, all three global 
scales were significantly, positively, and largely correlated with each other (Table 3.2). I 
reran the analyses with the correct subsample and the same pattern emerged. 
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Scales and Items for the Full Experimental Sample 
Scale/Item M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Justice Judgments     
Procedural Justice Scale (α = .77) 3.88 1.42 -.01 -.63 
Was the mother able to express her views? 3.31 2.27 .29 -1.51 
Did the mother have influence over the 
decision? 
2.39 1.77 .96 -.38 
Was the hearing procedure free of bias? 3.76 2.11 .12 -1.31 
Did the hearing procedure uphold ethical 
standards? 
5.12 1.72 -.73 -.29 
Interactional Justice Scale (α = .95) 4.39 1.88 -.18 -1.26 
Interpersonal Justice Scale (α = .98) 4.05 2.29 -.14 -1.55 
Did the judge treat the mother in a polite 
manner? 
4.16 2.37 -.20 -1.56 
Did the judge treat the mother with 
dignity? 
3.93 2.31 -.06 -1.55 
Did the judge treat the mother with 
respect? 
3.90 2.31 -.02 -1.55 
Did the judge refrain from improper 
remarks? 
4.24 2.48 -.23 -1.63 
Informational Justice Scale (α = .88) 4.73 1.72 -.36 -.87 
Was the judge candid with the mother? 5.17 1.93 -.85 -.41 
Did the judge explain his decision 
thoroughly? 
4.42 2.10 -.29 -1.29 
Did the judge explain the procedures 
thoroughly? 
4.71 2.00 -.47 -1.04 
Were the judge’s explanations reasonable? 4.58 2.03 -.37 -1.09 
Distributive Justice Scale (α = .98) 4.35 2.13 -.21 -1.36 
Did the decision reflect what the mother 
deserved? 
4.17 2.18 -.13 -1.40 
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Was the decision appropriate given the 
situation? 
4.46 2.19 -.29 -1.33 
Was the decision justified given what the 
mother did? 
4.44 2.17 -.25 -1.35 
Justice Outcomes     
Decision Satisfaction Scale (α = .97) 4.17 2.14 -.11 -1.41 
The judge’s decision was acceptable. 4.49 2.17 -.27 -1.35 
I am satisfied with the judge’s decision. 4.28 2.28 -.16 -1.49 
The mother should be satisfied with the 
decision. 
3.55 2.23 .28 -1.38 
I agreed with the judge’s decision. 4.33 2.27 -.22 -1.46 
Leader Evaluation Scale (α = .98) 4.08 2.12 -.10 -1.35 
The judge was a good judge. 4.25 2.11 -.19 -1.25 
I really liked the judge. 3.83 2.15 .03 -1.35 
The judge did a good job at this hearing. 4.12 2.22 -.12 -1.41 
I respect this judge. 4.15 2.20 -.16 -1.37 
Legal Compliance Scale (α = .89) 5.23 1.32 -.65 .08 
The mother will try to follow her case plan. 5.10 1.52 -.57 -.29 
The mother will attend her next hearing on 
time. 
5.54 1.46 -.75 -.15 
The mother will follow the judge’s orders. 5.35 1.51 -.74 -.02 
The mother will be reunited with her 
daughter. 
4.92 1.63 -.50 -.35 
Collective Esteem Scale (α = .95) 3.30 1.56 .29 -.48 
Most people would respect the mother’s 
values. 
3.58 1.62 .10 -.54 
Most people would think highly of the 
mother. 
3.34 1.67 .27 -.73 
Most people would approve of the mother. 2.98 1.64 .48 -.46 
 
Identity Judgments 
    
Respect (same as Collective Esteem, above) - - - - 
Pride (α = .89) 3.47 1.51 .16 -.26 
The mother is proud to think of herself as a 
parent. 
3.55 1.75 .12 -.80 
The mother is complimented by praises of 
parents. 
3.59 1.67 .18 -.52 
The mother talks up being a parent to her 
friends. 
3.30 1.61 .23 -.47 
Identity (α = .80) 4.64 1.42 -.10 -.47 
Being a parent says a lot about the mother 
is. 
4.40 1.84 -.16 -.90 
The mother feels personally responsible as 
a parent. 
4.55 1.88 -.34 -.89 
The mother takes criticism of parenting 4.52 1.80 -.29 -.86 
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personally. 
 
Societal Costs and Benefits     
Respect for Parents’ Rights (α = .93) 3.43 1.76 .17 -1.03 
Removal is an infringement on parents’ 
rights. 
3.43 1.85 .25 -1.00 
In this case, removal was an infringement. 3.49 2.09 .25 -1.27 
Child protection hearings are an 
infringement. 
3.32 1.79 .27 -.90 
This hearing was an infringement. 3.45 2.03 .23 -1.21 
Magnitude of Threat of Child Neglect (α = 
.90) 
5.38 1.30 -.55 -.50 
Child neglect is a big problem in our 
society. 
5.57 1.46 -.71 -.44 
In this case, I am worried about the 
mother’s behavior. 
4.81 1.82 -.52 -.72 
I am worried about the extent of neglect in 
our society. 
5.57 1.48 -.79 -.21 
Child neglect is a risk to children’s safety. 5.92 1.29 -1.10 .59 
In this case, the mother’s behavior was a 
threat. 
4.96 1.88 -.53 -.83 
In cases like this, our society should be 
worried. 
5.41 1.64 -.80 -.32 
Efficacy of Child Protection as Intervention 
(α = .91) 
4.36 1.42 -.15 -.38 
When CPS intervenes, the risk is effectively 
reduced. 
4.31 1.69 -.20 -.73 
CPS is an effective intervention system. 4.26 1.65 -.24 -.59 
Removing children from their homes is a 
good strategy. 
4.64 1.65 -.25 -.64 
Court hearings are effective at reducing 
the risks. 
4.38 1.57 -.21 -.40 
Court hearings are effective at reducing 
the amount. 
4.21 1.65 -.19 -.50 
Fairness of Child Removal (α = .92) 4.41 1.73 -.16 -.96 
The way the child was removed from her 
home was fair. 
4.33 2.13 -.18 -1.31 
Removing the child was a fair response. 4.51 2.17 -.32 -1.30 
We use fair procedures to remove children. 4.48 1.67 -.36 -.47 
I approve of the removal procedures used 
by society. 
4.34 1.73 -.14 -.77 
 
I created four scales to represent each of the four measured justice outcomes: 
decision satisfaction, leader evaluation, legal compliance, and collective esteem. Most, 
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though not all, of the justice judgments were significantly correlated with each other 
(Table 3.2). Legal compliance stood out as unrelated to all but one other justice 
outcome—collective esteem. However, within the correct subsample, the correlation 
between legal compliance and decision satisfaction became significant, r (188) = -.23, p 
= .001, and the correlation with leader evaluation became marginally significant, r (186) 
= -.13, p = .08. In general, the pattern of correlations supported the argument that these 
outcomes are independent, although related. Higher scores on these scales indicated 
higher decision satisfaction, more positive leader evaluation, increased predictions of 
legal compliance, and greater collective esteem/respect. 
 Societal costs and benefits were measured with four separate constructs: 
infringement of child protection on parents’ rights, magnitude of threat of neglect, 
efficacy of child protection as an intervention, and fairness of child removal. To simplify 
hypothesis-testing, I explored whether the former two and latter two scales could be 
combined into overall costs and benefits scales. Reliability for the costs scale was 
inadequate, so I kept the measures as four separate scales. Higher scores represented 
higher perceptions of infringement, higher perceived threat, higher perceived efficacy, 
and higher perceptions of fairness of child removal. All scales were significantly 
correlated (Table 3.2). The correlations maintained their directions and significance in the 
correct subsample.  
To test the GEM, I measured three constructs related to social identity: pride, 
respect, and social identification. These constructs were only used in structural equation 
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modeling, so no scale construction was necessary. However, for the sake of confirming 
that the individual items were normal, I included them in the preliminary analyses and in 
Table 3.1. Higher scores on these scales represented greater collective esteem/respect, 
identity, and pride. All three scales were significantly positively correlated (Table 3.2), 
and remained so with the correct subsample. 
 While the demographic variables were not central to the hypotheses, I nonetheless 
did explore the influence of demographic characteristics on the relationships being 
studied. Therefore, as a preliminary step, I examined the distribution of the four 
continuous demographic variables that were measured: age, political orientation, number 
of children, and age of youngest child. Age (M = 47.58, SD = 13.19, skewness = -.07, 
kurtosis = -.78), political orientation (M = 3.97, SD = 1.69, skewness = .11, kurtosis = -
.63), and age of youngest child (M = 19.88, SD = 12.77, skewness = .48, kurtosis = -.70) 
were fairly normally distributed, but number of children was abnormal (M = 2.34, SD = 
1.34, skewness = 3.05, kurtosis = 19.77).  The distribution was clearly distorted by an 
outlier; one respondent had 13 children. Once that case was excluded, the distribution 
became more normal (M = 2.28, SD = 1.11, skewness = 1.01, kurtosis = 1.33). For 
subsequent analyses with this variable, I used the trimmed version. 
Demographic Analyses 
 I proposed no hypotheses about relationships between demographic 
characteristics and the variables of interest in this study. Nonetheless, I anticipated that 
demographic characteristics might be related to the variables and those relationships 
needed to be controlled. I tested for these relationships by running a series of correlations 
or multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) between each of the demographics and 
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all the scale scores. For continuous demographic characteristics (i.e., age, political 
orientation, number of children, and age of youngest child), I ran correlations. For 
dichotomous variables (i.e., gender and whether the participants have children), I ran 
MANOVAs. I chose to run MANOVAs, rather than a series of ANOVAs, because the 
dependent variables were all theoretically interrelated and most were statistically 
correlated. Table 3.3 summarizes the results of the demographic analyses for both the full 
and correct subsamples; this summary only reports the p-values and the effect sizes for 
significant relations. 
 None of the demographic characteristics were significantly related to any of the 
justice judgments, even in the correct subsample. On the other hand, two of the justice 
outcomes were related to demographic characteristics. Using the full sample, collective 
esteem was significantly related to two demographic characteristics: age, r (317) = -.14, p 
= .01, and gender, F (1, 312) = 14.82, p < .001, ηp
2 = .05. Males (M = 3.63, SD = 1.52) 
attributed greater collective esteem to the mother in the case than did females (M = 2.96, 
SD = 1.55). Legal compliance was marginally related to whether participants had 
children, F (1, 309) = 3.99, p = .05, ηp
2 = .01. However, with the correct subsample, these 
relations became weaker and two became non-significant. The effect for gender on 
collective esteem remained significant, F (1, 183) = 4.52, p = .04, ηp
2 = .02. Again, males 
(M = 3.39, SD = 1.49) had higher scores than females (M = 2.90, SD = 1.61). 
 The relationships between demographic characteristics and the first social 
identification variable—respect—were reported in the prior paragraph, because the 
respect construct in the GEM model is the same as the collective esteem construct in the 
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OMJ. Identity was not related to any of the demographic characteristics. Pride, on the 
other hand, was significantly related to four of the demographic variables: age, r (317) = -
.11, p = .04; political orientation, r (317) = -.12, p = .03; number of children, r (194) = -
.20, p = .01; and gender, F (1, 314) = 14.21, p < .001, ηp
2 = .04. Compared to females (M 
= 3.16, SD = 1.53), males (M = 3.79, SD = 1.43) attributed a higher sense of pride in 
being a parent to the mother. In the correct subsample, the age and political orientation 
effects were smaller and not statistically significant. The size effect for gender decreased 
slightly, F (1, 187) = 4.77, p = .03, ηp
2 = .03, again with males (M = 3.63, SD = 1.45) 
reporting higher scores than females (M = 3.15, SD = 1.56). The correlation for number 
of children increased slightly, r (125) = -.21, p = .02. Finally, a new effect emerged: 
participants who had children (M = 4.83, SD = 1.38) attributed significantly higher 
identity as a parent to the mother than participants who did not have children (M = 4.29, 
SD = 1.57), F (1, 186) = 5.66, p = .02, ηp
2 = .03. 
Of the societal costs and benefits scales, efficacy of child protection and fairness 
of removal were not significantly related to the demographic characteristics. However, 
males (M = 3.84, SD = 1.70) had significantly higher scores than females (M = 2.98, SD 
= 1.74) on respect for parents’ rights, F (1, 308) = 19.40, p < .001, ηp
2 = .06, and males 
(M = 5.08, SD = 1.25) had lower scores than females (M = 5.70, SD = 1.30) on perceived 
magnitude of the threat of child neglect, F (1, 308) = 18.17, p < .001, ηp
2 = .06. 
Magnitude of threat was also correlated with age, r (316) = .15, p = .01. In the correct 
subsample, the age effect became smaller in size and non-significant. The gender effects 
remained significant. Males (M = 3.55, SD = 1.72) still had higher scores than females (M 
= 2.83, SD = 1.77) on respect for parents’ rights, F (1, 182) = 7.79, p = .01, ηp
2 = .04, 
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although the effect size was a little smaller. In contrast, males (M = 5.17, SD = 1.26) had 
lower scores than females (M = 5. 87, SD = 1.17) on magnitude of threat, F (1, 182) = 
15.05, p < .001, ηp
2 = .08, and that effect grew a little stronger. 
In conclusion, the demographic relationships were not strongly or consistently 
related to any of the theoretical measures collected for this study. They were not at all 
related to justice judgments. Age, gender, and whether the participants had children were 
related to a subset of the justice outcomes, but those effects were all small. The most 
consistent relationship was between demographic characteristics and one of the 
identification measures—pride. Pride was significantly related to whether the participants 
had children, the number of children, and gender; those effects were also generally small, 
although the effect for number of children was the largest in this set of analyses. 
Regarding societal costs and benefits, age and gender were significantly related to two of 
the measures, but these effects sizes were also small. For subsequent analyses, I 
controlled for the demographic characteristics that were significantly related to the 
measures used in each particular test. For example, RH 1 implicated only the justice 
judgment measures, none of which were significantly related to participants’ 
demographics; therefore, I did not control for any demographics in testing RH 1. 
RH 1: In a confirmatory factor analysis, the four-factor organizational justice 
measurement model will perform significantly better than both the traditional and three-
factor organizational justice models.  
 I conducted separate confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) testing the one-, two-, 
three- and four-factor models (Table 3.4). Remember that the one-factor model combined 
all justice judgments into a single latent construct. The two-factor model, typically used 
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in psycholegal justice models, distinguishes between distributive and procedural justice. 
The three- and four-factor models were both variations on the organizational justice 
model, where the three-factor model posited that procedural, distributive, and 
interactional justice were independent judgments and the four-factor model further 
separated interactional justice into interpersonal and informational justice.  
Table 3.4. Model Fit Statistics for Increasingly Complex Models of Justice Judgments 
 χ2 CFI RMSEA RMSEA Confidence 
Interval 
SRMR 
Full sample  
( =322) 
     
1-factor 2741.58 .57 .28 .27-.29 .18 
2-factor 1528.56 .77 .21 .19-.22 .16 
3-factor 1088.49 .84 .17 .17-.18 .12 
4-factor 559.60 .92 .12 .11-.13 .07 
Correct subsample  
( = 184) 
     
1-factor 1476.78 .59 .27 .26-.28 .18 
2-factor 877.08 .77 .20 .19-.22 .16 
3-factor 590.98 .85 .16 .15-.18 .11 
4-factor 370.01 .92 .12 .11-.14 .07 
ote. Chi-square values were all significant at p < .0001. CFI = comparative fit index; 
RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean 
square residual.  
I used maximum likelihood estimation with Mplus Version 5.1 (Muthén & 
Muthén, 1998), structural equation modeling software. Mplus offers a number of fit 
indices to gauge the success of the model in describing the data. Researchers and 
statisticians give different advice on which indices are better, but all generally agree that 
researchers should interpret multiple indices to determine whether the model is 
successful. For example, Hu and Bentler (1999) recommend that researchers use a 
combination of the SRMR and one of the comparative fit indices (e.g., RMSEA or CFI) 
to conclude adequate model fit. Table 3.4 reports the results of four model fit indices for 
both the full sample and correct subsample: chi-square, the comparative fit index (CFI), 
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the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root mean 
residual (SRMR).  
 The model chi-square has an advantage because it is the only commonly available 
index that gives a significance value. A non-significant chi square value means that the 
data fits the model well. Note that none of the CFAs evaluated here had a non-significant 
chi-square value. However, the chi-square test has important limitations. First, it is a 
conservative test—the model chi-square tests whether the model perfectly fits the 
analyzed covariance matrix derived from the raw data. Second, the chi-square value is 
inflated and the p-value deflated with large samples. Therefore, it is unwise, and often 
inaccurate, to rely solely on the chi-square test to gauge model fit. 
 In contrast to the model chi-square, CFI (Bentler, 1990) tests the current model 
against a null model where there are no relationships between the observed measures. 
Generally, a CFI greater than .90 is considered an adequately-fitting model, and a CFI 
greater than .95 is considered a good-fitting model (Hu & Bentler, 1995; Hu & Bentler, 
1999). According to these guidelines, only the four-factor CFA reached an acceptable 
level (CFI = .92). 
 The RMSEA is referred to as a “badness of fit” index, because it measures the 
lack of fit in the model to a perfectly saturated model. One advantage of the RMSEA is 
that it prefers parsimony; it will always favor the least complex of two models with 
equivalent “explanatory power” (Kline, 2005). Because it measures lack of fit, lower 
scores are better. Browne and Cudeck (1983) recommend that an RMSEA above .10 
indicates an unacceptable fit, a value between .08 and .10 indicates mediocre fit, a value 
between .05 and .08 indicates acceptable fit, and a value below .05 indicates good fit. Hu 
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and Bentler (1999) suggested that a value below .06 indicates that the model has good fit, 
although they encourage researchers not to rely solely on any one index to draw that 
conclusion. Regardless of standard, none of the CFAs tested here had an RMSEA value 
in an acceptable range. The four-factor model was closest (RMSEA = .12), but the value 
was still too high to be considered even mediocre. 
 The SRMR measures the difference between the observed and predicted 
covariance residuals. Because it is also a measure of error variance, lower values indicate 
better fit. Hu and Bentler (1999) recommended using a cut-off value of .08 to reject a 
model as unacceptable. Following this rule, only the four-factor CFA had acceptable fit 
(SRMR = .07). 
 Considering the fit statistics together, and using Hu and Bentler’s (1999) rule-of-
thumb, the four-factor model was accepted as an adequate description of the data. The 
four-factor model was the only of the four models that had CFI and SRMR values in the 
acceptable range, although it is important to note that even for the four-factor model, the 
CFI was not high enough to be considered good-fitting and the RMSEA was outside the 
acceptable range. In other words, even the four-factor model had room for improvement, 
at least as it explained this data sample.  
To make modification decisions, I used the modification indices and parameter 
estimates as a guide. All indicators significantly loaded onto their latent factors. Many of 
the modification recommendations were not theoretically-grounded and some were 
theoretically inconsistent. In the end, I made two modifications. First, I dropped one of 
the procedural justice items because it was redundant with another. Second, I correlated 
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two of the interpersonal justice items to account for potential measurement error resulting 
from their highly similar wording. 
The modified model had good global fit, χ2 (83) = 316.04, p < .001; CFI = .96; 
RMSEA = .09, RMSEA Confidence Interval: .08-.10; SRMR = .06. In fact, the CFI, 
RMSEA, and SRMR all indicated acceptable fit, although the RMSEA remained a little 
high. Because this model included one less item than the original four-factor model, I 
could not perform a χ2 difference test to conclude that the modified model performed 
significantly better. Instead, to evaluate the relative fit of the original four-factor model 
with its modified version, I compared the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and 
Bayesian information criteria (BIC) values; lower scores indicate better fit. Both indices 
of model fit supported the modified model (AIC = 15187.92, BIC = 15384.21) over the 
original model (AIC = 16510.33, BIC = 16714.15). 
 Finally, I reran the modified model with the correct subsample. Again, the model 
performed adequately, χ2 (83) = 245.71, p < .001; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .10, RMSEA 
confidence interval: .09-.12; SRMR = .06. Compared to the original model with the 
correct subsample (AIC =10015.13, BIC =10188.74), the modified model performed 
better (AIC = 9242.77, BIC =9245.25). Figure 3.1 (p. 78) illustrates the modified four-
factor model together with the structural model described in the next section. 
RH 2-4: Consistent with the OMJ, relative to the other justice judgments, procedural 
justice will more strongly predict legal compliance, interpersonal justice will more 
strongly predict leader evaluations, informational justice will more strongly predict 
collective esteem, and distributive justice will more strongly predict decision satisfaction. 
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To test this set of hypotheses I started with the simplest structural model, posited 
by Colquitt (2001), in which each of the justice judgments was uniquely related to each 
of the justice outcomes (Figure 1.1, p. 33). This model contrasted with one that I thought 
was more likely, where justice judgments were relatively stronger predictors, but not 
unique predictors, of their associated outcomes,. If the simple model with single paths to 
each outcome fit the data well, then there would be no need to proceed to a more complex 
assessment of the relative strength of the justice judgments as predicting justice 
outcomes.  
I tested the simple model as a structural equation model, using maximum 
likelihood estimation with Mplus software (Muthén & Muthén, 1998). Following 
Bollen’s (1989) two-step approach, first I tested the measurement model, which had good 
fit in the full sample, χ2 (376) = 890.24, p < .001; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .07, RMSEA 
confidence interval: .06-.07; SRMR = .05, and in the correct subsample, χ2 (376) 
=688.85, p < .001; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .07, RMSEA confidence interval: .06-.07; 
SRMR = .05.  
Table 3.5 reports the correlations between the latent justice judgments and the 
latent justice outcomes. In general, the pattern of correlations did not support the simple 
structural model. None of the justice outcomes was uniquely correlated with only one 
justice judgment. In addition, of all specific hypotheses about judgment-outcome 
relationships, only the relationship between distributive justice and decision satisfaction 
was supported by the correlations; distributive justice had the strongest correlation with 
decision satisfaction. As expected most of the justice judgments were significantly related 
to the justice outcomes, suggesting that each judgment might load onto multiple 
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outcomes. Importantly, collective esteem was negatively correlated with three of the 
justice judgments—procedural, informational, and distributive. And, in the correct 
subsample, legal compliance was negatively correlated with procedural and distributive 
justice. This negative correlation indicated that increasingly fair treatment was related to 
a decreased perception that the mother should feel a sense of respect. These negative 
relationships are contrary to the OMJ theory and Colquitt’s (2001) findings.  
 
Table 3.5. Correlations between Latent Justice Judgments and Latent Justice Outcomes in 
the Organizational Model of Justice 
 Legal 
Compliance 
Decision 
Satisfaction 
Leader 
Evaluation 
Collective  
Esteem 
Procedural Justice Full: .08 
Sub: -.15* 
 
Full: .84** 
Sub: .83** 
Full: .84** 
Sub: .83** 
Full: -.37** 
Sub:-.52** 
Interpersonal Justice Full: .09 
Sub: .04 
 
Full: .47** 
Sub: .45** 
Full: .77** 
Sub: .79** 
Full: -.04 
Sub: -.14 
Informational Justice Full: .13* 
Sub: -.05 
 
Full: .66** 
Sub: .60** 
Full: .85** 
Sub: .84** 
Full: -.21** 
Sub: .30** 
 
Distributive Justice Full: -.07 
Sub: -.26** 
 
Full: .94** 
Sub: .93** 
Full: .81** 
Sub: .78** 
Full: -.48** 
Sub: -.61** 
ote. Full sample (“Full”) N = 320, correct subsample (“Sub”) n = 177. 
* p < .05 ** p < .01. 
 
Based on the results of the first step, I concluded that the measurement model was 
acceptable and moved on testing the structural model. To begin, I tested the simple 
structural model proposed by Colquitt (2001) wherein each justice judgment was 
uniquely linked to an individual justice outcome, adding the relevant demographic 
variables as controls. The simple model had poor fit in the full sample, χ2 (463) = 
1402.45, p < .001; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .08, RMSEA confidence interval: .08-.08; 
SRMR = .13, but slightly better fit in the correct subsample, χ2 (463) = 1021.51, p < .001; 
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CFI = .93; RMSEA = .08, confidence interval: .07-.9; SRMR = .14. For the full sample, 
the CFI was in the acceptable range, the RMSEA was in the mediocre range, and the 
SRMR was in the unacceptable range.  
Because I expected each of the justice judgments to load onto multiple justice 
outcomes, but did not have specific expectations about these relative relationships, I next 
tested a model in which all four justice outcomes were each regressed onto each of the 
four justice judgments (i.e., the “full path model”). This model fit well in the full sample, 
χ
2 (451) = 1023.08, p < .001; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .06, confidence interval: .06-.07; 
SRMR = .05, and in the correct subsample, χ2 (451) = 296.10, p < .001; CFI = .96; 
RMSEA = .06, confidence interval: .06-.07; SRMR = .05. For both samples, the 
modification indices suggested correlating two of the indicators on the informational 
justice construct, which I did (full sample: χ2 (450) = 985.63, p < .001; CFI = .96; 
RMSEA = .06, RMSEA confidence interval: .06-.07; SRMR = .05; correct subsample: χ2 
(450) = 772.93, p < .001; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .06, RMSEA confidence interval: .05-
.07; SRMR = .05). 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the modified full-path model and standardized parameter 
estimates from the full sample. While the model as a whole was well-supported, there 
was mixed support for the hypotheses about specific relationships between justice 
judgments and outcomes proposed by the OMJ. As predicted, interpersonal justice was 
the strongest predictor of legal compliance and distributive justice was the strongest 
predictor of decision satisfaction. There was partial support for the hypothesis regarding 
procedural justice. Procedural justice significantly predicted legal compliance, but it was 
not the strongest predictor. Instead, distributive justice was the strongest predictor of 
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legal compliance. Finally, there was no support for the hypothesis that informational 
justice would most strongly predict collective esteem. In fact, the path from informational 
justice to collective esteem was not significant; instead, distributive justice most strongly 
predicted collective esteem. 
Beyond the relationships described above, the results of this analysis provided 
additional information that was contrary to the OMJ. To begin with, distributive justice 
was the most consistent predictor of justice outcomes. In addition, the model included 
two negative parameter estimates, both of which were contrary to the OMJ. First, 
distributive justice negatively predicted legal compliance. Second, distributive justice 
negatively predicted collective esteem, meaning that higher judgments that the outcome 
was fair led to decreased perceptions that the mother should be respected.  
As an exploratory step, I ran a final set of models. The arguments underlying the 
OMJ presuppose that the person evaluating the decision-making situation is the recipient 
of the decision. However, in this study, I manipulated whether participants were decision-
makers or decision-recipients. As a final analysis, I reran the modified full path model 
separately for those assigned to be parents and those assigned to be judges. For assigned 
parents, the model was acceptable, χ2 (450) = 852.53, p < .001; CFI = .94; RMSEA = .08, 
RMSEA confidence interval: .07-.08; SRMR = .06. In contrast, the model would not 
converge for the assigned adults, suggesting that this model of justice does not translate 
to decision-makers’ justice judgments and outcomes. 
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Figure 3.1. 
Results of the organizational model of justice (OMJ), modified full path version. For 
indicators, the labels correspond to their order in the measure (Appendix F). All indicator 
loadings were significant. For paths, standardized estimates are reported here. Only 
significant paths are drawn. All latent factor variances were set to 0. Abbreviations: e = 
error, d = disturbance. 
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RH 5-7: The group engagement model will adequately represent the data. All paths 
specified by the model will be significant. 
I tested this hypothesis in a structural equation model. First, I converted the GEM, 
as illustrated by Tyler and Blader (2003; Figure 1.2, p. 35), into a higher-order structural 
equation model. The first-order latent constructs were the four justice judgments 
(procedural, interpersonal, informational, and distributive), decision satisfaction, three 
identity judgments (pride, respect, and identification), and legal compliance. The second-
order latent constructs were procedural justice, which was measured by procedural, 
interpersonal, and informational justice judgments; resource judgments, which were 
measured by distributive justice and decision satisfaction; and social identity, which was 
measured by pride, respect, and identification.  
For the most part, this translation of the model was consistent with theory and 
with the authors’ subsequent work (Blader & Tyler, 2009). However, certain changes 
should be considered modifications of the underlying theoretical model. First, I replaced 
the four-component model of procedural justice proposed by Tyler & Blader (2003) with 
the three components (i.e., procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice) from the 
organizational model of justice. Second, while the original model distinguished between 
psychological and behavioral engagement and further between discretionary and 
mandatory behavioral engagement, I included only “engagement” in this structural 
model, which was defined in terms of perceived likelihood that the mother would comply 
with the law. The design of this study prevented me from measuring actual compliance 
and this measure was the best substitute.  
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I began by testing the measurement model. Because the measurement model was 
so large, I divided it into several portions—procedural justice, resource judgments, social 
identity, and legal compliance—and tested each independently. I started with the 
procedural justice measurement model. Even making recommended modifications, the 
model had poor fit in the full sample, χ2 (51) = 384.53, p < .001; CFI = .92; RMSEA = 
.14, RMSEA confidence interval: .13-.16; SRMR = .13.  
Because the hierarchical model was unacceptable, I next tested a model that 
would be more consistent with the organizational model, which proved well-fitting in 
earlier analyses. This model consisted of three latent factors—procedural, interpersonal, 
and informational justice—but no second-order justice judgment. The model was 
acceptable in the full sample, χ2 (51) = 249.20, p < .001; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .11, 
RMSEA confidence interval: .10-.12; SRMR = .07, and marginally acceptable in the 
correct subsample, χ2 (50) = 178.41, p < .001; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .11, RMSEA 
confidence interval: .0-.13; SRMR = .09. I replaced this measurement model with the 
hierarchical one proposed by Tyler and Blader (2003; Blader & Tyler, 2003), which also 
required modifying the structure of the group engagement model to add paths from each 
of the three types of justice to social identity, rather than just a single path from the 
second-order procedural justice factor. 
The measurement model for resource judgments had excellent fit in both the full 
sample, χ2 (13) = 26.93, p = .01; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = .06, RMSEA confidence interval: 
.03-.09; SRMR = .01, and the correct subsample, χ2 (13) = 28.96, p = .01; CFI = .99; 
RMSEA = .08, RMSEA confidence interval: .04-.12; SRMR = .01. The social identity 
measurement model also had excellent fit in the full sample, χ2 (31) = 58.28, p = 002; 
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CFI = .99; RMSEA = .05, RMSEA confidence interval: .03-.07; SRMR = .03; and the 
correct subsample, χ2 (31) = 42.46, p = .08; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .04, confidence 
interval: .00-.07; SRMR = .03. Finally, the measurement model of legal compliance had 
excellent fit in the full sample, χ2 (2) = 3.46, p = .18; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = .05, RMSEA 
confidence interval: .00-.13; SRMR = .01, and in the correct subsample, χ2 (2) = 3.20, p = 
.20; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = .06, RMSEA confidence interval: .00-.16; SRMR = .02.  
After confirming the measurement portion of the GEM, I tested the structural 
model (Figure 3.2). The model also included demographic variables as controls. They are 
not shown in the drawing, but they are reported in Table 3.6. Because the heart of the 
GEM is that perceptions of social identity mediate the relationships between justice 
judgments and resource judgments, on the one hand, and group engagement, on the other, 
I also measured indirect effects from procedural justice, interactional justice, and 
resource judgments to legal compliance via social identity. The indirect effect sizes are 
reported in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.6. Standardized Parameter Estimates for Demographic Variables in the Group 
Engagement Model in the Full Sample 
 DV: Social Identity DV: Legal 
Compliance 
 Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
Age -.06 .06 .10 .06 
Gender .18** .05 -.13* .06 
Political Orientation -.05 .05 .08 .06 
Whether Participants Had Children .12 .09 .03 .09 
Number of Children -.18* .09 .07 .09 
ote. DV = Dependent Variable. S.E. = Standard Error. Gender was coded 0 (female) 
and 1 (male). Whether participants had children was coded 0 (no) and 1 (yes). Political 
orientation was scaled so that higher scores indicated greater self-reported conservatism. 
* p < .05 ** p ≤ .01. 
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Table 3.7. Indirect Effects of Justice and Resource Judgments on Legal Compliance Via 
Social Identity in the Full Sample 
 Estimate S.E. 
Procedural Justice .20 .26 
Interpersonal Justice .18 .13 
Informational Justice .22 .23 
Resource Judgments -1.10* .04 
ote. S.E. = Standard Error. 
*p < .05. 
The model had excellent fit in the full sample, χ2 (612) =1189.50, p < .001; CFI = 
.95; RMSEA = .05, RMSEA confidence interval: .05-.06; SRMR = .06. While the overall 
model fit was excellent, there was only partial support for the individual paths specified 
by the group engagement model. The core hypothesis of the GEM is that social identity 
judgments mediate the relationships between justice judgments and group engagement. 
That hypothesis was not supported by this data. First, social identity was not a strong 
predictor of legal compliance; while the standardized estimate was significant, the 
unstandardized estimate was not. Second, neither procedural, interpersonal, nor 
informational justice significantly predicted social identity, meaning that social identity 
did not mediate the relationships between these justice judgments and legal compliance. 
The social identity mediation hypothesis was supported with respect to resource 
judgments; the indirect effect from resource judgments to legal compliance via social 
identity was significant.  
As predicted, resource judgments directly predicted legal compliance, so that 
increased decision satisfaction and fairness led to increased confidence that the mother 
would comply with the court and the case plan. In general, resource judgments had a 
greater influence on the outcome variables in this model than did procedural, 
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interpersonal, and informational justice; this is also inconsistent with the GEM. As a final 
note, pride did not directly predict legal compliance. 
Because justice judgments did not predict legal compliance indirectly via social 
identity judgments, as predicted by the group engagement model, I explored whether an 
alternative model that added direct paths between these justice judgments and legal 
compliance would perform better. The model was exactly the same aside from the 
addition of these three paths, and it also had excellent fit, χ2 (609) = 1176.47, p < .001; 
CFI = .95; RMSEA = .05, RMSEA confidence interval: .05-.06; SRMR = .06. In this 
model, the direct path between procedural justice and legal compliance was significant (β 
= .38, p = .046), but interpersonal and informational justice judgments were not 
significant predictors of legal compliance. Adding the direct paths did little, then, to add 
explanatory power to the model. 
I reran the GEM, without the additional direct paths between justice and legal 
compliance, using the correct subsample. The model retained its excellent fit, χ2 (612) = 
1006.01, p < .001; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .06, RMSEA confidence interval: .05-.06; 
SRMR = .06. Again, all factor loadings were significant and all residual variances were 
small. The pattern of significant paths was almost identical to that with the larger sample, 
with one important exception: there were was not a significant direct effect between 
resource judgments and legal compliance. Nonetheless, the indirect effect between 
resource judgments and legal compliance remained significant. In all other ways, the path 
structure was the same as with the full sample. 
Finally, as with the OMJ, the theory underlying the GEM presupposes that the 
people evaluating the situation and inferring information about their social identity are 
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decision-recipients. I fit the GEM separately to assigned parents and assigned judges. As 
with the OMJ, the model did not converge for the assigned judges. In contrast, the model 
had marginally acceptable fit for the assigned parents, χ2 (612) = 1025.94, p < .001; CFI 
= .93; RMSEA = .07, RMSEA confidence interval: .06-.07; SRMR = .07, and different 
parameter estimates compared to the full sample. Specifically, for assigned parents, 
interpersonal justice did predict social identity, even though it did not for the full sample. 
On the other hand, the significant relationship between social identity and legal 
compliance dropped out. Therefore, there was still no support for the social identity 
mediation hypothesis. In addition, resource judgments directly predicted social identity, 
but ceased to predict legal compliance. In the assigned parents sample, none of the 
theorized predictors of legal compliance was significant, although the parameter estimate 
for resource judgments was marginally significant, p = .10. 
RH 8-9: Participants in the moderate neglect condition will report lower distributive 
justice and decision satisfaction than participants in the severe neglect condition. 
Participants in the moderate neglect condition will exhibit weaker relationships between 
procedural and interactional justice and their outcomes than participants in the severe 
neglect condition.  
 I tested these hypotheses simultaneously using a multivariate analysis of 
covariance (MANCOVA) in which three of the four manipulations (procedural treatment, 
interactional treatment, and neglect severity) were entered as factors and distributive 
justice, decision satisfaction, leader evaluation, legal compliance, and collective esteem 
were entered as dependent variables. Based on the preliminary analyses, I also included 
age, gender, and whether participants had children as covariates.  
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All three demographic variables had significant multivariate effects, although they 
all had fairly small effect sizes: age, F (5, 293) = 2.56, p = .03, ηp
2 = .04; gender, F (5, 
293) = 2.47, p = .03, ηp
2 = .04; whether participants’ had children, F (5, 293) = 2.52, p = 
.03, ηp
2 = .04.  The between-subjects tests revealed patterns consistent with preliminary 
analyses. Specifically, age, F (1, 297) = 4.45, p = .04, ηp
2 = .02, and gender, F (1, 297) = 
6.86, p = .01, ηp
2 = .02, were significantly related to perceptions of collective esteem, but 
not to any of the other dependent variables. None of the between-subjects tests reached 
significance for whether participants had children. 
As expected, there were significant multivariate effects for both interactional 
treatment, F (5, 293) = 29.83, p < .001, ηp
2 = .34, and severity of neglect, F (5, 293) = 
32.56, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36. Surprisingly, there was no multivariate effect for procedural 
treatment. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report the means and significance tests for the significant 
between-subjects effects for the interactional treatment and severity of neglect 
manipulations. As hypothesized, participants in the severe neglect condition reported 
higher distributive justice and decision satisfaction than those in the moderate neglect 
condition. This finding confirms that the severity of neglect manipulation did serve as a  
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proxy for a manipulation of distributive justice. However, contrary to the hypothesis, 
there were no significant interactions between severity of neglect and interactional or 
procedural justice. Thus, severity of neglect did not reduce the strength of the relationship 
between procedural and interactional justice judgments and their associated outcomes. 
In addition to the effects described above, participants in the high severity 
condition reported higher leader evaluation, lower legal compliance, and lower collective 
esteem. The interactional treatment manipulation was significant for three of the 
dependent variables. Those in the fair interactional treatment condition reported higher 
levels of decision satisfaction, leader evaluation, and distributive justice. 
As a final test, I reran the MANCOVA with just those participants who correctly 
answered the manipulation checks. The results were largely identical. The only difference 
was that there were no significant multivariate effects for any of the demographic 
characteristics. 
RH 10: Distributive justice judgments and decision satisfaction will moderate the 
relationships between procedural and interactional justice and their associated 
outcomes.  
 I ran three sets of regression analyses, each using a different justice outcome 
(leader evaluation, legal compliance, and collective esteem) as the dependent variable 
(Table 3.10). As independent variables, in the first step, I entered the procedural, 
interpersonal, informational, and distributive justice scales, as well as the decision 
satisfaction scale and relevant demographic variables. In the second step, I added two-
way interaction terms representing interactions between each of the three justice 
judgments of interest and both distributive justice and decision satisfaction. 
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 The first regression predicted leader evaluation. Because preliminary analyses 
revealed no related demographic characteristics, I did not control for demographics in 
this regression. The first step, with only main effects, was statistically significant, R2 = 
.86, F (5, 297) = 364.67, p < .001. There were significant main effects for interactional 
justice, informational justice, decision satisfaction, and distributive justice. The second 
step was also statistically significant, R2 = .86, F (11, 291) = 170.18, p < .001, but it was 
not significantly better than the regression with only main effects. Contrary to 
hypotheses, there were no significant interactions with distributive justice and decision 
satisfaction, meaning that these judgments did not moderate the relationships between the 
other justice judgments and leader evaluation. In the second step, the main effects for 
procedural justice and interactional justice were significant. 
 The second set of regressions predicted legal compliance. All the same variables 
were entered with the addition of whether participants had children, because preliminary 
analyses revealed that this variable was related to participants’ predictions about legal 
compliance. Again, the main effects regression was significant, R2 = .09, F (6, 295) = 
4.85, p < .001, but note that the variables accounted for quite less variance compared to 
the model predicting leader evaluation. Two justice judgments were significant predictors 
of legal compliance: informational and distributive justice. No other variables were 
significant. The second step was also significant, R2 = .10, F (12, 289) = 2.79, p = .001, 
but it was not significantly better than step one. Again, there were no significant 
interactions. In the second step, the only significant predictor of legal compliance was the 
main effect for informational justice.  
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 The final set of regressions predicted collective esteem (Table 3.10). Again all the 
justice judgments and decision satisfaction were entered, along with gender and age. Step 
one, the regression with just main effects and demographics, was significant, R2 = .33, F 
(7, 293) = 20.12, p < .001, with interpersonal justice, distributive justice, and gender all 
significantly predicting collective esteem. The second step was also significant, R2 = .36, 
F (14, 286) = 11.39, p < .001, and accounted for significantly more variance than the first 
model, R2∆ = .03, F∆ (7, 286) = 2.12, p = .04. The main effect for distributive justice 
remained significant, as did the main effect for gender.  
As hypothesized, there was a significant interaction effect for interactional and 
distributive justice in predicting collective esteem. To follow-up, I performed a median 
split for distributive justice and then correlated interpersonal justice and collective esteem 
for the two samples. For participants who perceived the outcomes as fair (i.e., high 
distributive justice), interpersonal justice was correlated with collective esteem, r (164) = 
.24, p < .001; however, for those who perceived the outcome as unfair, there was no 
significant relationship between interpersonal justice and collective esteem. Thus, 
reactions to the outcome moderated the relationships between interactional justice and 
collective esteem, although it is important to note that this moderation effect was in the 
opposite direction predicted. Prior researchers (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) found 
that the relationship between interactional justice and justice outcomes was stronger 
when distributive justice was low; in this sample, the relationship was stronger when 
distributive justice was high. 
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As a final step, I reran all the analyses with only the correct subsample. The 
pattern of results largely replicated the full sample, with one exception. I found evidence 
of moderation in the regression predicting legal compliance, where procedural justice 
interacted with distributive justice. Follow-up analyses showed no significant correlation 
between procedural justice and legal compliance for either participants with high 
distributive justice or those with low distributive justice. It is likely that there was too 
little power with the correct subsample to detect differences between the two groups. 
RH 11-12. As compared to decision-recipients, decision-makers’ decision satisfaction 
will be more strongly related to their judgments about the costs and benefits of child 
protection than to their procedural justice judgments. Even when evaluating procedural 
justice, decision-makers will be more strongly influenced by costs and benefits than 
traditional procedural justice criteria. 
 Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) found that a person’s role in the decision-
making process affected their perceptions of justice and satisfaction with the decision. 
Specifically, they found that decision-makers were more influenced by outcome 
concerns, which they defined as distributive justice and an analysis of societal costs and 
benefits, when they made judgments about procedural justice and decision satisfaction. In 
contrast, decision-recipients were more influenced by the traditionally defined 
prerequisites to justice judgments, which they operationalized as process neutrality and 
positive interpersonal treatment. 
 As a preliminary step, I investigated whether participants in the different role 
conditions reported different levels on the justice judgments, justice outcomes, and 
societal costs and benefits by running a series of ANOVAs comparing mean differences 
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between assigned judges and assigned parents on each of the dependent variables. The 
only significant difference was in perceived respect: assigned judges (M = 3.09, SD = 
1.48) rated significantly less respect than assigned parents (M = 3.53, SD = 1.63), F (1, 
317) = 6.51, p = .01. Therefore, contrary to expectations, in this study, decision-makers 
and decision-recipients rated the scenario fairly similarly along all of the dimensions 
measured. 
 Despite the minimal group differences between decision-makers and decision-
recipients, the possibility of interaction effects remained. To test for these, I ran a series 
of multiple regressions for each of three dependent variables—global procedural justice, 
global interactional justice, and decision satisfaction (Table 3.11). For the independent 
variables, I entered participants’ procedural, interactional, and distributive justice scale 
scores, which reflected perceptions of the traditional justice criteria. In addition, I entered 
the four societal costs and benefits scales—respect for parents’ rights, magnitude of the 
threat of neglect, efficacy of the child protection system, and fairness of child removal. I 
entered all the two-way interaction terms between induced role and each of the other 
predictors. Significant interaction terms would suggest that role as a decision-maker 
versus a decision-recipient moderated the traditional relationships between procedural 
justice criteria and judgments. Regardless of whether interactions were present, I also ran 
the regressions separately for induced judges and induced parents, without the two-way 
interactions; this analysis allowed me to compare beta weights to evaluate the relative 
strength of the various predictors. 
9
4
 
 
T
ab
le
 3
.1
1
. 
D
o
 D
ec
is
io
n
-M
ak
er
s 
an
d
 D
ec
is
io
n
-R
ec
ip
ie
n
ts
 E
v
al
u
at
e 
D
ec
is
io
n
 S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
, 
P
ro
ce
d
u
ra
l 
Ju
st
ic
e,
 a
n
d
 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
al
 J
u
st
ic
e 
D
if
fe
re
n
tl
y
? 
R
es
u
lt
s 
o
f 
S
ep
ar
at
e 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 M
o
d
el
s 
fo
r 
In
d
u
ce
d
 P
ar
en
ts
 a
n
d
 I
n
d
u
ce
d
 J
u
d
g
es
 
 
D
ec
is
io
n
 S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
 
G
lo
b
al
 P
ro
ce
d
u
ra
l 
Ju
st
ic
e 
G
lo
b
al
 I
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
al
 J
u
st
ic
e 
 
P
ar
en
ts
 
Ju
d
g
es
 
P
ar
en
ts
 
Ju
d
g
es
 
P
ar
en
ts
 
Ju
d
g
es
 
M
ai
n
 E
ff
ec
ts
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
ro
ce
d
u
ra
l 
Ju
st
ic
e 
S
ca
le
 
.1
0
*
 
.0
5
 
.4
1
*
*
 
.4
1
*
*
 
.1
3
 
.0
6
 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
al
 J
u
st
ic
e 
S
ca
le
 
.0
2
 
.0
1
 
.0
4
 
.1
0
 
.6
2
*
*
 
.6
5
*
*
 
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
v
e 
Ju
st
ic
e 
S
ca
le
 
.7
1
*
*
 
.7
4
*
*
 
.3
3
*
*
 
.4
3
*
*
 
.1
4
 
.3
6
*
*
 
R
es
p
ec
t 
fo
r 
P
ar
en
ts
’ 
R
ig
h
ts
 
-.
0
6
 
-.
0
1
 
-.
1
7
*
*
 
.0
2
 
-.
1
0
 
-.
0
7
 
M
ag
n
it
u
d
e 
o
f 
T
h
re
at
  
-.
0
6
 
.0
1
 
-.
0
3
 
-.
0
1
 
-.
0
8
 
-.
0
3
 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 E
ff
ic
ac
y
 o
f 
C
P
S
 
.0
3
 
-.
0
1
 
.0
0
 
.1
7
*
*
 
.0
7
 
-.
0
4
 
F
ai
rn
es
s 
o
f 
C
h
il
d
 R
em
o
v
al
 
.1
6
*
 
.1
6
*
 
.1
0
 
-.
0
5
 
.0
7
 
-.
0
7
 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
g
e 
-.
0
2
 
.0
4
 
-.
0
8
 
-.
0
2
 
-.
0
7
 
-.
0
3
 
G
en
d
er
 
.0
2
 
.0
3
 
.0
3
 
-.
0
5
 
.0
3
 
.0
0
 

o
te
. 
T
h
es
e 
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s 
w
er
e 
co
n
d
u
ct
ed
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
fu
ll
 s
am
p
le
 o
f 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
. 
*
 p
 <
 .
0
5
 *
*
 p
 <
 .
0
1
. 
95 
 
 I found only weak support for the hypothesis with regard to the first dependent 
variable—decision satisfaction. In the regression with the full sample, R2 = .88, F (16, 
278) = 127.51, p < .001, there were no significant role interactions, suggesting that role 
was not a moderator where evaluations of the decision were concerned. In the separate 
regressions, distributive justice and fairness of removal were the strongest predictors for 
both samples, again, suggesting that induced judges and induced parents were evaluating 
the decision similarly. However, there was also a significant effect for procedural justice 
for parents, but not judges, which provided some support for the argument that parents 
were more influenced by traditional procedural justice criteria when evaluating decisions, 
but this effect was not strong enough to cause a significant role by procedural justice 
interaction in the full sample. 
 I found arguably stronger support for the hypothesis with regard to the second 
dependent variable—global perceptions of procedural justice. There were still no 
significant role interactions in the full-sample regression, R2 = .78, F (16, 279) = 63.04, p 
< .001; however, a comparison of the beta weights for induced judges and induced 
parents showed that induced parents relied more strongly on traditional procedural justice 
criteria than outcome criteria when evaluating procedural justice. Induced judges, on the 
other hand, had a higher beta weight for distributive justice and a significant and higher 
beta weight for perceived efficacy of the child protection system, both of which are 
outcome concerns.  
 I found even stronger support for the hypothesis with the third dependent 
variable—global perceptions of interactional justice. Here, there was a significant 
interaction between induced role and distributive justice judgments, β = -.27, model R2 = 
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.81, F (16, 277) = 75.49, p < .001. Separate regressions for each induced role showed that 
induced judges’ evaluations of interactional justice were influenced by distributive 
justice, while induced parents’ evaluations of interactional justice were not. 
 In sum, these analyses provided some support for Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan’s 
(2007) contention that decision-makers are more outcome-focused when they evaluate 
procedural justice, interactional justice, and decision satisfaction. Compared to decision-
recipients, decision-makers were more strongly influenced by distributive justice and 
certain societal costs and benefits, specifically, perceived efficacy of the child protection 
system and fairness of child removal. Decision-recipients, on the other hand, were more 
influenced by the traditional criteria of procedural justice. Nonetheless, in this study, 
even decision-recipients were heavily influenced by distributive justice. 
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Chapter 4. Discussion 
Overview of Design and Purpose 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to evaluate the utility of justice models in the 
child protection context. I tested two models of procedural justice: the organizational 
model of justice (OMJ; Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001) and the group engagement 
model (GEM: Tyler & Blader, 2003). In addition, I tested two potential moderators of the 
relationship between procedural justice and justice outcomes, both based on prior 
research. Building on work by Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) and others (Cropanzano, 
Slaughter, & Bachiochi, 2005; Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk, 1999), I investigated whether 
outcome judgments acted as a moderator, such that procedural justice was a more 
powerful influence on outcomes when distributive justice and decision satisfaction were 
low. Finally, building on work by Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007), I tested whether the 
role of the evaluator as a decision-recipient or decision-maker acted as a moderator, such 
that decision outcomes and societal costs and benefits influenced decision-makers more, 
while traditional relational criteria influenced decision-recipients more when they 
evaluated procedural and interactional justice. 
 To achieve this purpose, I created an experimental factorial design in which I 
manipulated procedural treatment, interactional treatment, severity of neglect, and 
assigned role. The first two manipulations were designed as straightforward 
manipulations of the traditional procedural justice criteria. The third manipulation was 
used to test the moderator effect of outcome concerns (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996), 
and was demonstrated to directly cause differences in distributive justice judgments. The 
final manipulation was used to directly test the moderator effect of the evaluator’s role; 
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participants were assigned to be either a judge (i.e., decision-maker) or parent (i.e., 
decision-recipient). 
 Finally, the context of the test was child protection decision-making. Participants 
read a case file that described a case of child neglect. There is reason to believe that 
perceptions of justice might bear a strong influence on parents’ behavior within the child 
protection system, including their compliance with the requirements of their caseplan 
(Dumbrill, 2006; Drake, 1994; Kapp & Propp, 2002; Thoburn, Lewis, & Shemmings, 
1995). In addition, we know that judges and caseworkers weigh their perceptions that the 
parents are compliant heavily in their own decision-making in these cases (Dalgleish & 
Drew, 1989; DeRoma, Kessler, McDaniel, & Soto, 2006; Jellinek et al., 1992; Jones, 
1993; Larrieu et al., 2008). In short, this evidence suggests that procedural justice theory 
would be an appropriate framework for understanding parents’ compliance in child 
protection cases. This study was an initial test of whether reactions to procedural 
treatment during child protection hearings might have carryover effects on parents’ 
willingness to comply with the law. 
Summary of Results 
RQ 1: Which measurement model best accounts for participants’ justice 
judgments? Over the past thirty years, justice researchers have proposed several 
measurement models of procedural justice. Each model makes the argument that people 
evaluate justice along a specific number of domains, between two and four. Arguably, the 
authors did not intend the first and simplest measurement model to be a measurement 
model at all, but rather, an introduction to the concept of procedural justice. Starting with 
Thibaut and Walker (1975), legal psychologists argued that perceptions of distributive 
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justice (i.e., outcome fairness) were not people’s sole concern nor were they people’s sole 
determinants of their perceptions of the favorability of the outcome. Instead, argued these 
researchers, procedural justice judgments were equally, perhaps more, relevant.  
Following Thibaut and Walker’s seminal work, justice researchers adopted this 
two-factor framework and developed it fully in the literature. During the 1980s, legal 
psychologists like Leventhal (1980; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980) and Tyler (1984, 
1988, 1989) began a line of research attempting to identify exactly what criteria make a 
legal procedure seem fair to people. This line of work marked the beginning of 
attempting to identify a measurement model of justice judgments, and the two-factor 
model remains predominant in the field of legal psychology even today.  
By the mid 1980s, however, organizational psychologists also took an interest in 
justice research. Starting with Bies and Moag (1986), organizational justice researchers 
theorized that justice evaluations are made up of three, not two, independent judgments. 
Distributive justice remained in their theory, but Bies and Moag (1986; Bies, 2001) 
argued that “procedural justice” was too broad a construct, and that common definitions 
of “procedural justice” actually combined two separate justice judgments—procedural 
and interactional justice. “Procedural justice” was defined as an evaluation of the process 
itself, whereas “interactional justice” was an evaluation of the authority making the 
decision. Procedural justice judgments emerged from people’s perceptions that the 
process was accurate and neutral, whereas interactional justice judgments came from 
people’s perceptions that the authority was trustworthy, respectful, and explained the 
reason for the decision. This three-factor model of procedural justice is still predominant 
in the organizational justice field today; however, recently, Colquitt (2001) has proposed 
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that interactional justice is also too broad a construct. Instead, he proposed that 
“interactional justice” is better conceived as two constructs—interpersonal and 
informational justice. Interpersonal justice refers to the authority’s treatment of the 
decision recipient, while informational justice refers to the evaluations of the authority’s 
willingness to provide an explanation about the decision that they made, as well as 
evaluations of the quality of that explanation. 
In this dissertation, I tested each of these measurement models—a single factor, 
two factors, three factors, and four factors. Measurement of the first three models was 
experimentally-derived, meaning that I manipulated each of the three constructs central to 
those three models. Differences in severity of neglect served as manipulations of 
distributive justice. Participants perceived the outcome of maintaining the child’s 
placement outside the home as less fair when the mother had engaged in a moderate level 
of child neglect as opposed to a severe level. Varying whether the jurisdiction allowed 
parents to speak during the protective custody hearing was the direct manipulation of 
procedural justice and varying the judge’s attitude toward the mother and varying 
whether he provided her any information about the decision-making process and decision 
served as the manipulation of interactional justice. This last manipulation included the 
components of interpersonal and informational justice, which researchers have recently 
added to the mix of justice factors. I did not independently manipulate these two factors,  
but instead measured participants’ evaluations of both and found that they varied 
considerably, which allowed me to also test the four-factor model of justice. 
I used confirmatory factor analyses to test each of the four models, and only the 
four-factor model of justice had adequate model fit. Thus, the four-factor organizational 
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model of justice (OMJ) provided the best structural description of people’s evaluations of 
justice in this study. In other words, people were clearly distinguishing between 
distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice. The implication from 
this finding is that the two- and three-factor models of procedural justice, which are 
predominant today, may not be accurately describing how people really evaluate justice 
in a given context. In fact, these models are likely clumping evaluations of the procedure, 
interpersonal treatment, and informational treatment together, which clouds the 
differential effects that each of these justice judgments might have.  
The question of differential effects is a necessary step to validating the four-factor 
model, because the OMJ makes explicit predictions that each justice judgment is 
uniquely linked to specific justice outcomes. The question of differential effects was also 
tested and will be discussed in the next section, but before moving on I must 
acknowledge an alternative interpretation of the results of the confirmatory factor 
analyses. It is possible that the general support for the four-factor model is an artifact of 
the measurement technique used in this study. 
 I adopted Colquitt’s (2001) measure of justice judgments in this dissertation. The 
advantages of adopting this measure were that the measure has been tested and validated, 
it is widely used in the field, and Colquitt used it in his own test of the four-factor model. 
In terms of measurement, there was an important disadvantage. The measure includes 
four distinct sections, each of which measures one of the four types of justice (see 
Appendix F). There are no construct labels for the items and no indication of their 
construct membership in the instrument. However, the items within each factor appeared 
next to each other in the survey. The result might be that participants merely answered 
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each cluster of questions similarly because of their placement in the instrument, thus 
causing greater support for the four-factor model over the other measurement models. As 
I mentioned, Colquitt (2001) also used this approach, and his study has been the only one 
to thoroughly test the four-factor model. In future tests of the OMJ, researchers should 
take great care to use alternative measures and alternative arrangements of this measure 
to provide stronger support for the model. 
RQ 2: Do justice judgments differentially predict justice outcomes? As mentioned 
above, a requisite step to validating the OMJ is establishing that the factors are 
differentially related to their predicted outcomes. In the OMJ, Colquitt (2001) argued that 
distributive justice should be more strongly related to evaluations of the favorability of 
the decision, procedural justice should be more strongly related to evaluations of the 
institutional and support for the institution. In this study, the operational definition of 
organizational support involved legal compliance, or participants’ predictions of the 
likelihood that the mother would ultimately comply with the judge’s orders and case plan. 
Colquitt (2001) further argued that interpersonal justice should predict evaluations of the 
authority making the decision. Finally, informational justice should more strongly predict 
evaluations about the quality of the relationship between the decision-recipient and the 
decision-maker or deciding organization. In this study, as in Colquitt (2001), relationship 
quality was measured in terms of collective esteem, or the participants’ judgments that 
the mother is a respected member of society. 
 Colquitt (2001) tested a model in which each justice judgment had a single path to 
its outcome. I tested this single path model and found little support; the model fit 
statistics were inadequate, so I did not interpret the parameters. In contrast to Colquitt’s 
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(2001) single path model, I proposed that each of the justice judgments would predict 
multiple outcomes, but that each justice judgment would more strongly relate to its 
associated outcome. In other words, I expected that the core relationships proposed by the 
OMJ would be there, but that a model with more paths would better fit the data. The 
primary reason for this argument was the knowledge that justice judgments, while they 
may operate independently, are still somewhat related, and as such, they should still be 
somewhat related to multiple justice outcomes. If nothing else, 30 years of justice 
research has established that the relationships between justice judgments and outcomes is 
complicated. 
 The full path model performed well in that the model fit statistics were all in the 
adequate to good range. However, I found only partial support for the specific 
relationships hypothesized by the OMJ. I will discuss each justice outcome in turn, 
starting with those hypotheses that that results supported. I found full support for the 
OMJ’s predictions regarding distributive justice: distributive justice predicted decision 
satisfaction more strongly than did any other justice judgment. In fact, this relationship 
had the strongest standardized weight in the entire model. That this finding was the 
strongest should not be surprising, as it is among the most robust in the justice literature. 
A number of researchers (Roch & Shanock, 2006; Sweeney & McFarlin, 1993) have 
replicated the connection between outcome fairness and personal evaluations of the 
outcome.  
 In fact, this relationship between distributive justice and acceptance or satisfaction 
with the outcome is at the core of the procedural justice research movement of the 1970s 
and 1980s. It was Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) argument that perceptions of the 
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procedure might also affect participants’ reactions to outcomes that sparked the field of 
justice research as we know it today. Further, Tyler and colleagues (Tyler, 1989, 1994, 
2006; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler, Casper, & Fisher, 1989; Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw, 
1985) have argued and found that, in many circumstances, procedural justice can be an 
even stronger predictor of decision satisfaction than is distributive justice. This study did 
not support Tyler’s contention. Although procedural justice was a significant predictor of 
decision satisfaction, it was weaker than distributive justice was. Perhaps more 
importantly, the current definition of procedural justice was narrower in this portion of 
the study, so that it did not map well onto Tyler’s definition. In fact, Tyler’s definition of 
procedural justice includes components of interpersonal and informational justice, neither 
of which significantly predicted decision satisfaction here. 
 I also found full support for the hypothesis that interpersonal justice judgments 
would more strongly predict leader evaluation than would any of the other justice 
judgments. The argument for the link between interpersonal justice and leader evaluation 
is straightforward. Because interpersonal justice judgments result from people’s 
perceptions of how respectfully they are treated by the decision-maker, it is these 
judgments that most strongly influence their evaluations of that decision-maker. While 
each of the other justice judgments was significantly predictive of leader evaluation, the 
standardized weight for interpersonal justice was highest. This finding provides support 
for the hypothesis that interpersonal justice is a separate construct, and that it is 
independent from informational justice. The fact that informational justice had the 
weakest loading onto leader evaluation also supports the contention that the two are 
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separate justice judgments. However, it should be noted that these two latent constructs 
were highly correlated, which means that they are, at least, interrelated. 
 I found partial support for the hypothesis that procedural justice would more 
strongly predict legal compliance. The argument for this link is that procedural justice 
refers to people’s evaluations of the process used to make a decision—whether that 
process adheres to criteria associated with neutral, unbiased decision-making. As such, 
evaluations of procedural justice reflect on the organization or institution that created 
those procedures and link to outcomes relevant to evaluations of the organization or 
institution. In the organizational justice context, outcomes associated with procedural 
justice are usually discussed in terms of organizational support or citizenship (e.g., 
Ambrose & Schminke, 2003; Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002; Roch & Shanock, 
2006). Colquitt (2001) defined the outcome in terms of compliance with the rules of the 
institution. The best analog in the child protection context was compliance with the 
orders of the court and the case plan.  
 Consistent with the OMJ, procedural justice significantly predicted legal 
compliance, but it was not the strongest predictor. Instead, distributive justice was the 
strongest predictor of legal compliance. Importantly, distributive justice negatively 
predicted legal compliance. In other words, as participants’ ratings of fairness increased, 
their predictions that the mother would comply with the law decreased. This finding is 
contrary to justice theories, the general tenet of which is that higher perceptions of justice 
will lead to more positive outcomes.  
This somewhat surprising finding likely reflects the context of the decision. 
Participants were reading about a case of child neglect and evaluating whether they 
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believed the mother would comply with her case plan. The distributive justice 
manipulation in this study was a manipulation of the mother’s behavior that led to her 
losing, at least temporarily, custody of her child. In the moderate neglect condition, the 
primary allegation was that the child was home alone for a few hours in the evening 
because the mother had to work late. In the severe neglect condition, the child was also 
home alone, but the primary allegations described a dirty, unsafe home. It could be that in 
evaluating these two scenarios, participants were also making inferences about the 
mother’s motivation and/or ability to care for her child. It could be that participants in the 
severe neglect condition, which was perceived as distributively more fair, believed that 
the mother would be less capable or willing to comply with the law. Whereas participants 
in the moderate neglect condition, which participants rated as distributively less fair, 
believed that the mother would be more capable or willing to comply with the law.  
I did not measure participants’ attributions of blame toward the mother, so this 
hypothesis remains untested. However, it is an important one for future research. 
Judgments about personal responsibility are central to legal decision-making. If it is true 
that these kinds of judgments moderate some of the relationships between justice 
judgments and outcomes, then it may be that the OMJ will not neatly translate into a legal 
psychology context. It might also be that blame mediates the relationships between 
justice judgments and outcomes in the OMJ. Future justice research should explore the 
role of blame, especially in the legal context. 
 The final hypothesis of the OMJ, that informational justice would more strongly 
predict collective esteem, received no supported at all in this study. The argument for this 
hypothesis was that provision of adequate information communicates to decision-
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recipients something about their position in the group. This hypothesis is related to the 
social identity arguments posed by Tyler (1989) in the group value model and Tyler and 
Blader (2003) in the group engagement model. All of these models argued that people 
look to how decision makers treat them to learn something about their social identity.  
In this study, informational justice did not predict collective esteem at all. Instead, 
interpersonal justice and distributive justice predicted collective esteem, with distributive 
justice having the considerably stronger standardized weight. Again, distributive justice 
negatively predicted collective esteem, meaning that increased perceptions of outcome 
fairness predicted decreased perceptions that the mother is a respected member of 
society. And again, this finding might reflect attributional judgments on the part of 
participants. Participants might have themselves judged the mother as more blameworthy, 
and therefore less respectable, in the severe neglect condition. In turn, the neglect 
manipulation served to alter perceptions of distributive justice. In future research, it will 
be important to disentangle the effects of distributive justice from the effects of 
attributions of blame. In a similar vein, studies in which the participants are also the 
decision recipients, rather than reading about decision recipients, will also help to 
disentangle these effects. 
RQ3: How well does the group engagement model account for justice outcomes? 
The group engagement model was proposed by Tyler and Blader (2003). The authors 
theorized that procedural justice has its effect on justice outcomes, in particular, group 
engagement, indirectly via social identity judgments. Labeled the “social identity 
mediation hypothesis” (Blader & Tyler, 2009), the authors argued that the value of 
procedural justice is that it communicates to decision-recipients that they are valued 
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members of the group. In other words, fair procedural treatment tells people that they 
have a positive social identity. This positive social identity, in turn, directly motivates 
people to engage in both mandatory and voluntary group behaviors.  
 Beyond this core argument, the authors of the group engagement model also made 
some secondary hypotheses. First, they argued that procedural justice, which they defined 
broadly to include aspects of procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice as 
defined in the OMJ, would have stronger effects on social identity, but that resource 
judgments would also have an influence on social identity. They defined resource 
judgments as a combination of perceptions of the outcome fairness and outcome 
favorability. The authors used the phrase “resource judgments,” because these 
evaluations reflect general impressions about the amount of social resources and aid the 
group is willing to give the decision-recipient. The group engagement model argues that 
decision-recipients use their perceptions of resource availability and procedural justice to 
evaluate their own social identity, but that the procedural justice judgments should exert a 
stronger effect. 
 Using structural equation modeling, I found little support for the group 
engagement model in this study. First, social identity did not mediate the relationships 
between justice judgments and predictions about the mother’s likelihood of legal 
compliance. In fact, procedural justice did not even directly predict legal compliance in 
this model. Therefore, these data did not support the core proposition of the group 
engagement model; however, the data did support the secondary proposition, that social 
identity would mediate resource judgments. Resource judgments directly predicted social 
identity, which significantly predicted legal compliance. In addition, as predicted with 
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regard to mandatory behaviors, resource judgments also directly predicted legal 
compliance. 
 Taken together, the results of this analysis suggested that resource judgments 
were stronger predictors of legal compliance than perceptions of any of the other justice 
judgments. This was consistent with the findings from the test of the OMJ, which showed 
that distributive justice had a stronger relationship with legal compliance than did the 
other three types of justice, with one important difference. In the test of the OMJ, 
distributive justice had a negative relationship with legal compliance. In this study, 
resource judgments linked positively to legal compliance. This finding is more consistent 
with justice research. Note, however, that resource judgments did negatively predict 
social identity. In other words, more positive resource judgments predicted less positive 
evaluations of the mother’s social identity; when the mother received a fairer and more 
favorable outcome, participants perceived her as less deserving of social respect and 
personal pride. This is contrary to what one would expect, but might be an artifact of the 
distributive justice manipulation. In this study, fairer outcomes were the result of the 
mother committing more severe acts of neglect, which would reasonably lead to 
participants rating the mother less favorably.  
 This study marks one of the first complete tests of the group engagement and the 
very first test of the model in a legal context. Blader and Tyler (2009) recently published 
a test of the social identity mediation hypothesis in the organizational justice context and 
found support for the hypothesis. In this study, however, the results do not support the 
model. While the authors proposed the model as a general theory of justice, it could be 
that the model does not translate well into the legal context, or at least not the child 
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protection context. Where parental rights and child custody are concerned, people may be 
less concerned about procedural and interactional justice than they are about the 
outcomes themselves. The results of this study suggest that resource judgments are far 
more influential on predictions about legal compliance. 
 Another possibility is that the vignette design was not successful in creating the 
conditions for social identification. The GEM model argues that people learn something 
about their own social identities by being involved in an institutional decision-making 
process. It is possible that participants’ investment in the process or this case was not 
great enough to implicate their own social identities.  
RQ 4: Does the neglect severity moderate the relationships between justice judgments 
and outcomes? 
 Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) identified an interaction effect between justice 
judgments. Specifically, they noted that perceptions of procedural and interactional 
justice often interact with perceptions of distributive justice to affect the relationships 
between justice judgments and outcomes. Specifically, they reviewed the literature and 
observed that the relationship between procedural justice judgments and outcomes was 
generally strongest when distributive justice was low.  
 I tested for this interaction effect in two ways. First, I tested for an interaction 
effect within the factorial design of the study. The severity of neglect manipulation, by 
design, also manipulated participants’ judgments of distributive justice. Those in the 
moderate neglect condition perceived the outcome—keeping the child out of her home—
as less fair than those in the severe neglect condition. In a MANCOVA analysis, I tested 
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for interactions between the three justice judgments. I found no evidence of an interaction 
effect with the severity of neglect manipulation 
 Second, I tested for an interaction effect in a series of regression analyses, where I 
added interaction terms in the second step to test whether interactions uniquely 
contributed to prediction of justice outcomes. There was no evidence of an interaction 
effect for two of the three justice outcomes. There was some evidence of an interaction 
effect for collective esteem, but it was in the opposite direction predicted; the relationship 
between interpersonal justice and collective esteem was stronger when distributive justice 
was high, rather than when it was low. Taken together, these findings suggest that the 
interaction effect is not as robust as Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) argued. It could be 
that distributive justice was too strongly related to outcomes, or procedural and 
interactional justice were too weakly related too outcomes, for the interaction effect to 
manifest. 
RQ 5: Does participant role—decision-maker (i.e., judge) versus decision-
recipient (i.e, parent) moderate the relationships between justice judgments and 
outcomes? The final research question was whether the nature of a participant’s role in 
the legal process moderated the relationships between justice judgments and outcomes. 
Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) found that decision-makers’ evaluations of procedural 
justice and the decisions themselves were more strongly influenced by their judgments 
about the relative costs and benefits associated with the case than by the traditional 
procedural criteria. Even before conducting the primary analyses associated with this 
research question, I found some support for this hypothesis. In my test of the OMJ and 
the GEM, I ran the final models separately for assigned parents and assigned judges. For 
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both models, I was unable to get convergence for assigned judges, meaning that the 
models were not able to account adequately for the assigned judges’ responses.  
For the primary tests of this research question, I assigned participants to either a 
judge role (i.e., decision-maker) or a parent role (i.e., decision-recipient). In addition to 
justice judgments, I also asked them to rate the costs and benefits of child protection 
systems in general, including their tolerance for infringement of parents’ rights, perceived 
magnitude of the threat of child neglect to society, perceived efficacy of the child 
protection system in protecting children from harm, and the fairness of removing children 
from their homes. I found only weak support for the argument that decision-makers and 
decision-recipients evaluate decision satisfaction differently. For both assigned parents 
and assigned judges perceptions of distributive justice and the fairness of child removal 
influenced decision satisfaction. However, procedural justice influenced assigned parents 
but not assigned judges. This finding supports the argument that traditional procedural 
criteria more strongly influence decision-recipients.  
I found stronger support when measuring decision-makers and decision-recipients 
judgments about procedural and interactional justice. For procedural justice judgments, 
distributive justice evaluations more strongly influenced judges, although parents’ 
distributive justice judgments were also significant predictors. For interactional justice 
judgments, there was a significant role by distributive justice interaction; assigned 
judges’ distributive justice judgments were significant predictors, but they were not 
significant predictors for assigned parents.  
In sum, the results of these analyses suggest that perceptions of distributive justice 
are more influential on decision-makers’ procedural and interactional justice judgments 
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than they are for decision-recipients. This pattern of results is consistent with Heuer, 
Penrod, and Kattan (2007); however, it is important to note that my measure of societal 
costs and benefits, which was based on those authors’ own measures, did not do a good 
job of accounting for decision-makers’ judgments. The four scales were only sporadically 
related to justice judgments and only more related for assigned judges than assigned 
parents in one case. Perceived efficacy of the child protection system was a significant 
predictor of assigned judges’, but not assigned parents’, procedural justice judgments. It 
could be that perceived costs and benefits is not actually the best mechanism to explain 
decision-makers judgments. It may be more straightforward. Decision-makers might 
simply rely more strongly on distributive justice in evaluating outcomes, whereas 
decision-recipients rely more strongly on procedural and interactional justice. Before 
Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) justice research focused on distributive justice and its 
associated outcomes. While the field has moved far from that in the past thirty years, it 
may be time to revisit the idea that distributive justice judgments can be a powerful force, 
especially where decision-makers are concerned.  
A second possibility lies in the context. It is possible that the child protection 
context makes societal costs and benefits less of a driving force in making justice 
judgments, but this seems unlikely. Issues related to child maltreatment and the child 
protection system are inherently issues of societal costs and benefits. The questions of 
whether the state should remove children from their homes and for how long require a 
weighing of the costs and benefits to children and to society. If anything, one might 
expect the societal costs and benefits measures to be highly influential on both decision-
makers and decision-recipients, but that was not the case in this study. 
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Taken together, these finding suggest that traditional models of procedural justice 
must be explicitly qualified as only accounting for decision-recipients’ justice judgments 
and outcomes. This kind of qualification may already be implicit in the models. For 
example, some of the outcomes traditionally measured, like legal compliance, only make 
sense from the perspective of decision-recipients. However, what outcomes should we 
expect to be associated with decision-makers’ judgments about fairness? For decision 
recipients, the research has robustly established some positive outcomes associated with 
perceiving fair treatment during the decision-making process. For decision-makers, 
Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) would perhaps argue that positive outcomes would be 
more strongly associated when a decision is born from a positive societal cost-benefit 
balance. However, I did not find that in this study. Decision satisfaction related only 
weakly to societal costs and benefits, and it was equally related for both assigned judges 
and assigned parents. Given that this is a new area of research, these results pose more 
questions than they answer.  
Implications for Procedural Justice Theory 
 In addition to the specific research questions discussed above, the results of this 
dissertation have several general implications for procedural justice theory. Perhaps the 
broadest conclusion is that the field would benefit from a clarification of the research 
questions and conceptual definitions at use, especially in the legal psychology field. In 
organizational psychology, scholars have recently attempted to synthesize the research 
and bring coherence to the field. Perhaps most notably, Colquitt and Greenberg have 
released two edited books in the past ten years (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Greenberg 
& Colquitt, 2005). In addition, several scholars have published conceptual reviews of the 
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literature (Ambrose, 2002; Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001; Fortin, 2006; 
Nowakowski & Conlon, 2005).  
 The reviews of the organizational justice literature offer some wisdom for justice 
researchers in the legal context. First, as Ambrose (2002) noted in the organizational 
context, legal psychologists must recognize that we are asking two distinct research 
questions and we should treat them as such, without ignoring their interdependence. The 
first question is what factors influence justice judgments. In other words, we must 
identify a measurement model of justice that works in the legal context. The results of 
this dissertation suggest that the organizational model of justice will translate nicely, but 
we have to do more research focused specifically on answering the measurement question 
in order to confidently draw that conclusion. While the measurement question was taken 
up in early legal psychology justice research (e.g., Leventhal, 1980; Tyler, 1988, 1989), it 
is rarely explicitly done so today. The one exception is the four-component model 
introduced by Blader and Tyler (2003), which the authors argued was appropriate for 
both organizational and legal contexts. However, that model was only tested in the 
organizational context, and the authors themselves have not adopted that measurement 
model in their subsequent research (Blader, 2007a; Blader & Tyler, 2009, Davis-Lipman, 
Tyler, & Andersen, 2007; Tyler & De Cremer, 2005).  
 On the topic of measurement, distributive justice played a strong role in 
participants’ evaluations of the decision in this child neglect case. Distributive justice 
judgments most consistently and most strongly predicted the justice outcomes in this 
design. Historically, justice researchers have played down the importance of distributive 
justice, arguing that procedural justice is a far more potent influence on outcomes related 
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to the decision (Bettencourt, Brown, & MacKenzie, 2005; Tyler, 1984, 2006; Tyler & 
Blader, 2000; Tyler, Casper, & Fisher, 1989; Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw, 1985). The 
results here suggest that distributive justice does play a prominent role in people’s 
understanding of justice and related outcomes. The advantage of the OMJ, especially as 
compared to the GEM, is that it places distributive justice on equal status with other 
justice judgments; thus, it recognizes that a complete understanding of justice requires 
acknowledging the role of distributive justice. 
 The second issue that legal researchers need to address is identifying the specific 
outcomes of justice judgments. Here, the legal psychology field, again, lags behind 
organizational justice. In fact, Nowakowski and Conlon (2005) observe that the 
organizational justice field has begun moving beyond this simple question to exploring 
moderator effects. Researchers in legal psychology have not made a full move to 
studying moderator effects, because the field is not in a position to do so yet. Although 
legal psychologists have been studying justice concepts for just as long as organizational 
researchers, they have not come as far in establishing the foundational connection 
between justice judgments and behavioral outcomes. Most of the legal psychological 
research stops short of measuring behavioral outcomes in favor of measuring short-term 
satisfaction with the decision, stated intentions to comply with the law, and sometimes 
respect for the law (e..g, Gover, Brank, & MacDonald, 2007; Maeder & Wiener, 2008; 
Wells, 2007), although there are some important exceptions (Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 
2007; Reisig & Mesko, 2009; Tyler, Sherman, Strang, Barnes, & Woods, 2007).  
While these are all important outcomes, and indeed, the ones I tested in this study, 
the presumption of the field is that positive justice judgments will directly contribute to 
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positive behavioral outcomes. For example, the group engagement model (Tyler & 
Blader, 2003) explicitly states that people who perceive fair treatment will more willingly 
engaged in voluntary and mandatory group behaviors. Unfortunately, the group 
engagement model received little support in this sample, suggesting that social identity 
may not be the best explanation for the relationship between justice judgments and 
outcomes in all legal contexts. In fact, Tyler and colleagues (Blader & Tyler, 2003, 2009; 
Tyler & Blader, 2003) have tested the group engagement model primarily in the 
organizational context. While the authors argue this model applies in the legal context, no 
other researchers outside the current study have tested it in that context. There are 
certainly reasons to expect that there are differences between these two contexts that 
would render the processes underlying procedural justice judgments very different. For 
example, people are free to work for organizations, while parents are forced into the child 
protection system.  
Clearly, empirically testing behavioral outcomes of justice judgments is a far 
more difficult proposition in legal settings than in organizational ones. In the work place, 
employees are easy to identify and easier to maintain in the sample along multiple time 
points. In contrast, the logistics of tracking parties to a legal decision for multiple time 
points is cumbersome, but doing so will be valuable to the field.  If we cannot establish 
that perceptions of justice do have an impact on people’s behavioral engagement in the 
law, then we have little reason to study perceptions of fairness in the legal context at all. 
Legal Implications 
 The results of this dissertation have three broad implications for the law, both 
generally and in the child protection context. First, due process did matter to participants. 
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In this study, procedural treatment was a direct manipulation of a key due process 
protection—voice, or opportunity to present one’s side of the story. Participants who read 
the scenario in which the judge afforded the mother this right rated higher procedural 
justice. In addition, higher procedural justice ratings predicted participants’ belief that the 
mother was more likely to comply with the law, that the judge was better at his job, and 
overall decision satisfaction. The fact that procedural justice had such a strong influence 
on justice outcomes lends support to the argument that due process protections do 
promote a general sense of fairness and increased acceptance of legal decisions. 
 At this juncture, it is worth reiterating that the OMJ model did a good job of 
accounting for participants’ justice judgments. In other words, participants did distinguish 
between formal procedural treatment and informal interactional treatment. From a legal 
perspective, this finding suggests that, in the legal context, people understand these 
different kinds of treatment as separate but related constructs. This is consistent with the 
law in that the law provides a number of procedural protections, but does very little to 
provide legal parties protection from interpersonal treatment. From a research 
perspective, this finding supports the argument that the OMJ does translate well into a 
legal context and has some benefits over models that combine and confound procedural 
and interactional treatment. 
 Second, predictions of legal compliance came from both procedural and 
distributive justice perceptions. That is to say that with a simultaneous test of all justice 
judgments, only formal procedural treatment and distributive treatment predicted 
participants’ ratings of the mother’s likelihood to comply with the case plan. This finding 
is consistent with the organizational literature, which predicts that procedural treatment 
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will be related to institutional support, including rule obedience (Colquitt, 2001; 
Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002; Roch & Shanock, 2006). However, and importantly, 
this finding is contrary to much of the rhetoric of procedural justice researchers in the 
legal context, who arguably overemphasize the import of interactional treatment as a 
powerful force in facilitating compliance with the law and minimize objective, 
distributive justice (Gonzalez & Tyler, 2008; Tyler, 2006).  
As Fox (1999) argued, it could be that this increased emphasis on interactional 
justice in the law has distracted us from remembering that procedural and distributive 
outcomes are the foundation on which a truly just legal system are built. Without due 
process and generally fair outcomes, interactional justice means little and maybe nothing 
at all. Along these lines, distributive justice judgments were a strong influence on 
participants’ ratings of all justice-related outcomes. In fact, overall, distributive justice 
was the most consistent predictor of justice outcomes. Thus, in the child protection 
context, it appears that participants’ perceptions that the removal was fair were more 
powerful than their judgments about how fairly the court treated the mother during the 
hearing.  
Again, the fact that participants were outcome-focused is contrary to what 
procedural justice researchers generally find, but it is important to note that most 
procedural justice researchers do not study the topic within a context with so much 
consequence. In the child protection context, parents face the temporary loss of custody 
of their children and the knowledge that this loss may become permanent. With an 
outcome this severe at stake, it is easy to imagine that issues of distributive justice might 
overshadow any concerns about procedural and, especially, interactional justice that 
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might otherwise be present. This line of reasoning begs the question whether there is a 
point at which the outcome at stake is so personally important that concern over it 
dominates the other justice evaluations that are typically involved during a decision-
making procedure? If there is, then one can easily imagine that point to be present quite 
often in the legal context, suggesting that procedural and interactional justice might not 
play as strong a role across the legal board as justice researchers have argued. In order to 
understand truly the boundaries between procedural, interactional, and distributive 
justice, legal psychologists must begin to test the theory in the field. 
Third, parents and judges are likely to perceive and evaluate the legal process 
quite differently. In this study, assigned judges placed a bigger premium on distributive 
justice than assigned parents, especially when evaluating the procedural and interactional 
justice in the scenario. In other words, assigned judges’ perceptions of distributive justice 
impacted their evaluations of procedural and interactional justice, suggesting that 
distributive justice judgments had some sort of primacy over the other justice judgments. 
On the other hand, distributive justice influenced parents less when they made their other 
justice evaluations, although (as noted in the prior paragraph), assigned parents were still 
quite influenced by distributive justice in general. 
The fact that parents and judges are likely to perceive the process differently has 
important implications for the practice of the law. If judges are not as attuned to issues 
related to procedural and interpersonal treatment, then they will be less likely to modify 
their behavior to promote procedural and interactional justice. Procedural justice, to a 
great extent, is commanded by due process laws; however, interactional treatment is at 
the discretion of individual judges. The child protection context, which is often 
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characterized by more informal hearings, is one in which judges could have great 
freedom to practice communication techniques that parents’ might perceive as more just, 
including speaking in plain English, clearly explaining decisions, and always being 
respectful toward parents.  
The results of this study suggested that when people perceive the interactional 
treatment as more positive, they are more likely to evaluate the judge as competent and 
they are more likely to respects the law.  These outcomes might have important effects on 
parents’ engagement in the legal process. In fact, it is possible that respect for the judge 
and a sense of personal respect might be better indicators of parents’ progress toward 
reunification than complying with the case plan. As Brank et al. (2001) noted, 
compliance with a case plan is only a good indicator that the parent will be able to 
maintain the child’s safety and wellbeing when the case plan is narrowly tailored to the 
parents’ needs. In reality, many case plans are written broadly and compliance is 
measured in terms of attendance at meetings rather than improvement in skills or 
reduction of problem behaviors. In the future, researchers should identify specific 
indicators of improved parenting and establish that justice judgments conform to those 
indicators.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 I identified many of the limitations of this study earlier in this discussion, so I will 
only briefly address them here. Perhaps the biggest weakness was that this was a 
laboratory study, meaning that the design was artificial and weak in external validity. 
Participants read a written case file and description of what happened in a fictional court 
proceeding. People attending actual court hearings would likely react to the situation 
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differently, probably more strongly than participants in this study. Beyond the difference 
between the written word and actual presence in a hearing, there is also the difference 
between what was at stake for participants in this study and what is truly at stake for 
participants in a child protection hearing. Judges are burdened with the responsibility of 
making decisions that greatly impact the lives of children and families, including keeping 
children outside the custody of their parents. Real judges, as opposed to participants 
assigned as judges, would have the benefit of their own experience, as well as the 
pressures of a real docket. Parents face the possibility of long-term separation from their 
children, let alone the barriers of low socioeconomic status, mental health, and substance 
abuse problems, which are common among parents in the child protection system 
(Forrester & Harwin, 2006; Sidebotham & Heron, 2006; Stromwall, Larson, Nieri, 
Holley, Topping, Castillo et al., 2008). Real parents, as opposed to participants assigned 
as parents, would potentially be much more affected by and much more aware of 
variations in procedural and interpersonal treatment. 
 In terms of internal validity, the procedural justice manipulation was somewhat 
weak compared to the other manipulations. In this study, the manipulation of procedural 
treatment either allowed or refused the mother an opportunity to present her side of the 
story in court. The vignette made it clear that the judge had no discretion in granting or 
denying the mother’s request to speak, and it is true that the majority of participants did 
understand that. Nonetheless, compared to the other manipulations, a large minority did 
not correctly understand the parameters of the procedural treatment manipulation. The 
weakness of the manipulation could explain why procedural justice was less strongly 
related to outcomes than expected. However, it is important to consider the legal context. 
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While some participants did not understand this manipulation, the question remains 
whether parents in a real child protection proceeding are able to make that distinction. 
Unlike in the organizational context, the distinction between institutional treatment and 
interpersonal treatment blur easily because the public has less familiarity with rules of 
law than with the norms in the workplace. Future research should explore whether 
understanding of the law affects people’s evaluations of procedural and interpersonal 
treatment.  
The procedural justice manipulation was also somewhat artificial in that, by law, 
parents’ have the constitutional right to testify in their defense, at least the time of 
adjudication (Jones, 2006). Nonetheless, by beginning this line of research with a basic 
due process right, I was able to confirm that the refusal of due process rights, in fact, does 
reduce procedural justice judgments. In the future, researchers should begin to explore 
the boundaries of due process-what rights are most important to parents involved in the 
child protection system? 
The interactional treatment manipulation was quite effective in altering 
perceptions of interactional justice, but there is one weakness in the design. I manipulated 
interpersonal and informational treatment concurrently, rather than orthogonally, thus 
weakening conclusions based on the distinction between interpersonal and informational 
justice from this sample. Even so, participants’ ratings of interpersonal and informational 
justice were sufficiently distinct to be able to test the constructs separately in the 
analyses. In the future, I would like to begin exploring the differential effects of 
interpersonal and informational justice in the child protection context with stronger 
research design. Field research suggests that both interpersonal and informational 
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treatment are relevant to parents’ reactions to the child protection system, but that 
information might be more important (Drake, 1994; Dumbrill, 2006; Kapp & Propp. 
2002; Thoburn, Lewis, & Shemmings, 1995). 
 In all, the dependent measures were coherent and proved reliable. I adopted them 
almost entirely from prior research, largely from Colquitt (2001).  Because they were 
adapted from Colquitt’s work, this study provides a solid replication of many of his core 
hypotheses. Nevertheless, researchers will need to test the relationships with alternative 
measures of justice judgments and outcomes to be fully confident in this model. Testing 
different outcomes is especially important. Here, I tested participants’ perceptions of the 
mother in the scenario. Future research should extend this by testing outcomes that are 
more personally relevant to the evaluator. Future research should also test behavioral, not 
just attitudinal, outcomes. Finally, in the future, researchers should test additional 
outcomes, which they can theoretically derive from the model. For example, if procedural 
treatment is perceived as institutionally linked, and therefore affects institutionally 
relevant outcomes, then increased respect for the institution should be an outcome of 
positive procedural treatment. Tyler (2006) has shown a link between procedural justice 
and perceived legitimacy of authority and respect for the law, but all of his work uses a 
much broader definition of procedural justice, one that includes an interactional 
component. To my knowledge, Tyler has not evaluated whether this more narrow 
definition of procedural treatment also predicts respect for the law. 
 Ultimately, this study was a potential first in a program of research that explores 
the utility of the organizational model of justice in the legal context, in particular, the role 
that justice judgments play in influencing parental compliance with case plans. As that, it 
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served its purpose. The results generally supported the organizational model of justice in 
both its measurement and its structure, although not as strongly in its structure. Future 
research needs to replicate and extend these findings in the child protection context, in 
addition to other legal contexts. It will be important to enter the courtroom and beginning 
talking to parties to child protection cases. In terms of procedural and interactional 
treatment, future studies should combine courtroom observations with interviews of 
parents to get a more complete sense of differences between objective and perceived 
treatment, and how treatment impacts parents’ willingness to engage in the process.  
In addition, it will be important to explore other legal factors. Parents interact 
with their caseworkers and their attorneys more often than with judges, and their 
caseworkers are in a position of authority. It is likely that parents’ interactions with their 
caseworkers also involve elements of fair or unfair treatment, and that this treatment is 
even more powerful on parents’ future behavior in the case. In fact, many researchers 
have identified the quality of the caseworker-parent relationship as an important 
influence on parents’ willingness to cooperate with child protective services (Drake, 
1994; Dumbrill, 1996; Kapp & Propp, 2002; Thoburn, Lewis, & Shemmings, 1995). 
Importing a procedural justice framework to this body of research might go a long way in 
helping to introduce some coherence to this literature, as well as identify potential 
gateways and barriers to parental compliance. 
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Appendix A. Role Induction Materials 
Judge Induction 
 
This study is about a juvenile court case. In juvenile court, judges have to hear a variety 
of cases, including cases involving child abuse and neglect. When a parent has been 
accused of abusing or neglecting their child, it is the judge’s job to make a range of 
decisions. For example, juvenile court judges have to hear descriptions of the child’s 
living circumstances and decide whether it was reasonable that the caseworker removed 
the child from home. Judges also have to decide when and whether it is safe for the child 
to return home and, in severe cases, whether a parent’s right to their child should be 
terminated altogether. In general, juvenile court judges have to make decisions about 
what is in the child’s best interests.  
 
Imagine that you are a judge in a juvenile court, where you frequently hear and decide 
child abuse cases. Please take the next few minutes to imagine what it would be like to be 
a juvenile court judge, and then answer the following questions. 
 
Would it be easy or difficult for you to be a juvenile court judge? Please write a 
paragraph explaining your answer. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
What kinds of information would you need to make good decisions? Please write a 
paragraph explaining your answer. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
How would it feel to be a juvenile court judge hearing child abuse and neglect cases? 
Please write a paragraph explaining your answer. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Next, you will read a court case file describing a child neglect case based upon one that 
recently came before a juvenile court. The identifying information has been changed, but 
the core facts are similar to those in the original case.     
 
Please read the file carefully, thinking about it from the perspective of a 
juvenile court judge, then answer a series of questions about the case. 
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Parent Induction 
 
Imagine that you are a single parent of a 10-year-old daughter. As a single parent, you 
have to take care of your child. For example, you have to make sure that your child has 
food to eat, clothes to wear, and a safe place to live. In general, you have to do your best 
to make sure that your child’s needs and interests are met. Please take the next few 
minutes to imagine what it would be like to be accused of neglecting your child, and have 
your child removed from your home. Within two days of your child’s removal, you must 
attend a hearing before a judge, who is to decide whether the child should temporarily 
remain outside of your home. 
 
What would it be like to a parent in this situation? Please write a paragraph explaining 
your answer. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
How would you feel about attending this hearing? Please write a paragraph explaining 
your answer. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
What would you expect to happen at this hearing? Please write a paragraph explaining 
your answer. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Next, you will read a court case file describing a child neglect case based upon one that 
recently came before a juvenile court. I have changed the identifying information, but the 
core facts are similar to those in the original case.    
 
Please read the file carefully, thinking about it from the perspective of a parent, 
and then answer a series of questions about the case. 
136 
 
Appendix B. Official Juvenile Petition 
Severe Neglect Version 
Below is the description of the purpose of the petition, followed by the petition’s text. Within the 
petition, only the italicized text was manipulated for this study. Participants did not see the italics. 
 
OFFICIAL JUVE ILE PETITIO  
The county attorney files the official petition. The purpose of the petition is to describe 
the nature of the situation that led to removing Hailey from her mother’s home and 
bringing the case before the court. 
 
IN THE SEPARATE JUVENILE COURT  
IN THE INTEREST OF   )   DOC. 9128   NO. 23 
     ) 
HAILEY SMITH   ) 
     ) 
Child Under Eighteen Years of Age )   JUVENILE PETITION 
 
 COMES NOW, Sally Marlon, Deputy County Attorney and shows to the Court: 
 That said child is under the age of eighteen years, said child’s date of birth being 
January 4, 1999. 
COUNT I: That the above-named minor child is in a situation dangerous to life or 
limb or injurious to the health or morals of said child in that: 
A. On or about January 13, 2009, the child was removed from her home when it 
was found in a dirty condition and she was found alone with no adult 
supervision, to wit: 
1. A toilet in one bathroom was broken and the child continued to use it. The 
toilet was filled with feces and urine and feces were on the floor. 
2. The house had clothes, food containers, and debris on the floor 
everywhere. A strong smell of urine permeated the upstairs of the home. 
3. Piles of rat feces were scattered through the dresser drawers and on the 
floor of the home. 
 
WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays that summons issue and be served upon the above-
named child, the child’s mother, the person having custody and control of said child, 
requiring them to appear personally before this Court at the time and place stated in said 
summons and that the Court make such orders concerning the care, custody and control 
of said child as deemed appropriate in the premises. 
 
        Sally Marlon, petitioner 
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 Moderate Neglect Version 
Below is the description of the purpose of the petition, followed by the petition’s text. Within the 
petition, only the italicized text was manipulated for this study. Participants did not see the italics. 
 OFFICIAL JUVE ILE PETITIO  
The county attorney files the official petition. The purpose of the petition is to describe 
the nature of the situation that led to removing Hailey from her mother’s home and 
bringing the case before the court.
 
IN THE SEPARATE JUVENILE COURT  
IN THE INTEREST OF   )   DOC. 9128   NO. 23 
     ) 
HAILEY SMITH   ) 
     ) 
Child Under Eighteen Years of Age )   JUVENILE PETITION 
 
 COMES NOW, Sally Marlon, Deputy County Attorney and shows to the Court: 
 That said child is under the age of eighteen years, said child’s date of birth being 
January 4, 1999. 
COUNT I: That the above-named minor child is in a situation dangerous to life or 
limb or injurious to the health or morals of said child in that: 
A. On or about January 13, 2009, the child was removed from her home when it 
was found in a dirty condition and she was found alone with no adult 
supervision, to wit: 
1. The minor child was found sitting in her home watching television with no 
adult supervision. 
2. The minor child explained that her mother worked until 5pm, and that she 
always arrived home from school at 4pm and watched television until her 
mom came home. 
3. The kitchen sink, table, and counters were full of dirty dishes and pans 
and there was no clean food preparation area. 
 
WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays that summons issue and be served upon the above-
named child, the child’s mother, the person having custody and control of said child, 
requiring them to appear personally before this Court at the time and place stated in said 
summons and that the Court make such orders concerning the care, custody and control 
of said child as deemed appropriate in the premises. 
        Sally Marlon, petitioner 
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Appendix C. Official Caseworker Court Report 
The caseworker files the court report before the protective custody hearing. The purpose 
of the court report is for the caseworker to make recommendations to the judge about 
what to order for the family.  
 
Nebraska Health and Human Services System 
COURT REPORT 
Date of Preparation: 1-15-2009 
FAMILY INFORMATION 
Parent: Sarah Smith 
Child:  
Name: Hailey Smith 
 Birthdate: 1-4-1999    Age: 10 years 
 
Case Manager: Becky Cassidy 
 
COURT RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It is recommended the court order: 
1. That Hailey remain in the temporary legal and physical custody of the 
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services. 
2. That Ms. Smith, the mother, participate in a parenting assessment and 
class. 
3. That Ms. Smith, the mother, maintains a sanitary and safe home 
environment for Hailey. 
4. That Ms. Smith, the mother, ensures that Hailey is being properly 
supervised at all times. 
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Appendix D. Protective Custody Hearing Summary 
  
Unfair Procedural Treatment/Unfair Interactional Treatment/Severe Neglect Version 
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the 
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this 
study. Participants did not see the italics. 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY 
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare 
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the 
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and 
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the 
court process. 
 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY 
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s 
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in 
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker 
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home. 
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the 
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that 
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and 
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.” 
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of 
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the 
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While 
reading, the judge appeared irritated and gave Ms. Smith a disapproving look. Ms. Smith 
heard the judge mumble, “This is disgusting.” After a moment, the judge looked at the 
courtroom and said, “There are three allegations in this petition.  
“First, the toilet in the home was broken, but continued to be used. The toilet had urine 
and feces in it, and there were feces on the floor of the bathroom.” The judge then rudely 
added, “That is disgusting, Ms. Smith. I am absolutely appalled that you would keep your 
home in such a filthy condition, especially with your daughter also living there.” 
140 
 
“Second, the house was messy and dirty. There were clothes, food containers, and trash 
scattered on the floor throughout the home.” The judge continued in a hostile tone, “I 
just don’t understand how you could live like that.”  
“Third, there were piles of rat feces in your home.” At this, the judge got irate. “I hope 
you’re as disgusted with yourself as I am, Ms. Smith!” 
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they 
had anything to add. They both declined.  
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her 
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your 
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can 
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to 
explain the situation from her own perspective.” 
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law prevents me from allowing Ms. 
Smith to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective 
custody hearing is merely to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are not 
allowed to provide information at this hearing. Ms. Smith cannot speak to the court in the 
manner you requested. I cannot hear her testimony now.” 
 
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any 
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this 
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and 
Human Services.”  
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.” 
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Unfair Procedural Treatment/Fair Interactional Treatment/Severe Neglect Version 
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the 
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this 
study. Participants did not see the italics. 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY 
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare 
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the 
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and 
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the 
court process. 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY 
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s 
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in 
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker 
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home. 
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the 
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that 
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and 
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.” 
The judge turned to the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, this is called the protective custody 
hearing. I want to explain to you why we are here. As you know, Hailey was living with 
you up until a few days ago, when the caseworker took her out of your custody. The 
purpose of today’s hearing is for me to hear about why Hailey was removed and for me 
to decide if Hailey should remain out of your home for now or if she is safe to be returned 
to your care while the case continues. Do you understand?” 
“Good,” said the judge, smiling. 
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of 
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the 
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While 
reading, the judge appeared interested and occasionally glanced up at Ms. Smith. After a 
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moment, the judge looked at the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, there are three allegations 
in this petition.  
“First, the toilet in your home was broken, but continued to be used. The toilet had urine 
and feces in it, and there were feces on the floor of the bathroom.”  
“Second, the house was messy and dirty. There were clothes, food containers, and trash 
scattered on the floor throughout the home.”  
“Third, there were piles of rat feces in your home.”  
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they 
had anything to add. They both declined.  
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her 
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your 
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can 
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to 
explain the situation from her own perspective.” 
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law prevents me from allowing Ms. 
Smith to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective 
custody hearing is merely to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are not 
allowed to provide information at this hearing. Ms. Smith cannot speak to the court in the 
manner you requested. I cannot hear her testimony now.” 
 
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any 
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this 
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and 
Human Services.”  
The judge turned to Ms. Smith, and said rather gently, “Ms. Smith, this means that I have 
ordered that Hailey live outside of your home for the time being. I have made this 
decision based on what I believe to be in Hailey’s best interests. Based on what I have 
read in this petition, I believe that you have not taken appropriate care of Hailey, and 
that she is not safe in your home. Ms. Smith, do you have any questions about what has 
happened here today?”  
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.” 
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Fair Procedural Treatment/Unfair Interactional Treatment/Severe Neglect Version 
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the 
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this 
study. Participants did not see the italics. 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY 
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare 
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the 
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and 
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the 
court process. 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY 
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s 
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in 
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker 
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home. 
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the 
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that 
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and 
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.” 
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of 
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the 
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While 
reading, the judge appeared irritated and gave Ms. Smith a disapproving look. Ms. Smith 
heard the judge mumble, “This is disgusting.” After a moment, the judge looked at the 
courtroom and said, “There are three allegations in this petition.  
“First, the toilet in the home was broken, but continued to be used. The toilet had urine 
and feces in it, and there were feces on the floor of the bathroom.” The judge then rudely 
added, “That is disgusting, Ms. Smith. I am absolutely appalled that you would keep your 
home in such a filthy condition, especially with your daughter also living there.” 
“Second, the house was messy and dirty. There were clothes, food containers, and trash 
scattered on the floor throughout the home.” The judge continued in a hostile tone, “I 
just don’t understand how you could live like that.”  
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“Third, there were piles of rat feces in your home.” At this, the judge got irate. “I hope 
you’re as disgusted with yourself as I am, Ms. Smith!” 
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they 
had anything to add. They both declined.  
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her 
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your 
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can 
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to 
explain the situation from her own perspective.” 
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law requires that I allow Ms. Smith 
to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective custody 
hearing is to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are allowed to provide 
information at this hearing. Ms. Smith has a right to provide her own perspective, so that 
I may consider it in deciding Hailey’s placement. I can hear her testimony now.” 
 
The mother then described her side of the story to the judge. 
 
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any 
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this 
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and 
Human Services.”  
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.” 
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Fair Procedural Treatment/Fair Interactional Treatment/Severe Neglect Version 
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the 
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this 
study. Participants did not see the italics. 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY 
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare 
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the 
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and 
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the 
court process.
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY 
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s 
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in 
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker 
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home. 
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the 
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that 
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and 
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.” 
The judge turned to the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, this is called the protective custody 
hearing. I want to explain to you why we are here. As you know, Hailey was living with 
you up until a few days ago, when the caseworker took her out of your custody. The 
purpose of today’s hearing is for me to hear about why Hailey was removed and for me 
to decide if Hailey should remain out of your home for now or if she is safe to be returned 
to your care while the case continues. Do you understand?” 
“Good,” said the judge, smiling 
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of 
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the 
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While 
reading, the judge appeared interested and occasionally glanced up at Ms. Smith. After a 
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moment, the judge looked at the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, there are three allegations 
in this petition.  
“First, the toilet in your home was broken, but continued to be used. The toilet had urine 
and feces in it, and there were feces on the floor of the bathroom.”  
“Second, the house was messy and dirty. There were clothes, food containers, and trash 
scattered on the floor throughout the home.”  
“Third, there were piles of rat feces in your home.”  
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they 
had anything to add. They both declined.  
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her 
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your 
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can 
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to 
explain the situation from her own perspective.” 
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law requires that I allow Ms. Smith 
to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective custody 
hearing is to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are allowed to provide 
information at this hearing. Ms. Smith has a right to provide her own perspective, so that 
I may consider it in deciding Hailey’s placement. I can hear her testimony now.” 
 
The mother then described her side of the story to the judge. 
 
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any 
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this 
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and 
Human Services.”  
The judge turned to Ms. Smith, and said rather gently, “Ms. Smith, this means that I have 
ordered that Hailey live outside of your home for the time being. I have made this 
decision based on what I believe to be in Hailey’s best interests. Based on what I have 
read in this petition, I believe that you have not taken appropriate care of Hailey, and 
that she is not safe in your home. Ms. Smith, do you have any questions about what has 
happened here today?”  
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.” 
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Unfair Procedural Treatment/Unfair Interactional Treatment/Moderate Neglect Version 
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the 
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this 
study. Participants did not see the italics. 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY 
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare 
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the 
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and 
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the 
court process. 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY 
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s 
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in 
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker 
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home. 
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the 
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that 
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and 
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.” 
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of 
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the 
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While 
reading, the judge appeared irritated and gave Ms. Smith a disapproving look. Ms. Smith 
heard the judge mumble, “This is disgusting.” After a moment, the judge looked at the 
courtroom and said, “There are three allegations in this petition.  
“First, Hailey was found home alone without adult supervision.” The judge then rudely 
added, “That is unacceptable, Ms. Smith. I am absolutely appalled that you would leave 
your daughter unsupervised.” 
“Second, Hailey is left home alone for an hour each day five days a week.” The judge 
continued in a hostile tone, “I just don’t understand how you do that.”  
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“Third, the kitchen was dirty, and dirty dishes were also on the kitchen counter and 
table.” At this, the judge got irate. “I hope you’re as disgusted with yourself as I am, Ms. 
Smith!” 
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they 
had anything to add. They both declined.  
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her 
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your 
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can 
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to 
explain the situation from her own perspective.” 
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law prevents me from allowing Ms. 
Smith to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective 
custody hearing is merely to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are not 
allowed to provide information at this hearing. Ms. Smith cannot speak to the court in the 
manner you requested. I cannot hear her testimony now.” 
 
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any 
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this 
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and 
Human Services.”  
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.” 
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Unfair Procedural Treatment/Fair Interactional Treatment/Moderate Neglect Version 
[OTE: Only italicized text has been manipulated; italics were not present for 
participants.] 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY 
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare 
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the 
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and 
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the 
court process. 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY 
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s 
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in 
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker 
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home. 
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the 
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that 
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and 
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.” 
The judge turned to the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, this is called the protective custody 
hearing. I want to explain to you why we are here. As you know, Hailey was living with 
you up until a few days ago, when the caseworker took her out of your custody. The 
purpose of today’s hearing is for me to hear about why Hailey was removed and for me 
to decide if Hailey should remain out of your home for now or if she is safe to be returned 
to your care while the case continues. Do you understand?” 
“Good,” said the judge, smiling. 
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of 
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the 
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While 
reading, the judge appeared interested and occasionally glanced up at Ms. Smith. After a 
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moment, the judge looked at the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, there are three allegations 
in this petition.  
“First, Hailey was found home alone without adult supervision.” 
“Second, Hailey is left home alone for an hour each day five days a week.”  
“Third, the kitchen was dirty, and dirty dishes were also on the kitchen counter and 
table.” 
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they 
had anything to add. They both declined.  
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her 
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your 
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can 
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to 
explain the situation from her own perspective.” 
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law prevents me from allowing Ms. 
Smith to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective 
custody hearing is merely to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are not 
allowed to provide information at this hearing. Ms. Smith cannot speak to the court in the 
manner you requested. I cannot hear her testimony now.” 
 
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any 
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this 
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and 
Human Services.”  
The judge turned to Ms. Smith, and said rather gently, “Ms. Smith, this means that I have 
ordered that Hailey live outside of your home for the time being. I have made this 
decision based on what I believe to be in Hailey’s best interests. Based on what I have 
read in this petition, I believe that you have not taken appropriate care of Hailey, and 
that she is not safe in your home. Ms. Smith, do you have any questions about what has 
happened here today?”  
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.” 
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Fair Procedural Treatment/Unfair Interactional Treatment/Moderate Neglect Version 
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the 
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this 
study. Participants did not see the italics. 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY 
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare 
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the 
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and 
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the 
court process. 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY 
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s 
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in 
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker 
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home. 
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the 
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that 
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and 
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.” 
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of 
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the 
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While 
reading, the judge appeared irritated and gave Ms. Smith a disapproving look. Ms. Smith 
heard the judge mumble, “This is disgusting.” After a moment, the judge looked at the 
courtroom and said, “There are three allegations in this petition.  
“First, Hailey was found home alone without adult supervision.” The judge then rudely 
added, “That is unacceptable, Ms. Smith. I am absolutely appalled that you would leave 
your daughter unsupervised.” 
“Second, Hailey is left home alone for an hour each day five days a week.” The judge 
continued in a hostile tone, “I just don’t understand how you do that.”  
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“Third, the kitchen was dirty, and dirty dishes were also on the kitchen counter and 
table.” At this, the judge got irate. “I hope you’re as disgusted with yourself as I am, Ms. 
Smith!” 
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they 
had anything to add. They both declined.  
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her 
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your 
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can 
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to 
explain the situation from her own perspective.” 
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law requires that I allow Ms. Smith 
to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective custody 
hearing is to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are allowed to provide 
information at this hearing. Ms. Smith has a right to provide her own perspective, so that 
I may consider it in deciding Hailey’s placement. I can hear her testimony now.” 
 
The mother then described her side of the story to the judge. 
 
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any 
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this 
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and 
Human Services.”  
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.” 
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Fair Procedural Treatment/Fair Interactional Treatment/Moderate Neglect Version 
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the 
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this 
study. Participants did not see the italics. 
 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY 
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare 
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the 
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and 
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the 
court process. 
 
  PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY 
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s 
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in 
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker 
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home. 
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the 
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that 
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and 
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.” 
The judge turned to the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, this is called the protective custody 
hearing. I want to explain to you why we are here. As you know, Hailey was living with 
you up until a few days ago, when the caseworker took her out of your custody. The 
purpose of today’s hearing is for me to hear about why Hailey was removed and for me 
to decide if Hailey should remain out of your home for now or if she is safe to be returned 
to your care while the case continues. Do you understand?” 
“Good,” said the judge, smiling 
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of 
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the 
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While 
reading, the judge appeared interested and occasionally glanced up at Ms. Smith. After a 
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moment, the judge looked at the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, there are three allegations 
in this petition.  
“First, Hailey was found home alone without adult supervision.” 
“Second, Hailey is left home alone for an hour each day five days a week.”  
“Third, the kitchen was dirty, and dirty dishes were also on the kitchen counter and 
table.” 
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they 
had anything to add. They both declined.  
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her 
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your 
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can 
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to 
explain the situation from her own perspective.” 
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law requires that I allow Ms. Smith 
to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective custody 
hearing is to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are allowed to provide 
information at this hearing. Ms. Smith has a right to provide her own perspective, so that 
I may consider it in deciding Hailey’s placement. I can hear her testimony now.” 
 
The mother then described her side of the story to the judge. 
 
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any 
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this 
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and 
Human Services.”  
The judge turned to Ms. Smith, and said rather gently, “Ms. Smith, this means that I have 
ordered that Hailey live outside of your home for the time being. I have made this 
decision based on what I believe to be in Hailey’s best interests. Based on what I have 
read in this petition, I believe that you have not taken appropriate care of Hailey, and 
that she is not safe in your home. Ms. Smith, do you have any questions about what has 
happened here today?”  
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.” 
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Appendix E. Protective Custody Hearing Findings And Order 
This document is the judge’s official order at the end of the protective custody hearing. It 
formalizes the decision the judge made during the hearing, including whether the child should 
remain out of her mother’s home or return home pending the next hearing. 
 
IN THE SEPARATE JUVENILE COURT 
IN THE INTEREST OF   )   DOC. 9128 NO. 23 
     ) 
HAILEY SMITH   ) 
     ) 
Child Under Eighteen Years of Age )   FINDINGS AND ORDER 
 
 Now on the 20th day of January, 2004, the above-captioned matter came on for Protective 
Custody hearing before the undersigned Judge of the Separate Juvenile Court upon a Petition 
filed herein January 15, 2009. Appearing were Sarah Smith, the child’s mother, with counsel, 
Colleen Wilson; Becky Cassidy, Department of Health and Human Services; and Sally Marlon, 
Deputy County Attorney. 
 Being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds: 
 That further detention of the above-named child is a matter of immediate and urgent 
necessity for the protection of said child. 
 That continued placement in the residence is contrary to the child’s welfare because the 
house was found in a dirty condition and the child was found alone without adult supervision. 
 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the child herein be and is hereby placed in the 
temporary custody of the Department of Health and Human Services for placement, pending 
further proceedings herein. 
 Signed and dates this 15th date of January, 2009. 
         BY THE COURT: 
       JUDGE JONES, Separate Juvenile Court 
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Appendix F. Measures 
Below are all measures that I asked participants to complete. Here, all items are grouped 
according to construct with the construct clearly identified, but participants did not see 
the construct labels.
 
Manipulation Checks 
Directions: Below is a series of statements about the case file that you just read. Some 
statements have number scales below them. For these statements, please circle the 
number that best indicates how you feel about the case. The rest of the statements are 
True/False. For these, please mark whether you think the statement is True or False. 
Role induction 
1. Before you read the case, I asked you to evaluate it from one of the following 
perspectives. Please select the perspective you were assigned:  
 County Attorney 
 Parent’s Attorney 
 Judge 
 Parent 
 
 eglect severity 
1. This was a serious case of neglect. 
ot serious at all             very serious 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. Hailey was living in a harmful environment with her mother. 
ot harmful at all           very harmful 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Hailey was living in a dirty home. 
ot dirty at all             very dirty 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. Hailey was home alone when she was removed and taken into custody.  
 True 
 False 
 
Procedural Justice 
1. The mother was given an opportunity to present her story at the hearing.  
 True 
 False 
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2. The judge had no choice about whether to let the mother present her story at the 
hearing.  
 True 
 False 
Interactional Justice 
1. The judge expressed disapproval of the mother.  
o disapproval at all      A lot of disapproval 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. The judge explained his decision to the mother. 
o explanation at all    A lot of explanation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Decision  
 
1. The judge returned Hailey to her mother’s home at the end of the hearing.  
 True 
 False 
 
Justice Perceptions 
The next set of questions refers to your perceptions of the Protective Custody Hearing 
procedures and outcome. Please read each question and indicate the extent to which the 
content of each question happened or did not happen. 
Procedural Justice 
The following items refer to the process used during the hearing to arrive at the decision. 
To what extent: 
1. Was the mother able to express her views and feelings during the hearing 
procedure?  
2. Did the mother have influence over the decision being made during the hearing 
procedure?  
3. Was the hearing procedure free of bias?  
4. Was the hearing procedure based on accurate information?  
5. Did the hearing procedure uphold ethical and moral standards?  
6. Was the process used to make the decision during the hearing fair? (global) 
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Interactional Justice/Interpersonal  
The following items refer to the judge at the hearing. To what extent: 
1. Did the judge treat the mother in a polite manner? 
2. Did the judge treat the mother with dignity?  
3. Did the judge treat the mother with respect?  
4. Did the judge refrain from improper remarks or comments?  
Interactional Justice/Informational  
The following items refer to the judge at the hearing. To what extent: 
1. Was the judge candid in his communications with the mother?  
2. Did the judge explain his decision thoroughly?  
3. Did the judge explain the procedures thoroughly?  
4. Were the judge’s explanations about the hearing procedures and decision 
reasonable?  
5. Did the judge treat the mother fairly during the hearing? (global interactional) 
 Distributive Justice 
The following items refer to the outcome of the hearing. In other words, the following 
items refer to the decision made at the end of hearing. To what extent: 
1. Did the judge’s decision reflect what the mother deserved? 
2. Was the judge’s decision appropriate given the situation? 
3. Was the judge’s decision justified given what the mother had done? 
4. Was the hearing outcome fair? (global) 
 
Justice Outcomes 
For the next set of statements, think about the outcome of this hearing and how you think 
the case will ultimately end. Read each statement and indicate the extent to which you 
disagree or agree. 
 
Disagree completely        Agree 
completely 
1         2           3  4  5  6  7 
Decision Satisfaction and Approval 
How much do you agree with these items about the judge’s decision? 
1. The judge’s decision was acceptable. 
2. I am satisfied with the judge’s decision. 
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3. The mother should be satisfied with the judge’s decision. 
4. I agreed with the judge’s decision at the end of the hearing. 
 
Leader Evaluation  
How much do you agree with these items about the judge? 
1. The judge was a good judge.  
2. I really liked the judge. 
3. The judge did a good job at this hearing. 
4. I respect this judge. 
 
Legal Compliance 
How much do you agree with these statements about the future of the case? 
1. The mother will try to follow the rules of her case plan. 
2. The mother will attend her next hearing on time. 
3. The mother will follow the orders the judge gave her. 
4. In the end, the mother will be reunited with her daughter. 
 
Collective Esteem 
Same three items as Respect (below). 
 
Identity Judgments 
 
ow, think about the mother in this case. Read these questions and indicate how much 
you disagree or agree with each statement. 
Disagree completely        Agree 
completely 
1       2  3  4  5  6  7 
Respect 
How much do you agree with these items about the mother? 
1. If most people knew the mother well, they would respect her values. (respect) 
2. If most people knew the mother well, they would think highly of her 
accomplishments. (respect) 
3. If most people knew the mother well, they would approve of how she lives her 
life. (respect) 
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Pride 
How much do you agree with these items about the mother? 
1. The mother is proud to think of herself as a parent. 
2. When someone praises parents as a group, the mother feels that praise is a 
personal compliment to her.  
3. The mother talks up being a parent to her friends. 
 
Identity 
How much do you agree with these items about the mother? 
1. Being a parent says a lot about who the mother is as a person. 
2. When something goes wrong as a parent, the mother feels a personal 
responsibility to fix it. 
3. Being a parent is important to the way the mother thinks of herself. 
4. When someone from outside criticizes the mother’s problems as a parent, it feels 
like a personal insult. 
 
Societal Costs and Benefits 
Disagree completely        Agree 
completely 
1       2  3  4  5  6  7 
Respect for Parents’ Rights 
 
How much do you disagree or agree with each of these statements? 
1. In general, removal of children from their homes is an infringement on parents’ 
rights. 
2. In this case, removing the child from her mother’s home was an infringement of 
her mother’s rights. 
3. In general, child protection court hearings infringe on parents’ rights. 
4. In this case, the child protection court hearing infringed on the mother’s rights. 
 
Magnitude of Threat 
How much do you disagree or agree with each of these statements? 
1. Child neglect is a big problem in our society. 
2. In this case, I am worried about the mother’s behavior that led to the removal of 
her child from her home. 
3. I am worried about the extent of child neglect in our society. 
4. Child neglect is a big risk to children’s safety and wellbeing. 
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5. In this case, the mother’s behavior was a threat to Hailey’s safety and wellbeing. 
6. In cases like this, our society should be worried about the children involved. 
 
Efficacy of the Intervention 
How much do you disagree or agree with each of these statements? 
1. When child protective services intervenes, the risk of child neglect is effectively 
reduced. 
2. Child protective services is an effective intervention system. 
3. Removing children from their homes is a good strategy to prevent the harms of 
child neglect. 
4. Court hearings are effective at reducing the risks and harms of child neglect. 
5. Court hearings are effective at reducing the amount of child neglect in our society. 
 
Attitudes about Fairness of Child Removal 
How much do you disagree or agree with each of these statements? 
1. In this case, the way that the child was removed from her home was fair. 
2. In this case, removing the child from her home was a fair response to the 
situation. 
3. In general, we use fair procedures to remove children from their homes in this 
society. 
4. I approve of the procedures our society uses to remove children from their homes. 
 
Demographics 
These are the final questions. Please answer the following questions about yourlsef. 
 
1. What is your age (in years)? 
 _________ years 
 
 
2. Which gender do you identify with?  
 Male 
 Female 
 Transgender 
 Prefer not to say 
 
3. Which racial group do you most identify with? 
 Non-Hispanic White/European-American 
 Black/African-American American 
162 
 
 Hispanic 
 Asian/Pacific-Islander 
 Prefer not to say 
 
4. How liberal or conservative are you? 
      Very liberal       Very conservative 
1       2  3  4  5  6  7 
5. Do you have children:  
 Yes 
 No 
If yes: These questions should only be answered if you have children. If you 
do not have children this page and were sent to this page, just scroll to the 
bottom and click “next.” 
 
How many children do you have? _________________________ 
Please list the ages in years of each child. If you have more than five children, 
enter the ages of your five youngest children. __________________________ 
Do you currently have full physical custody of all of your minor (non-adult) 
children? 
 Yes 
 No 
If no: 
If you do not have full custody, how long (in years) has it been since you 
did not have custody. If you have never had custody, enter “never.” 
_______________________ 
If you do not have fully custody, who does?  
 Other parent 
 Other relative 
 Foster parent 
 Other: _____________________ 
If you do not have full custody, why not? Please explain briefly. 
________________________________ 
